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 i 
ABSTRACT 
Despite the fact that “making considerations in context” or “putting things into context” is something 
that happens regularly in normal people’s daily life, it remains a question for the academia and 
industry that how to escalate such intuitive way of thinking to a scientific methodology for the 
introduction of context awareness to benefit the security assurance in automatized processes. Aiming 
to answer this question, the following three research challenges are derived for this dissertation: 1) 
How to collect and organise useful information that constitutes security related context? 2) What is the 
general context modelling methodology that can be used to address various security issues in 
sophisticated data processing systems? 3) How to evaluate the context models, especially from the 
security point of view? 
Addressing these research challenges, the dissertation focuses on using context modelling to 
help solve security issues in data processing, where the security requirements are clarified on the 
system level and realised on the data level. For the first time, a theoretical framework is constructed 
for the security-oriented context modelling, defining a formalised description of security context and 
specifying it to guide the contextualisation of the security requirements on both levels. The framework 
is then further applied on two selected application scenarios, namely digital long-term archiving and 
forensic dactyloscopy, to develop context models either for a data processing system, or a series of 
data processing procedures, addressing security requirements on the corresponding levels. These two 
instantiations justify the applicability of the theoretical framework, and the resulting models show the 
benefit of introducing the context awareness regarding to the security assurance.  
The system level instantiation of security framework for digital long-term archive closes the 
gap of security concerns that have existed for a long time in the corresponding state of the art, 
whereas the data level separation approach of overlapped latent fingerprints achieves security 
improvements in multiple aspects, regarding not only the error rate of the separation result but also 
the non-repudiation of the whole approach. 
Additionally, the dissertation also discusses the evaluation metrics for the context models as 
well as their application on the two instantiations. It derives scenario-unspecific criteria for the quality 
assessment and identifies several principles that unite existing scenario-specific evaluation methods 
for the performance assessment. At last, a general methodology is presented, summarising the 
modelling process and identifying its nature of being an iterative progress: in case that a changing 
application scenario introduces new context, the modelling process evolves with the evolvement of 
the context, so does its evaluation. 
Despite the above contributions, there are still unclosed gaps regarding both the theory and 
the practices, which are beyond the possible coverage of one single dissertation. Therefore, several 
paths for future work are also identified at the end of this dissertation. 
Abstract 
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DEUTSCHSPRACHIGE VERSION DES ABSTRACT 
Trotz der Tatsache, dass im Alltagsleben unablässig „Überlegungen in einem bestimmten Kontext 
erfolgen“ oder „Dinge oder Angelegenheiten in einen Kontext gestellt werden“ bleibt es für die 
Wissenschaft und Industrie eine Herausforderung eine derartige intuitive Herangehensweise zu einer 
wissenschaftlichen Methodologie aufzuwerten um Kontextbewusstsein als Mittel zur Gewährleistung 
von Sicherheit in automatisierten Prozessen einzuführen. Um diese Fragestellung zu beantworten 
werden in dieser Dissertation daher drei Forschungsaufgaben angegangen: 1) Wie können nützliche 
Informationen, die zu einem sicherheitsbezogenen Kontext beitragen, eingesammelt und organisiert 
werden? 2) Welches ist eine allgemein nutzbare Methodologie für die Kontextmodellierung mit der 
unterschiedliche Sicherheitsfragen in komplexen Datenverarbeitungssystemen adressiert werden 
können? 3) Wie können Kontextmodelle evaluiert werden, insbesondere im Hinblick auf Sicherheit? 
Um diese Forschungsaufgaben zu adressieren wird sich diese Dissertation auf den Einsatz 
von Kontextmodellierung konzentrieren um Sicherheitsfragen in der Datenverarbeitung zu lösen, bei 
denen die Sicherheitsanforderungen erst auf der Systemebene geklärt und dann auf der Datenebene 
umgesetzt werden. Zum ersten Mal wird dabei ein theoretisches Rahmenwerk für 
sicherheitsorientierte Kontextmodellierung geschaffen, das eine formalisierte Beschreibung des 
Sicherheitskontexts definiert, als auch eine Anleitung wie dies zur Kontextualisierung der 
Sicherheitsanforderungen auf beiden Ebenen genutzt werden kann. Das Rahmenwerk wird weiterhin 
auf zwei ausgewählte Anwendungsszenarien angewandt – digitale Langzeitarchivierung und 
forensische Daktyloskopie – um Kontextmodelle für ein Datenverarbeitungssystem als auch 
Datenverarbeitungsprozeduren zu entwickeln, die Sicherheitsanforderungen auf den entsprechenden 
Ebenen adressieren. Beide Anwendungsfälle zeigen die Anwendbarkeit und Vorteile des 
theoretischen Rahmenwerks zur Gewährleistung von Sicherheit durch Kontextbewusstsein auf.  
Die Anwendung des Sicherheitsrahmenwerks auf Systemebene für digitale Langzeitarchive 
schließt eine Lücke von Sicherheitsbedenken die seit langem im Stand der Technik existiert, während 
der Ansatz zur Separierung von überlagerten latenten Fingerabdrücken auf der Datenebene 
Sicherheitsverbesserungen in mehreren Aspekten bringt, so bei den Fehlerraten der 
Separierungsergebnisse oder bei der Nichtabstreitbarkeit des gesamten Ansatzes. 
Zusätzlich diskutiert die Dissertation Evaluationsmetriken für Kontextmodelle als auch deren 
Anwendbarkeit auf beide Anwendungsfälle. Dabei werden universelle Kriterien zur 
Qualitätsbestimmung hergeleitet, sowie mehrere Prinzipien identifiziert um existierende 
anwendungsspezifische Evaluationsmethoden zur Performanzbestimmung zu vereinen. 
Abschließend wird eine allgemeine Methodologie vorgestellt um den Modellierungsprozess 
zusammenzufassen und dessen Natur als iterativen Prozess zu identifizieren: sollte ein sich 
veränderndes Anwendungsszenario einen neuen Kontext einführen, so entwickelt sich der 
Modellierungsprozess wie auch dessen Evaluierung mit der Entwicklung des Kontexts mit. 
Trotz der zuvor genannten Beiträge werden dennoch Lücken in Theorie und Praxis 
verbleiben, die außerhalb des möglichen Rahmens einer einzelnen Dissertation liegen. Daher werden 
am Ende dieser Arbeit mehrere Anknüpfungspunkte für zukünftige Arbeiten aufgezeigt. 
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1 MOTIVATION AND INTRODUCTION  
Just like architects use their blueprints for building skyscrapers, for decades computer scientists and 
IT specialists have been applying modelling for guiding and assisting the construction of sophisticated 
data processing systems. However, just like error and negligence in the blueprints could be fatal for 
the skyscrapers, error and negligence in scientific models could also fail the resulting system. 
In early 1990s the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) experienced an 
awkward and frustrating digital dark age. The scientists there realised that huge amounts of data 
collected during various space projects in the 1960s could not be accessed, as they not only were 
poorly archived but also stored in obsolete formats and required obsolete machinery [Blakeslee1990]. 
Despite the fact that NASA has learned its lesson and adopted HDF5 since 1993 as the standard file 
format for storing data collected in its projects to avoid similar problems [FC2004], it was still 
unavoidable for NASA to have to allocate lots of extra manpower and funds to sort out the old data 
and retrieve useful information. 
In August 2012 the charge was dismissed against a fugitive doctor involved in USA’s largest 
prosecution of pharmacies, as the volume of evidence posed a huge burden for the case staying open. 
The two terabytes electronic evidence confiscated from the doctor’s IT systems took up 5% of the 
worldwide electronic storage available at this time to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
and they were accompanied by several hundred boxes of paper containing 440,000 documents to be 
digitised, plus dozens of computers and servers [Pfeiffer2012]. As DEA’s evidence archive was never 
designed for such huge amount of data, its capacities and procedures showed severe limitations to 
adequately process the evidence of this case [Nye2012].  
These two exemplary events are both typical examples that large-scale IT systems fail in 
processing their data, and the reason behind both system failure events can be fundamentally induced 
as the application of inadequate modelling, i.e. the modelling applied fails to recognise and adapt for 
the evolved context, which can be loosely understood here as any relevant information from the 
discussed scenario. A further specified and formalised definition of context is provided in subsection 
2.1.2. 
Table 1 describes the inadequate modelling in both events by analysing and comparing the 
modelled objects, the evolved context that the modelling failed to address, and the consequence that 
the failure caused. In the first event, NASA’s data archive failed to handle the data obsolescence 
situation, and it caused the security compromise in the aspect of availability, i.e. the resources can no 
longer be used or accessed even by authorised entities. Although NASA took corresponding measures 
to alleviate future problems, the already caused loss was unfortunately still lost and can only be 
gradually recovered by slow, inefficient and costly manual work. As for the second event, there is a 
deeper reasoning than the simply lack of storage space. In fact it is hard to believe that even in the 
year of 2012 two terabytes of electronic data would still cause so much trouble for law enforcement. 
As Eric Pfeiffer wrote in his article that covered this dramatic incident [Pfeiffer2012], “an external hard 
drive with a terabyte of storage can be easily purchased online at outlets like Best Buy for around 
$100.” This narrative might be true, however what it implies is actually not feasible: any law 
1 Motivation and introduction 
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enforcement agency shall not simply purchase external hard drives to store and preserve electronic 
evidence, due to the rigorous legal and technical requirements on how the evidence shall be properly 
and securely processed. It is clear that the infrastructure of the DEA evidence archive, including not 
only its capacities but also specific processing procedures, was not capable of handling the large 
amount of data with sufficient security assurance. Therefore, the security compromise in this event 
lies not only in the aspect of availability, but at least also in the aspects of authenticity and integrity, and 
as the security compromise in those aspects could be fatal for the processing of evidence, it eventually 
caused the case dismissal in 2012. The definitions of the security aspects mentioned in this paragraph, 
e.g. availability, authenticity, and integrity, are provided in subsection 2.3.1. 
 
Modelled object 
Evolved context failed to be 
addressed 
Consequence 
Exemplary 
event 1 
NASA data archive  Substandard data formats and 
required processing environments 
which become obsolete over time 
Security compromise 
causing extra manpower 
and funds 
Exemplary 
event 2 
DEA evidence archiving 
capacities and procedures 
developed in 80s and 90s 
Complications caused by huge 
amount of electronic evidence 
Security compromise 
leading to case dismissal 
Table 1. Analysis of the inadequate modelling in both events 
To sum up, as revealed by Table 1, both events would not have happened if the modelling 
approaches involved had context awareness, i.e. if context modelling were applied to address evolving 
context in the first place. The preceding mentioned concepts, namely modelling, context and context 
modelling, together with various security aspects and goals, are further described in Chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, we are indeed living a digital era, which certainly leads to an exponentially 
growing amount of electronic data. The lesson learned from NASA is that context awareness needs to 
be considered as early as possible in system modelling, if not from the ever beginning. However, the 
dismissed prosecution against the fugitive doctor reflects the salient lack of methods of introducing 
context awareness for IT security in specific application scenarios, e.g. the need of processing large 
amounts of data in secure manners. The potential solution for the security compromises in these two 
events is further presented in Chapter 4. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: based on the preceding introduction, section 
1.1 specifies the problems that this dissertation tackles, and then section 1.2 introduces the approach 
that this dissertation applies and goals that it addresses, after that section 1.3 describes the scientific 
contribution of this dissertation, at last section 1.4 outlines the rest of the dissertation. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Figure 1 shows a generalised data processing system – the system takes in data as input, processes it 
and then outputs the processed data. Data processing on any scale, from the simplest data processing 
procedure to the most sophisticated data processing system, including the systems involved in 
preceding introduced events, can always be generalised to this illustration.  
  
Figure 1. A general data processing system with input and output 
System 
Data Data Data 
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In real world application scenarios, it is common that a sophisticated data processing system 
complicates its security requirements. Take the event with the failing DEA evidence archive 
introduced earlier as an example: when the processed data is specified as (potential) digital evidence 
and the system as an evidence archive, not only would various security requirements be raised 
accordingly for the processed data itself, the system in general should also be capable of handling 
evolved context with security assurance, e.g. addressing new types of evidence data, upgraded 
security levels, or simply huge amounts of data like in the introduced event.  
Therefore, the general problem that this dissertation addresses is how to introduce context 
awareness into the modelling methodology for sophisticated data processing systems to meet 
various security requirements. To sufficiently address such general problem, the dissertation focuses 
on resolving the following general research challenges:  
1) How to collect and organise useful information that constitutes security related context? 
In specific, how does the application scenario influence the handling of its information? 
What information should be considered as relevant hence context? How to formalise and 
interpret different types of context? How to reveal and meet the security requirements 
from the application scenario in it? 
2) What is the general context modelling methodology that can be used to address various 
security issues in sophisticated data processing systems? In specific, what are the 
general modelling steps towards security context awareness? How to specify these 
modelling steps in various application scenarios? What happens to the modelling steps if 
the application scenario tends to be dynamic, instead of static? 
3) How to evaluate the context models, especially from the security point of view? In 
specific, what specific properties that the context models should be evaluated on? How to 
generate evaluation metrics to assess these properties? What is the relationship between 
the application scenario and the evaluation metrics? How to apply such evaluation 
metrics? 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
To resolve the research challenges identified in section 1.1, it is necessary for this dissertation to at 
least achieve the following series of research objectives: 
1) Clarification and formulation of relevant concepts: As the first step, relevant concepts 
need to be clarified and formulated. A thorough study is performed on the general state of 
the art on modelling, context and context modelling. Furthermore, the general security 
aspects and goals summarised in the state of the art are also identified. Based on these, the 
concepts of security context and security-oriented context modelling are derived, formulated, 
and specified, to form a theoretical framework. This objective directly addresses research 
challenges 1) and 2) identified in section 1.1.  
2) Induction towards the constitution of security context and eventually the methodology: 
As general methodology is usually derived from specific applications, the state of the art 
on the two selected application scenarios (digital long-term preservation and digital 
dactyloscopy) needs to be studied and introduced. On this basis, in both application 
scenarios, it is demonstrated that how context models can be generated and applied to 
tackle various security issues. Combined with the derived concepts, the constitution of 
security context and the general methodology of security-oriented context modelling are 
further induced. This objective also addresses research challenges 1) and 2). 
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3) Proposal and utilisation of evaluation metrics: To assess security-oriented context 
models, evaluation metrics need to be proposed and utilised, covering the assessments 
from following two angles: a) the general quality of a derived model itself, and b) the 
performance of the derived model regarding its application in the specific application 
scenario. The metrics on both a) and b) should be compatible with existing evaluation 
criteria and methods, for the sake of universality and reproducibility. This objective 
directly addresses research challenge 3). 
1.3 SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
As the general solution to the problem described in section 1.1 and at the same time the core scientific 
contribution, this dissertation presents the concept of security-oriented context modelling. This 
concept is introduced, formulated, specified, further applied and eventually assessed; on both system 
and data levels, which are the two levels of granularity where this dissertation employs to analyse the 
security concerns of a sophisticated data processing system: On the system level, the infrastructure of 
the system must be security compliant, i.e. the system components must be designed to function in 
conformity with the security requirements imposed by security policies. On the data level, the data is 
processed either within a system component or among multiple ones, so there are also various 
security requirements for the corresponding processing procedures. Take the example of the digital 
evidence archive from section 1.1 again: for such system the security requirements can be defined 
either on the system level, e.g. the evidence must be securely managed, or on the data level, e.g. the 
integrity of a particular piece of evidence must be verified. Therefore, as illustrated by Figure 2, in this 
dissertation context modelling is applied respectively on the system and data levels, addressing 
security issues on both levels. 
 
Figure 2. Context modelling applied on the general data processing system to address system and data level 
security 
Specifically, surrounding the concept of security-oriented context modelling, the scientific 
contributions that this dissertation makes can be further categorised as primary and secondary ones. 
The primary contributions include: 
1) A theoretical framework is developed for the conception of security-oriented context 
modelling. Within the range of this framework, a series of concepts are derived and 
formulated, including scientific modelling, general context modelling, and eventually security-
oriented context modelling. A series of meta-models are developed for them, acknowledging 
their key constitutions, especially with emphasis of the concept of security context. The 
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dissertation also investigates how the nature of security context differs on the system and 
data level, so the framework is further extended correspondingly, forming specific meta-
models for security-oriented context modelling on both levels. The framework also 
comprises a descriptive scheme, which serves not only for the application of the context 
model, but also together with the other parts of the framework as the basis of the 
generalised modelling methodology described later.  
2) Two exemplary instantiations are presented respectively on system and data levels, 
where digital long-term preservation and digital dactyloscopy are selected respectively as 
the demonstrative application scenarios. The concepts on both levels within the 
theoretical framework are projected thus further specified in the application scenarios, 
showing how the context is collected, interpreted, and organised in both cases. 
Furthermore, the resulting context models are evaluated using existing methods, 
reflecting the advantage brought by the introduction of the context awareness. As such, 
not only these two instantiations serve as exemplary cases for future applications, the 
applicability of the proposed theoretical framework is also verified. 
3) As it is essential to verify the security assurance of the generated context models within 
their lifetime, this dissertation presents the development of their evaluation metrics on 
two domains: First, a set of general criteria are derived on a general scenario-unspecific 
domain based on the state of the art, so the quality assessment metrics can be generated 
and applied. Second, the basic principles of developing scenario-specific evaluation 
metrics are also summarised, so the performance assessment metrics can be 
correspondingly derived, encompassing the existing evaluation methods. The dissertation 
summarises following properties, that the metrics on both domains shall possess: a) the 
metrics are able to reflect the security level that the models achieve on both system and 
data levels, e.g. security aspects to cover, security goals to meet, etc.; b) the metrics differ 
on system and data level, due to the different nature of context on these two levels; c) the 
metrics are applied regularly through the life time of the context models to handle the 
evolution of context, i.e. they enable routine evaluation on the context model thus are able 
to determine when it needs to evolve or even be replaced; d) the metrics can also evolve if 
needed, to absorb emerging new criteria, including those with no particular emphasis 
regarding security, so the metrics and even be extended to evaluate context models in 
general. Furthermore, the dissertation also demonstrates the proposed scenario-unspecific 
evaluation metrics by applying them on the generated context models from the two 
instantiation examples, so their evaluation can be completed. 
4) Based on the above three primary contributions, a first generalised methodology of 
security-oriented context modelling is developed, summarising the preceding 
instantiations on system and data levels. The methodology is designed, applied and 
extended for further application scenarios: on the system level, it can be the guidance for 
either system modelling towards a future system with context awareness, or introducing 
context awareness to an already existing system; whereas on the data level it aims at a 
thorough description on how the relevant data objects is processed with context 
awareness, serving for particular security requirements. The methodology summarises 
how the modelling process proceeds from raw information from the application scenario 
to the final constructed context model together with other contents in its descriptive 
scheme. More importantly, it points out that under the circumstance of evolving scenario, 
how the modelling process should also correspondingly evolve, with regard to a 
simultaneously evolving evaluation process.  
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Besides the above presented primary contributions, the dissertation also makes the following 
secondary contributions: 
1) As the system level instantiation of security-oriented context modelling, this dissertation 
develops a security framework for digital long-term preservation. Taking into 
consideration the security-related issues revealed in the OAIS 
standards [OAIS2002] [OAIS2009], security context is extracted and a “top-down” context 
modelling approach is applied, yielding a context model as a prototype of such security 
framework. As the context in the framework is eventually interpreted by policies, a four-
level policy hierarchy is proposed for policy management, together with an enhanced 
solution for security policy generation, implementation and enforcement. The dissertation 
also illustrates with a specific application example, demonstrating that the proposed 
framework is appropriate for its application on a security-oriented archival system, which 
a) can be constructed with reasonable storage solution for huge amounts of data, b) 
ensures specific security requirements using specific policies, c) manages large amounts of 
security policies reflecting its high complexity using policy hierarchy, and d) bears context 
awareness so the system evolves itself with evolving context (e.g. obsolescence issue) by 
introducing and adopting new policies while abolishing old policies if necessary and at 
the same time invoking a complete audit trail, therefore can pose as a solution for the 
salient need of electronic evidence archive. Furthermore, selected part of state-of-the-art 
assessment framework is also applied on the developed context model, so its security 
coverage is analysed. 
2) As the data level instantiation of security-oriented context modelling, this dissertation 
develops a separation approach of overlapped latent fingerprints for forensic 
dactyloscopy. The state-of-the-art approaches serving the similar purpose show apparent 
drawbacks in various aspects, especially regarding the need from the forensic scenario. 
Therefore, in this dissertation, the development of the approach starts with presenting a 
series of security rules to summarise the requirements to regulate the approach in the 
forensic scenario. With the objective to meet the requirements, a “bottom-up” context 
modelling approach is utilised, with the gradual elimination of redundancy in the context, 
resulting the context-based separation approach. Following the theoretical framework, the 
approach identifies and specifies the different types of context in both acquisition and 
processing environments, yielding the implementation of an enhanced separation 
algorithm with optimised parameters. The approach is evaluated both subjectively (based 
on the derived security rules) and objectively (with an investigation of the error rate on 
generated test sets), showing the advantage introduced by the context awareness. 
The following figure illustrates the nexus between the general problem raised from the 
motivation and tackled by this dissertation, the specific research challenges that this dissertation 
addresses, the research objectives that it aims at, and the primary/secondary scientific contributions 
that it achieves. 
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Figure 3. A summary and overview of the nexus between the general problem, research challenges, research 
objectives and primary/secondary scientific contributions of this dissertation 
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theoretical framework derived in Chapter 3. Section 2.3 covers the basic concepts of IT security, 
together with the state of the art relevant to the application of context modelling for IT security. After 
that, section 2.4 describes the state of the art of the application of context modelling in digital long-
term preservation, serving as the fundamentals of the system level instantiation in Chapter 4. Section 
2.5 introduces the state of the art of the application of context modelling in digital dactyloscopy, 
serving as the fundamentals of the data level instantiation in Chapter 5. At last, section 2.6 summarises 
the whole chapter and analyses the research gaps revealed by the state of the art it introduces. 
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the data level the concept of primary and secondary context in both acquisition and processing 
environments are defined, yielding the effective execution of security mechanisms. After that, Section 
3.3 proposes a descriptive scheme to further approach the application of security-oriented context 
model. Section 3.4 summarises the whole chapter in the end. 
Chapter 4 applies the theoretical framework of security-oriented context modelling proposed 
in Chapter 3 in the scenario of digital long-term preservation. At the same time, it also serves as a 
system level instantiation, which contributes to the general methodology summarised in Chapter 6. 
Section 4.1 designs a contextualisation framework, which applies the theoretical conception to collect, 
interpret, and organise security context, which eventually functions in the form of security policies on 
various levels. Section 4.2 provides a specific application of the designed framework to show how it 
works. Section 4.3 demonstrates an exemplary assessment on the application described in section 4.2. 
At last, section 4.4 summarises the whole chapter. 
Chapter 5 also applies the theoretical framework of security-oriented context modelling 
introduced in Chapter 3, but in the scenario of digital dactyloscopy. Similar to Chapter 4, it serves as a 
data level instantiation, which also contributes to the general methodology summarised in Chapter 6. 
Section 5.1 proposes a context-based separation approach for overlapped latent fingerprints. It 
contextualises the forensic scenario that the separation is supposed to be conducted, specifies the 
various types of context defined by the conception, and derive a context-aware algorithm as well as its 
optimised parameters for the particular non-invasively acquired high-resolution samples to be 
processed in the scenario. Section 5.2 generates corresponding test sets and applies the evaluation on 
them for the derived algorithm with the optimised parameters. Section 5.3 further subjectively 
assesses the security coverage of the derived approach. At last, section 5.4 summarises the chapter. 
Chapter 6 discusses the evaluation metrics of the security-oriented context models and 
summarises the general methodology of security-oriented context modelling. Based on the theoretical 
framework proposed in Chapter 3, as well as the two instantiations described in Chapter 4 and 5, 
section 6.1 tackles the evaluation issue from two angles: First, it proposes a series of criteria that 
constitutes the scenario-unspecific evaluation metrics to assess the quality of context models, so the 
context models derived in Chapter 4 and 5 can be evaluated accordingly; Second, it also summarises 
the basic principles for the development of scenario-specific evaluation metrics for the assessment of 
the performance of context models, with which the evaluations conducted in Chapter 4 and 5 
conform. After that, section 6.2 generalises the presented models and modelling approaches and 
induces a general methodology, following which in further application scenarios proper context 
models can be generated with security assurance. 
Chapter 7 concludes the whole dissertation and discusses the future work. Section 7.1 
summarise the dissertation, yielding the conclusions. Section 7.2 analyses the gaps still to be closes 
within the range of this dissertation and suggests some feasible directions for future works. 
The following Figure 4 illustrates the nexus within the main body (i.e. Chapter 2, 3, 4, 5 and 
Chapter 6, excluding the summary sections, which trivially summaries their own chapters, 
respectively) of this dissertation for better clarification. 
Context modelling for IT security in selected application scenarios 
 
 9 
 
Figure 4. The nexus within the main body of the dissertation 
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2 FUNDAMENTALS AND STATE OF THE ART 
This chapter introduces the fundamentals which directly contribute to the theoretical framework 
derived in Chapter 3 and are reflected by the general methodology and evaluation metrics in Chapter 
6. It also introduces related state of the art, based on which the work in Chapter 4 and 5 is developed.  
The chapter starts in section 2.1 with a brief introduction on the basic concepts of modelling 
and context. Then it is followed in section 2.2 by the state of the art on context modelling in general, 
covering its original motivation, theories as well as existing applications. After that section 2.3 gives 
the basic concepts regarding IT security and summarises the existing examples of applying context 
modelling for IT security. As two instantiations will be demonstrated, first in Chapter 4 for digital 
long-term preservation and then in Chapter 5 for digital dactyloscopy, section 2.4 and 2.5 respectively 
introduces the state of the art in these two application scenarios. At last, section 2.6 summarises the 
previous sections to clarify the connection between this chapter and following chapters and identify 
the gaps revealed in the current state of the art and to be closed in this dissertation. 
2.1 MODELLING AND CONTEXT 
Before digging into the concept of context modelling, it is necessary to briefly clarify the fundamental 
concepts of modelling and context in this section. 
2.1.1 What is modelling? 
The word model is originally referred to as three-dimensional representation of a person or thing or a 
proposed structure and later extended to an abstract description of a system or process to assist 
calculations and predictions [Oxford2013a]. For hundreds of years models have been pervading in 
various aspects in our society to represent physical objects and phenomena as well as abstract 
concepts and theories. As either the activity of making three-dimensional models or devising/use of 
abstract models, modelling approaches usually vary depending on the specific type of the model. 
In many scientific disciplines, models are used to explain and predict the behaviour of real 
objects or systems, and scientific modelling is referred to as the generation of scientific models, which are 
physical, conceptual or mathematical representation of real phenomena that usually are difficult to 
observe directly [Britannica2013a]. Scientists benefit from scientific models by applying them to better 
understand or operate with those being modelled, which are also known as modelling targets, as Frigg 
and Hartman introduces in [FH2012]. Depending on the nature of the modelling targets, scientific 
models can represent a selected part of the world (i.e. model of phenomena or data) and/or a theory 
(i.e. interpretation of the laws and axioms of the theory) [FH2012]. 
The model of phenomena has been extensively studied in the past decades, addressing mainly 
two problems. The first problem is the fundamental philosophical explanation of what a model is, 
scientifically [FH2012], and it is addressed in the recent literature including [Bailer-Jones2003], 
[Suárez2003], [Giere2004], [Suárez2004], [vanFrassen2004], [Frigg2006], [SS2006], [Contessa2007], 
[Morrison2009], [Knuuttila2009], [Suárez2009], [Elgin2010], [Frigg2010], [Thomson-Jones2010], 
[Toon2010], [Toon2011], and [Toon2012]. The second problem is how to general or select the proper 
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representation styles according to specific circumstances [FH2012], and it is discussed in the literature 
such as [Peirce1931-1958], [Black1962], [Hesse1963], [Achinstein1968], [McMullin1968] [Ackerlof1970], 
[Hesse1974], [GV1978], [Redhead1980], [vanFrassen1980], [Musgrave1981], [McMullin1985], 
[Mundy1986], [Giere1988], [Cartwright1989], [Kroes1989], [Laymon1991], [Swoyer1991], [HT1995], 
[Psillos1995], [Teller2001], [BB2002], [Suppes2002], [DF2003], and [Giere2004]. While the specific 
content of those studies are not directly connected to the focus of this dissertation, it should be pointed 
out here that, despite the broadness of the studies in this field, no unanimous systematic account has 
ever been reached regarding all the proposed different ways in which models can relate to reality and 
of how these ways compare to each other [FH2012]. Therefore, there is little endeavour towards any 
potential formalised way of representing such models, and it is similar situation in the studies of the 
model of data. Despite the concept was proposed a few decades ago (see [Suppes1962]) and there have 
been enough follow-up studies (see [Laymon1982], [FS1994], [Mayo1996], [Galison1997], [Harris2003], 
and [Staley2004]), there is no broadly agreed formalisation of such models.  
However, in modern logic, it is relatively easier to develop a formalised description of model 
of theory. As Hodges introduces in [Hodges1997], in this case a theory is taken as a set (which is 
usually deductively closed) of sentences in a formal language, and the model of such theory is 
formalised as a logic structure (in the form of 3-tuple) that makes all sentences of it true. Therefore, 
such logic structure S is a model in the sense that it is what the theory represents and it is defined as 
[FH2012]: 
 𝑺 = (𝑈,𝑂, 𝑅),𝑈 ≠ ∅, 𝑅 ≠ ∅ (2.1) 
where 1) a non-empty set U denotes the domain (or universe) of S, 2) an indexed set O, which can be 
empty, denotes the operations on U, and 3) a non-empty indexed set R denotes the relations on U. If all 
sentences of a theory are true when its symbols are interpreted as referring to the elements of a 
structure S, then S is a model of this theory. The definition given here comes on a highly abstract level, 
thus nothing matters about what the elements actually are – they are to be extensionally specified. 
2.1.2 What is context? 
The word context is derived from the Latin con (with or together) and texere (to weave) [Oxford2013b], 
describing an active process dealing with the way humans weave their experience within their whole 
environment, to give it meaning [BCQ+2007]. In general, it is referred to as the circumstances that 
form the setting for an event, statement, or idea, and in terms of which it can be fully understood 
[Oxford2013b].  For decades various definitions of context have been derived from various angles (see 
e.g. [ST1994], [WJH1997], [RCD+1998], [Pascoe1998], and [SDA1999]). Aiming at applying the 
concept of context in computing, based on previous definitions, Dey derives the following definition 
in [Dey2001]: 
“Context is any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity. An entity 
is a person, place, or object that is considered relevant to the interaction between a user and an 
application, including the user and the applications themselves.”  
Based on this, a context-aware computing system is defined as a system that “uses context to 
provide relevant information and/or services to the user, where relevancy depends on the user’s task” 
[Dey2001].  
Better clarifying the boundary between an entity, its context and non-relevant information, 
Lee derives a definition of context in [Lee2011]:  
“Context is a set of things, factors or attributes that are related to a target entity (TE) in 
important ways (e.g. operationally, semantically, conceptually, pragmatically) but are not 
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closely related to the target entity that they are considered to be exclusively part of the target 
entity itself.”  
Based on this definition, Lee further proposes a contextual information framework, in which 
he classified context into nine general classes [Lee2011]: 
 Object is a bounded discrete entity that can be characterised as having one or more 
properties or states, persisting across multiple points in time and place, being uniquely 
identified, interacting with other objects, and being acted by an agent. 
 Agent is an entity that can carry out actions. 
 Concept (or Abstraction) refers to ideas or other individually/socially recognised properties 
or qualities as distinguished from any particular embodiment of the properties/qualities 
in a physical medium. 
 Time is a limited stretch or space of continued existence, as the interval between two 
successive events or acts, or the period through which an action, condition, or state 
continues. 
 Place is a designated point or region in space. 
 Relationship is an association between two or more entities (or classes of entities), which 
cannot be reduced to or adequately expressed as a property of the entities (or classes of 
entities) themselves. 
 Occurrence is a characterisation, for a given span of times and places, of either the state of 
a set of entities or their interactions. It can be either a simple event or a process, which can 
be considered as a series of events. Furthermore, it can take the form of either general 
phenomena, where there is no specific acting entity, or actions, which are carried out by 
identifiable entities. 
 Form of expression is a particular way of expressing ideas or information. 
 Purpose is mandate, norms, values, intention, rules, standards, virtues, or functions to 
which agents can advance or with which they can conform, attempt to advance or 
conform, hope to advance or conform, or perceive/expect entities (or set of entities) to 
advance or conform. 
Besides Lee’s way of categorisation from a semantic perspective of view, when the concept of 
context rests in a technical environment in computing systems, there exist other various categorisation 
schemes. Among those, representative ones are listed here. 
Schilit et al. categorise context into three classes in [SAW1994]: 
 Where you are includes all location related information, e.g. GPS coordinates, 
common/specific names, specific addresses, user preferences, etc. 
 Who you are with is information about the people present around the user. 
 What resources are nearby includes information about resources available in the area where 
the user is located, e.g. machinery, smart objects, utilities, etc. 
Henricksen categorises context into four classes in [Henricksen2003]: 
 Sensed data is directly sensed from the sensors. 
 Static information does not change over time. 
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 Profiled information changes over time with a low frequency. 
 Derived information is computed from primary context. 
Perera et al. categorise context into two classes in [PZC+2014]: 
 Primary context is any information retrieved without using existing context and without 
performing any kind of sensor data fusion operation.  
 Secondary context is any information that can be computed using primary context. 
A very similar categorisation scheme is also mentioned by Bettini et al. in [BBH+2010], where 
raw information from physical sensors is referred to as low-level context and the information derived 
from low-level context is called high-level context.  
Furthermore, instead of context, van Bunningen et al. classify the context categorisation 
schemes into two classes [BFA2005]: 
 Conceptual categorisation categorises context based on the meaning and conceptual 
relationships between the context. 
 Operational categorisation categorises context based on how they are acquired, modelled 
and treated. 
Therefore, according to the standard from van Bunningen et al., Lee’s categorisation scheme is 
conceptual, while the others’ can all be regarded all operational. Nevertheless, while Lee’s conceptual 
semantics based scheme is considered as quite thorough, the operational ones vary in their emphases 
hence are hard to always accommodate the demands from the computing systems. As shown in 
Chapter 3, the proposed theoretical framework uses Lee’s categorisation as fundaments and 
formulates it for IT security on system and data levels. On both levels the context is specified on 
various granularities, from the coarsest conceptual level to the finest operational level, closing the gap 
between two classes of categorisations.  
2.2 CONTEXT MODELLING IN GENERAL 
Serving as the fundamentals of the theoretical framework of this dissertation, this section provides a 
brief state of the art of context modelling in general.  
2.2.1 Why context modelling? 
When humans have conversations, they are able to use context (in this case implicit situational 
information) to increase the understanding of each other. However, this ability does not transform 
well to the interactions between human and computers, not to say communications between 
computers, so the flexibility of human language is severely restricted in computer applications. 
Therefore, the concept of context modelling is proposed for computing, aiming at improving the 
computer representation and understanding of context to increase the richness of communication in 
the field [Serrano2012].  
Context modelling is introduced to pervasive computing, due to the requirement for its 
application to be flexible, adaptable, and capable of acting autonomously on behalf of users 
[BBH+2010], as a context-aware system is able to extract, interpret and use context information and 
adapt its functionality to the current context of use [BC2004]. Specifically speaking, general context 
models are developed for pervasive computing applications to [BCQ+2007]: 
 adapt interfaces [VTH2006], 
 tailor the set of application-relevant data [BCS+2006], 
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 increase the precision of information retrieval [STZ2005], 
 discover services [RRC+2006], 
 make the user interaction implicit [PNS+2000], 
 build smart environment [DSS+2006].  
2.2.2 How to perform context modelling? 
Currently pervasive computing is the only field where context modelling is widely and systematically 
applied. The context modelling approach has evolved with the gradual enrichment understanding of 
context. Based on how the context is understood as well as how the information is organised and 
represented, there are several most popular context modelling approaches list as follows: 
 Key-value modelling uses simple key-value pairs in different formats to define the list of 
attributes, whose values describe context information used by context-aware 
applications/systems [BBH+2010] [PZC+2014]. This is for instance applied in [SAW1994], 
where the key-value pairs act as environment variables. 
 Markup scheme modelling is an improvement over the key-value modelling approach and 
utilises a variety of markup languages to organise and represent context information 
[SL2004] [BBH+2010]. A typical example is the Composite Capabilities/Preference Profiles 
(CC/PP) developed in [KRW+2004]. 
 Graphical modelling uses graphical components to describe relationships 
[SL2004] [PZC+2014]. Typical examples include the applications of Unified Modelling 
Language (UML) in [Bauer2003] and Object-Role Modelling (ORM) in [HIR2003].   
 Object based modelling applies object-oriented concepts to model data using class 
hierarchies and relationship [PZC+2014], bringing encapsulation and reusability to 
pervasive computing environment [SL2004]. A representative of such approach is the 
Active Object Model developed in [CMD1999]. 
 Logic based modelling consequently defines context as facts, expression and rules [SL2004], 
therefore provides more expressive richness compared to previous approaches and makes 
reasoning possible up to a certain level [PZC+2014]. An example is the Sensed Context 
Model proposed in [GS2001], where first-order predicate logic is used as a formal 
representation of contextual propositions and relations. 
 Ontology based modelling use semantic technologies to organise context with ontologies 
[PZC+2014], which are essentially descriptions of concepts and their relationships. 
Therefore the approach can apply various standards as description logic and achieve 
automatic reasoning, e.g. Resource Description Framework Schema (RDFS) [AH2011] as 
well as Web Ontology Language (OWL) [AH2011] and its subsets [GWP+2004] 
[HWD2013].  
The pros and cons as well as the applicability of the above approaches are analysed in [SL2004] 
and further summarised in [PZC+2014] as shown in Table 2: 
Approaches Pros Cons Applicability 
Key-value  Simple 
 Flexible 
 Easy to manage with 
small size 
 Strongly coupled with 
applications 
 Not scalable 
 No structure or schema 
 For limited amount of 
data 
 For independent and 
non-related information 
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 Hard to retrieve 
information 
 No way to represent 
relationships 
 No validation support 
 No available standard 
processing tools 
 For less complex 
temporary modelling 
requirements 
Markup 
scheme 
 Flexible 
 More structured 
 Validation possible 
through schemas 
 Processing tools 
available 
 Application depended as 
no standards for 
structures 
 Can be complex in case of 
multiple levels of 
information 
 Moderately difficult to 
retrieve information 
 For intermediate data 
organisation or data 
transfer over network 
 For decoupling data 
structures used by 
multiple components in a 
system 
Graphical  Allows relationships 
modelling 
 Information retrieval is 
moderately easier 
 Different standards and 
implementation are 
available 
 Validation possible 
through constraints 
 Querying can be complex 
 Configuration may be 
required 
 Interoperability among 
different implementation 
is difficult 
 No standards but 
governed by design 
principles 
 For long term and large 
volume of permanent 
data archival 
 Historic context can be 
stored in database 
Object based  Allows relationships 
modelling 
 Can be well integrated 
using programming 
languages 
 Processing tools are 
available 
 Hard to retrieve 
information 
 No standards but 
governed by design 
principles 
 Lack of validation 
 For representation of 
context in program-ming 
codes level 
 Allows context runtime 
manipulation 
 Short term and temporary 
 Supports data transfer 
over network 
Logic based  Allows to generate 
high-level context using 
low-level context 
 Simple to model and 
use 
 Supports logical 
reasoning 
 Processing tools 
available 
 No standards 
 Lack of validation 
 Strongly coupled with 
applications 
 For generating new 
knowledge 
 For modelling events and 
actions 
 For definition of 
constrains and restrictions 
Ontology 
based 
 Supports semantic 
reasoning 
 Allows more expressive 
representation of 
context 
 Strong validation 
 Application 
independent and 
 Representation can be 
complex 
 Information retrieval can 
be complex and resource 
intensive 
 For modelling domain 
knowledge 
 For structuring context 
based on relationships 
defined by the ontology 
 Data can be stored in 
appropriate data sources 
rather than on ontologies, 
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allows sharing 
 Strong support by 
standardisations 
 Fairly sophisticated 
tools available 
while structure is provided 
by ontologies 
Table 2. Comparison of state of the art context modelling approaches, adapted from [PZC+2014] 
The above context modelling approaches are categorised based on their different emphases 
regarding the understanding, organisation and representation of context information, therefore they 
are not mutually exclusive. As a matter of fact, to make best use of their advantages and compensate 
for their disadvantages, it is not only reasonable but also feasible to develop hybrid approaches, which 
integrate various modelling and reasoning techniques with each other. A representative is the CARE 
framework for context awareness developed in [ABR2009], which integrates a markup model with an 
ontological model to realise the semantic reasoning supported by representation formalism. As 
described in Chapter 3, the proposed theoretical framework also embraces the idea of hybrid 
modelling and integrates ontology model with logical reasoning, so it is capable of processing the 
sophistication that is usually expected in large-scale systems. 
2.2.3 How to evaluate context models? 
Despite the huge amounts of literature on developing various context modelling techniques, some of 
them even comparing them hence the results shown in Table 2, there are few publications on how the 
resulting context models should be evaluated. 
Nevertheless, Bettini et al. summarise several requirements for context models and their 
context management systems in pervasive computing in [BBH+2010]:   
 Heterogeneity and mobility: Context models have to be able to handle a large variety of 
context information, which differs in source, update rate, and semantic level. The models 
should also be able to express the different types of context information, and the context 
management systems should be able to manage the information depending on its type. 
Furthermore, the models and the systems should also be able to support either mobile 
context-aware application or mobile context information sources. 
 Relationships and dependencies: Context models and their context management systems 
should be able to correctly capture and handle the relationships, especially dependencies 
between different types of context information. 
 Timeliness: Context models and their context management systems should be able to 
capture and manage context histories, in case the context-aware applications need access. 
 Imperfection: Context models and their context management systems should be able to 
handle the situation that the context information comes with variable qualities or even 
incorrect, or it is incomplete or conflicting with other context information. 
 Reasoning: Context models and their context management systems should be able to 
support both consistency verification and context reasoning techniques, to decide whether 
any adaptation is necessary or derive new context fact from existing ones. 
 Usability of modelling formalisms: The modelling formalism should be easy for model 
designers to translate real world concepts to the modelling constructs and for the context-
aware applications to at runtime use and process context information. 
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 Efficient context provisioning: The context models should provide clear and efficient access 
to context information for the context-aware applications. 
As shown in Chapter 6, evaluation metrics are derived for the assessment of the security-
oriented context model, closing the gap between model generation and evaluation. 
2.3 CONTEXT MODELLING FOR IT SECURITY 
As this dissertation focuses on adopting context modelling to ensure security, this section starts with 
some basics on IT security, then summarise the state of the art of context-aware applications regarding 
security. 
2.3.1 What is IT security? 
When the concept of security is introduced to the scope of computer science, it is usually referred to as 
the protection of systems and information from harm, theft, and unauthorised use [Britannica2013c].  
Regarding how security can be specifically provided, the ISO mentions several security 
services within the framework of OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) Reference Model in  the 
standard ISO 7498-2 (recommendation ITU-T X.800) [ISO1989]: authentication (peer entity authentication 
and data origin authentication), access control, data confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation. 
Additionally, it also considers availability as a general requirement of OSI security management. 
Based on these, three main components are generally identified, known as the CIA triad or CIA 
model, as summarised by Bishop in [Bishop2002]: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Confidentiality is the concealment of information or resources, similar as stated in the OSI model, but 
also covering the access control service [ISO1989]. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness of data or 
resources and usually phrased in terms of preventing improper or unauthorised change, and therefore 
also covers the scope of the data origin authentication service in [ISO1989]. Availability refers to the 
ability to use the information or resources as desired. 
Based on the above identified concepts, the following definitions of security aspects are 
selected for their usage in this dissertation (based on [ISO2012]): 
 Authenticity is an ambiguous security aspect that can refer to two related concepts for 
authentication: Data origin authenticity refers to the proof of the origin of the data and 
ultimately together with its genuineness, truth, or realness. Entity authenticity is the proof 
that an entity (e.g. a person or other agent) has been correctly identified as the originator, 
sender or receiver, i.e. the ability that ensures an entity to be the one that it claims to be. It 
is often that authenticity is referred to as entity authenticity solely, as data origin 
authenticity is considered as a distinct aspect called provenance. 
 Integrity is a security aspect that describes the accuracy and completeness of objects. It 
refers to the ability of preventing improper and unauthorised change of data. 
 Confidentiality is a security aspect that refers to the non-disclosure of resources with 
respect to unauthorised entities. Depending on the security level this can also include the 
concealing of traces of communication and transmission of resources. 
 Availability is a security aspect denoting that resources can be accessed and used by 
authorised entities. 
 Non-repudiation is a security aspect to prove the actual occurrence or non-occurrence of an 
event and its participating entities with respect to third parties. 
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Additionally, privacy is also sometimes mentioned as the sixth security aspect. Although in a 
strict sense privacy is restrained to refer to a person whereas confidentiality refers more generally to 
data, they are often used interchangeable. 
To further interpret the above security aspects, the concept of security policy is defined as 
statement of what is allowed and what is not, and the concept of security mechanism is derived as a 
method, tool, or procedure to enforce a security policy [Bishop2002]. Following a security policy’s 
specification of “secure” and “non-secure” actions, the corresponding mechanisms can be used to 
achieve various security goals, mainly in three aspects as summarised also in [Bishop2002]: 
 Prevention means that an attack will fail. Prevention mechanisms can prevent security 
compromise of parts of the system, and at least in theory the resource protected by such 
mechanism need not be monitored for security issues. 
 Detection means, despite that an attack cannot be prevented there are still mechanisms to 
either determine the attack is underway or report after its occurrence. Such mechanisms 
monitor the attack to provide data about its nature, severity and results. The resource 
protected by these mechanisms is continuously or periodically monitored for security 
issues. 
 Recovery has two forms. The first is to stop an attack and to assess and repair any damage 
caused by the attack. Moreover, it can also involve identification and fixing of the 
vulnerabilities revealed by the attack. The second form is that the system continues to 
function correctly while an attack is underway, or it detects incorrect functioning 
automatically and then corrects the error. 
In the context of a complex system, security policies regulate what in the system should be 
protected [BS2002] to meet various aspects of security requirement depending on the application 
scenario. Most complex systems face the problem that how to organise large quantity of security 
policies properly and efficiently. As one solution, Baskerville et al. proposed in [BS2002] a functional 
hierarchy of policies uses a three level division consisting meta-policies, high-level policies, and low-
level policies. This hierarchy increases in granularity from the abstract meta-policies to specific 
detailed policies, which may be so concrete that they directly demand or prohibit certain 
implementations or mechanisms. However, as the systems become more complex and the number of 
low-level policy increases, it may occur that a large quantity of low-level child policies originates from 
a single parent high-level policy. Thus policy management would become rather complicated in this 
case.   
2.3.2 Use context models to address security issues 
With the development of context-aware pervasive computing systems, the concern about security has 
been raised and gradually increased [HSK2009]. As context modelling is in the first place commonly 
used in the field, it has also been applied to generate context models which lead to systems with 
security-related requirements. 
Jiang and Landay described in [JL2002] a theoretical model privacy control in context-aware 
systems based on a core abstraction of information spaces, which provide a way to organise context, 
namely relevant information, resources and services. Bhatti et al. pointed out in [BBG2004] the lack of 
context-aware models for access control in web services, designed an access control scheme to address 
the issue, and proposed an extended, trust-enhanced version of their XML-based Role Based Access 
Control (X-RBAC) framework which incorporates context-based access control. Hill et al. in 
[HAC+2004] developed a programmable middleware architecture named HESTIA as the solution to 
secure the cyber infrastructure for large-scale pervasive computing environments, providing services 
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including monitoring, intrusion detection, replication, authentication, etc.  Minami and Kotz 
presented in [MK2005] a secure context-sensitive authorisation system which protects confidential 
information in facts or rules and allows multiple hosts in a distributed environment to perform the 
evaluation of an authorisation query in a collaborative way. Falkovych and Nack in [FN2006] 
proposed an extended authoring support approach by integrating processes of topic identification, 
context collection and discourse structure building in a single environment, allowing identification of 
the context of the authoring process. Zhang et al. designed in [ZQZ+2007] a context-aware privacy 
protection framework for context aware services and privacy control methods about accessing 
personal information in pervasive environment, addressing uncertainty issues using a fuzzy privacy 
decision information system. Jürjen et al. in [JSB2008] conducted a security analysis of the context 
information of mobile system architecture by applying a model-based approach with a UML 
extension. Filho and Martin proposed in [FM2008] an owner-centric QoC (Quality of Context)-aware 
context-based access control model, namely QACBAC, to take into account both context information 
and its QoC indicators to grant and adapt access permission to resources in pervasive computing 
environments. Seifert et al. presented in [SLC2009] a context-sensitive security model for privacy 
protection on mobile phones, and then implemented the model in a system named TresurePhone, 
which not only handles the user’s context specific need for privacy but also integrates supporting 
context information based on locations and actions. For achieving effective security in mobile 
computing environment, Johnson et al. defined the term of security-relevant context and proposed the 
notion of shrink-wrapped security which couples a user’s situation with security in [Johnson2009], 
and further presented in [JSG+2011] an approach to practically incorporate the security-relevant 
context into security services with a focus on access control. Khan and Sakamura in [KS2012] explored 
the relationship of access control and context awareness in pervasive computing and proposed a 
comprehensive context-aware access control model for pervasive healthcare services. 
Besides pervasive computing, there are also other scenarios where context is involved in the 
modelling process for security. As early as in 1993, Woo and Lam in [WL1993] specified 
authentication protocols as formal objects with precise syntax and semantics and defined a semantic 
model that characterises protocol execution. Despite the actual term of “context” was never 
mentioned, by the standards summarised in earlier sections, their work was indeed all about how to 
extract and organise security-related context, which was referred to as “correctness properties” in 
their paper. Another early example would be the Path Context Model (PCM) of security proposed by 
Boshoff and von Solms in [BS1989], where security demands were analysed in real world commercial 
computer environments and the model was originated by using context-sensitive grammars to 
accommodate secure environment concepts and form a basis for automatic security evaluation and 
profile generation. There are also more recent examples that rest outside the field of pervasive 
computing. Dunkerley and Tejay developed in [DT2009] the information system security success 
model and used it for e-Government context for the dimensions of integrity, confidentiality, and 
authenticity. Simpson et al. in [SSE+2010] established a context for secure information systems 
development as well as a set of models used to develop and apply a secure software production 
pedagogy, which aimed to enable even entry-level university students to learn how to acquire new 
knowledge and adapt their standard software security approaches as a direct result of the fast flux of 
new technology development and services built on these new technologies.  
Furthermore, there are also some security-related scenarios, where context modelling exists in 
a de facto way, i.e. modelling in those scenarios is actually context-aware, despite viewed from such 
perspective. A perfect example of such is the development and maintenance of antivirus software: 
typical antivirus software is able to run signature based detection, i.e. the software analyses its 
environment and compares the file contents to a dictionary of virus signatures to identify viruses and 
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other malware [Landesman2009].  This comparison can be based on simple key-phrase matching, or 
more effectively semantic-based approach (see [YWL+2007] and [PCJ+2008]), which is able to 
characterise the behaviour of virus and malware. Such behaviour fits in the concept of context given in 
this dissertation, and antivirus software can therefore be regarded as context-aware service. 
Additionally, such context awareness is further enhanced, as the signature dictionary of commercial 
antivirus is constantly updated to address newly emerged virus and malware, so new context is 
constantly extracted and added to the service to assure that it stays context-aware. 
2.4 SECURITY IN DIGITAL LONG-TERM PRESERVATION 
As this dissertation selects digital long-term preservation (sometimes also referred to as digital long-
term archiving) as the application scenario of system level context modelling for its security, this 
section briefly introduces the security issues in this scenario and the state of the art regarding these 
issues.  
2.4.1 Security issues for digital long-term preservation 
The heritage of human society has been presented on various materials since ancient times, e.g. stone, 
bones, vellum, parchment, bamboo, silk, paper, etc. The traditional objects based on such materials 
such as text in books or images on photographs have an important property, that they are 
immediately the content which can directly pass the information [BKG+2009]. However, nowadays 
more and more information exists in digital form, or is even born-digital. These digital objects, in 
contrast with traditional ones, always require their corresponding environments to render or perform 
them to pass the information [BKG+2009]. Such environments can be software related, e.g. software 
interface, data format, etc., or hardware related, e.g. physical storage media, rendering device, etc. 
Nevertheless, both software and hardware environments can become obsolete over time, causing 
digital objects not accessible any more. This is called digital obsolescence, and it started to draw the 
attention of the libraries and archives only in 1990s [Hedstrom1997] and directly called for the 
development of the concept of digital long-term preservation is developed. However, besides digital 
obsolescence, there are further issues that need to be solved [Giaretta2011]: there shall be some 
mechanism to ensure the digital objects not to be altered over time, i.e. they can be trusted that they 
are indeed what they are claimed to be; the legal position of the digital objects should always be 
tracked, as legal system changes over regions and time, resulting various constrains on possible 
actions to the objects; furthermore, the links to networked resources could fail or be reallocated over 
time, therefore they need to be properly maintained.  
From the security point of view, all those exemplary issues identified for digital long-term 
preservation to solve reflect certain security aspects introduced in subsection 2.3.1.  
Issues for digital long-term preservation to solve Related security aspects 
Digital obsolescence Availability 
Trusted digital objects Integrity, authenticity 
Legal position of digital objects Confidentiality, non-repudiation 
Correct links to resources Availability 
Table 3. Exemplary issues for digital long-term preservation to solve and the security aspects they reflect 
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As Table 3 shows, comparing to the examples given in subsection 2.3.2, digital long-term 
preservation is an application scenario where multiple security aspects are involved. Obsolete 
software and hardware environments disable the access to the digital objects, therefore compromise 
their availability. Link failure or reallocation can be regarded as an extension of digital obsolescence in 
network environment, therefore also results in the compromise of availability of the digital objects. 
There are two layers of requirements for archived digital objects can be trusted: first, the digital objects 
encompass the identical information as it originally did, i.e. its integrity can be ensured; second, the 
origin of the objects is clarified, i.e. its authenticity can be ensured. As for the requirement on the legal 
position, it ranges from the basic level of access control (therefore confidentiality) to more advanced 
level of being able to prove each single action employed on the objects (therefore non-repudiation). 
Summarising this subsection, it can be concluded that security assurance is essential for a 
competent digital long-term preservation system, and this constitutes the motivation on the study in 
this field. 
2.4.2 Previous achievements 
A number of initiatives have emerged in the past few decades regarding the urge of digital long-term 
preservation. This section summarises some of the representative ones among them, with particular 
focus on their effects regarding security issues. 
OAIS (Open Archival Information System) 
The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) published the OAIS model in 
2002 [OAIS2002] and one year later it was adopted as ISO standard ISO14721:2003. Proven to be a very 
useful high-level reference model, OAIS uses functional entities to describe the exchange of 
information during the preservation procedures. Figure 5 illustrates the functional entities in OAIS 
model as well as the information exchange among them.  
 
Figure 5. OAIS functional entities [OAIS2002] 
OAIS uses various Information Packages (IPs) to represent digital objects in different 
archiving steps, and Descriptive Information (DI) to represent their metadata. The role provided by 
each functional entity is briefly explained as follows [OAIS2002]: 
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 Ingest entity provides the services and functions to accept Submission Information 
Packages (SIPs) from Producers and prepare the contents in the form of Archival 
Information Packages (AIPs) for storage and management within the archive.  
 Archival storage entity provides the services and functions for the storage, maintenance 
and retrieval of AIPs.  
 Data management entity provides the services and functions for populating, maintaining 
and accessing both Descriptive Information which identifies and documents archive 
holding and administrative data used to manage the archive. 
 Administration entity provides the services and functions for the overall operation of the 
archival system. 
 Preservation planning entity provides the services and functions for monitoring the 
environment of the OAIS and providing recommendations to ensure that the information 
stored in the OAIS remains accessible to the Designated User Community over time, even 
if the original computing environment becomes obsolete. 
 Access entity provides the services and functions that support Consumers in determining 
the existence, description, location and availability of information stored in the OAIS, and 
allowing Consumers to request and receive information products. 
Besides these functional entities, OAIS also defines several common service entities to provide 
pervasive services and functions. These entities include [OAIS2002]: 
 Operation system services entity provides the core services for operating and administering 
the application platform as well as an interface between application software and the 
platform.  
 Network services entity provides the capacity and mechanisms to support distributed 
applications requiring data access and applications interoperability in heterogeneous, 
networked environments.  
 Security services entity provides capabilities and mechanisms to protect sensitive 
information and treatments in the information system. 
As the preceding descriptions show, some security issues are already addressed, however 
they are quire underspecified [OAIS2002]: the security services entity is designed to include an 
identification/authentication service, and access control service, a data integrity service, a data 
confidentiality service and a non-repudiation service. Despite the these services address all the 
security aspects that should be covered for digital long-term preservation, the description of the 
services fails to propose any detail, e.g. how to implement the services, how to integrate these services 
with other functional entities in the information system, etc. Furthermore, in the administration entity, 
the “establish standards and policies” is responsible for establishing and maintaining the archive 
system standards and policies, including security policies for the contents of the archive. However the 
content is also in lack of details, e.g. guidance on how the security policies are established and 
organised. 
CCSDS issued the second version of OAIS standard in 2009. Besides the content introduced 
above, there are some enhancement in the security-related issues in this version [OAIS2009]. It 
references the Trustworthy Repositories Audit & Certification: Criteria and Checklist (TRAC). TRAC 
was issued by the Center for Research Libraries (CRL) and Online Computer Library Center (OCLC) 
in 2007 [TRAC2007]. It offers a set of evaluation criteria, which can be applied for audit and 
Context modelling for IT security in selected application scenarios 
 
 23 
certification to achieve a trusted environment for digital repositories, which also takes the security-
related requirements into consideration. Then, for the first time in the history of OAIS, the full 
definition of authenticity is introduces as the degree to which a person (or system) regards an object as 
what it is purported to be and it needs to be judged on the basis of evidence. This issue also make it 
clear that it is one of the main goals of the long-term archiving system to support the authenticity of 
the data. Furthermore, the issue introduces the Transformational Information Property as one of the 
properties of the data. This property is a contribution to authenticity when e.g. any format 
transformation operation needs to be applied on the archived data. A new type of Preservation 
Description Information is also added: Access rights provide the terms of access, including 
preservation, distribution and usage of Content Information. While introducing the functional entity 
of ingest, the issue describes the necessary operations on how to preserve authenticity within the scope 
of this functional entity, however no similar content is offered for other functional entities. 
CASPAR (Cultural, Artistic and Scientific Knowledge for Preservation, Access and Retrieval) 
Started in 2006, CASPAR project aimed at the implementation, extension and validation of the OAIS 
reference model proposed in [OAIS2002]. Within the scope of CASPAR, several major threats have 
been identified and considered as salient to be solved. Table 4 summarises these specific threats with 
regard to the security issues introduced in Table 3 together with the relevant security aspects their 
corresponding solutions that CASPAR proposes. 
Security issue Specific threat Security aspect Solution in CASPAR 
Digital 
obsolescence 
Users may be unable to 
understand or use the data e.g. 
the semantics, format, processes 
or algorithms involved 
Availability Archive’s ability to create and 
maintain adequate 
Representation Information 
(RepInfo) 
Non-maintainability of essential 
hardware, software or support 
environment may make the 
information inaccessible 
Archive’s ability to share 
information of hardware and 
software and their replacements 
or substitutes 
Trusted digital 
objects 
The chain of evidence may be 
lost and there may be lack of 
certainty of provenance or 
authenticity 
Authenticity, 
integrity 
Archive’s ability to bring 
together evidence from diverse 
sources about the authenticity 
of a digital object 
The ones we trust to look after 
the digital holdings may let us 
down 
Certification process so that one 
can have confidence about 
whom to trust to preserve data 
holdings over the long term 
Legal position 
of digital 
objects 
Access and use restrictions may 
make it difficult to reuse data, or 
alternatively may not be 
respected in future 
Confidentiality Archive’s ability to deal with 
digital rights correctly in a 
changing and evolving 
environment. Preservation-
friendly rights or appropriate 
transfer of rights is necessary 
Correct links to 
resources 
The current custodian of the 
data, whether an organisation or 
project, may cease to exist at 
some point in the future 
Availability Brokering of organisations to 
hold data and the ability to 
package together the 
information needed to transfer 
information between 
organisations ready for long 
term preservation 
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- Loss of ability to identify the 
location of data 
Availability An persistent ID resolver system 
Table 4. Specific threats identified in CASPAR and corresponding solutions with regard to general security 
issues for long-term preservation and addressed security aspects [Giaretta2011] 
CASPAR employs a document/data-centric approach, which relies heavily on the interactions 
between RepInfo (which is an extended concept of DI in OAIS) and IPs to describe various 
preservation related processes. Figure 6 on page 24 illustrates the CASPAR information flow 
architecture, which illustrates all such interactions in the embodied OAIS functional entities. This 
architecture is defined with specific focus on the transformation of a digital object (with various forms 
of IPs) as well as its metadata (in the form of RepInfo) being accurate, up-to-date and intact. It 
describes how generic interfaces with virtualisation technologies might provide “abstract interfaces on 
top of concrete implementations [CASPAR2007]”, allowing data to be accessed and manipulated 
independently of discipline or platform, with preservation activities distributed across systems as 
shared services. Furthermore, the original OAIS representation network is logically extended to a 
RepInfo registry. RepInfo and its dependencies are therefore tracked, maintained and preserved. 
 
Figure 6. CASPAR information flow architecture [CASPAR2007] 
Despite raising security level hardly being one of the core objectives of CASPAR, it has indeed 
managed to provide more specific details towards a more secure archiving environment. Access 
control and Digital Rights Management (DRM) are proposed for access, so a digital object can be 
properly processed when it enters the archive. Provenance management is proposed with regard to 
the digital rights and authenticity of digital objects. Security management is proposed to cover 
preservation planning, data management and administration, so it deals with user account/role/profile, 
content access permissions as well as digital rights, and also guarantees authenticity.  
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However, these specifications are hardly sufficient for system level security. They are 
scattered and lacking of systematic organisation. More importantly, as the archive is supposed to keep 
functioning for a long term, there is no mechanism to guarantee the flexibility of the system to adapt 
for either security threats or conflicts emerging over time.  
e!DAL (electronical Data Archive Library) 
Current studies on life sciences tend to generate large amount of raw/primary data, hence it is 
commonly encountered with the problem of limited storage space, and this problem can become even 
more complicated due to the heterogeneity of the data [ALC+2012]. In the meantime, the study of life 
sciences often require the publication of primary data, and the current solution is to upload the data to 
special domain-specific repositories (e.g. European Nucleotide Archive or the BioModels Database, 
where basically the findings and test sets of bio scientists used in their publications are uploaded for 
others to use and validate) as well as to internal storage systems. Therefore, within the scope of 
ongoing DPPN/EPPN (Deutsches Pflanzen Phänotypisierungsnetzwerk/ European Plant Phenotyping 
Network) project, e!DAL is designed as a storage system, which at the time of writing this dissertation 
is still under development, aiming to the support of long-term archiving, sharing and citing primary 
data in life sciences [ALC+2012].  
e!DAL classifies the data dissemination into three domains [ALC+2012]: the private domain 
(raw data, typically collected from the scientists/researchers themselves), the group domain (primary 
data shared only within the working group), and the public domain (the selected data for publication). 
The framework is implemented in Java to support the workflows for dissemination, so that the data 
that enters into the system is disseminated to the public databases and/or the internal databases, and 
corresponding services are provided, including version management, metadata storage, persistent 
identifiers, etc . 
However, in e!DAL the long-term preservation itself is only addressed in a very basic manner, 
and only in the sense of disseminating the data to other sites which are contractually obliged to store it 
for 10 years or so [ALC+2012], yet not tackling data obsolescence. From the security point of view only 
entity authentication is addressed, in the way that the system does not allow the deletion or modify 
the data after the ingest, but automatically makes a copy for every new version. However, no 
cryptographic means are proposed to allow the verification of the data integrity systematically, but 
this is rather done on per-user basis, e.g. depending on the user who ingests the data already provides 
hashes. Further, it is also not mentioned that any audit trail is planned to be implemented to meet 
further security needs. 
SHAMAN (Sustaining Heritage Access through Multivalent AchiviNg) 
SHAMAN project was launched in 2008, with the overall objective of a next generation digital 
preservation framework. Similar to CASPAR, to a large degree the framework is also constructed with 
the reference to OAIS. Nevertheless, as SHAMAN proposes to develop and integrate technologies to 
support contextual and multivalent archival/preservation processes, it achieves significantly in its 
conceptualisation with context, especially regarding security concerns. 
Schott et al. presented in [SDV+2008] a first study on how to enforce integrity and authenticity 
for digital preservation beyond electronic signatures to build a solution for data emulation and 
migration. They analysed the integrity and authenticity requirements in SHAMAN environment with 
iRODS (i Rule Oriented Data System) grid and multivalent engine, summarised common integrity 
models including Biba model [Biba1977] and the Clark-Wilson model [CW1987], and proposed a 
novel approach for enforcing integrity and authenticity for digital objects by extending the Clark-
Wilson integrity model. Based on this, in [SKD+2010] they introduced a more detailed investigation 
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and showed exemplarily the influence of the application of the extended Clark-Wilson security model 
on the use cases and roles of the SHAMAN preservation environment. In the meantime, in [EKB+2009] 
Engel at al. motivated the approach of context-oriented information retrieval, based on the context 
appearing in a scientific archive scenario and a proposed information life cycle model. Brocks et al. 
introduced in [BKJ+2010] the concept of context into digital long-term preservation and proposed a 
generic context model to provide a formal representation for capturing all aspects of the context 
information of archived digital objects, to enable retracing information paths for future reuse.  
An assessment framework is also developed within the scope of SHAMAN and it relates to 
several perspectives [SHAMAN2009]: 1) Regarding the SHAMAN project, it aims to performing the 
evaluation according to the objectives of the project; 2) Regarding the developed and realised 
SHAMAN preservation framework, it employs the relevant elements from TRAC (see Appendix B for 
its audit and certification criteria) and a Digital Repository Audit Method Based on Risk Assessment 
(DRAMBORA) toolkit, which yields a bottom-up approach developed by the Digital Curation Centre 
(DCC) and DigitalPreservationEurope (DPE) [IRM+2009][DRAMBORA2014]; 3) Regarding the 
individual work-packages of SHAMAN, it employs iRODs rules to test the outputs of the work-
packages. 
These preceding achievements in SHAMAN directly contribute to the state of the art of the 
work of system level context modelling for IT security, which is described in Chapter 4 in this 
dissertation. 
2.5 DIGITAL DACTYLOSCOPY AND THE SEPARATION OF OVERLAPPED 
FINGERPRINTS 
As this dissertation selects a specific application scenario in forensic dactyloscopy, namely the 
separation of overlapped fingerprints, to perform data level context modelling, this section introduces 
some fundamentals regarding this scenario: subsection 2.5.1 introduces very briefly about forensic 
dactyloscopy, subsection 2.5.2 gives a state of the art on the separation of overlapped fingerprints, 
subsection 2.5.3 describes the Daubert standard, which is the standard that forensic techniques are 
expected to meet to yield court evidence. 
2.5.1 Forensic dactyloscopy 
Forensics, or forensic science, is in general the scientific tests or techniques used in connection with the 
detection of crime [Oxford2013c]. As one of the most important branch of the forensics, forensic 
dactyloscopy, the forensic science focusing on fingerprint analysis, has been world widely applied by 
law enforcements and courts as authentication means for more than a century [BMW+2011]. Due to 
their uniqueness, the fingerprints acquired from the crime scenes, even partial ones, can help crime 
investigators to identify the people who left them in the first place, with support of proper 
infrastructure, e.g. AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System). 
Human’s friction ridge skin constitutes fingerprints, and the uniqueness of its features 
constitutes the uniqueness of fingerprints. Reflecting such uniqueness, three levels of detail were 
summarised by Ashbaugh in [Ashbaugh1999] for the fingerprint features: 
 First level detail refers to the general overall directions of ridge flow in the fingerprint, and 
detail on this level solely is not considered to be unique. 
 Second level detail refers to the path of a specific ridge, covering specific locations of where 
a ridge terminates at a ridge ending or bifurcation (or Galton points), which are referred 
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to as minutiae. The ridge path and its length with minutiae are unique, and the sequences 
and configurations of a series of ridge paths are also unique. 
 Third level detail refers to the shapes of ridge structures, encompassing the morphology of 
the ridge, e.g. edges, textures, and pore positions. They are unique in their shapes, 
sequences and configurations. 
Figure 7 shows the three levels of detail in one original fingerprint. As explained, while the 
first level detail can be solely lead to conclusive decision about the origin of a fingerprint, combining it 
with either of other two levels of detail, or both, can usually yield an accurate authentication. 
 
Figure 7. Three levels of detail of fingerprints [BMW+2011] 
As it is not always expected that the fingerprints left at crime scenes are simply visible, or 
patent, various techniques are introduced to acquire those hidden or unseen, or latent, fingerprints. In 
general, these techniques are either chemical or optical, or sometimes both combined. Some of the 
representative latent fingerprint acquisition techniques are enumerated as follows [BMW+2011]: 
 Latent print powder: the conventional way for crime scene investigators to visualise latent 
fingerprints is with powder, or “dusting”. Typically, it involves the application of finely 
divided particles that physically adhere to the aqueous and oily components in latent 
fingerprint residue [SK2011], so the fingerprint becomes more visible via reflected light, 
absorbed light, or luminescence. Afterwards, the fingerprint can be lifted with transparent 
tape or other lifters, or simply photographed. 
 Ninhydrin: Ninhydrin is used to visualise latent fingerprints, because it reacts with the 
amino acid in the residue and forms a deep purple compound, exhibit excellent contrast 
and clarity [CLM+2004]. After that, the contrast can be further enhanced and 
photographed. 
 1,8-Diazafluoren-9-one (DFO): DFO is another reagent with the amino acid in the 
fingerprint residue. The reaction results in a faint red or pink fingerprint that is 
intensively fluorescent at room temperature [PGM1990]. The combination of DFO 
followed by ninhydrin develops more latent fingerprints than DFO or ninhydrin alone 
[WRB+2005]. Therefore fluorescence of the developed fingerprint can be photographed. 
 1,2-Indanedione: 1,2-Indanedione also reacts with amino acid, visualise the fingerprint 
residue by resulting fluorescence. It develops even more latent fingerprints than the 
combination of DFO and ninhydrin [WSS+2001]. 
 5-Methlthininhydrin (5-MTN): 5-MTN reacts with amino acid and develops fingerprints 
under heat and humidity in purple colour. Therefore the fingerprints can be easily 
photographed. 
 Cyanoacrylate fuming: The liquid commercial adhesive (CA) fuming is a versatile and 
effective latent fingerprint development technique on various surfaces, as CA vapours are 
Original fingerprint 1st level detail 2nd level detail 3rd level detail 
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extremely sensitive to fingerprint residue. Fully developed CA fingerprints are a three-
dimensional matrix, often already visible to unaided eye and can be further enhanced 
with various techniques. 
 Fluorescence examination: A forensic light source or laser is also often applied to help 
examine for latent fingerprints. By using the correct barrier filters that block out the light 
from the forensic light source being used, but not the fluorescence, a very high signal-to-
noise ratio can be observed. This technique is often combined with the application of 
fluorescent chemicals. 
 Vacuum metal deposition: As a long-established industrial technique for the application 
of metal coatings to components such as glass to form a mirror, vacuum metal deposition 
(VMD) is now also used to develop latent fingerprints. Typical choices of metal include 
gold, silver, cadmium, and zinc. VMD can be used on some surfaces that considered as 
tricky for other techniques, e.g. plastic bags and packaging and firearms, to visualise 
fingerprint residues so they can be easily documented by photographing. 
Besides the conventional fingerprint developing techniques summarised above, with the 
development of modern non-invasive sensing and analysing technologies, there are new techniques 
derived for the acquisition, investigation of analysis of fingerprint evidence, some of them even 
expanding the goal of digital dactyloscopy from yielding positive identification to revealing further 
context information from the evidence. Endeavour has been made to visualise the latent fingerprints, 
which can be hardly perceptual under visible light, in invisible light spectrums. Plese et al. introduces 
an approach to visualise untreated latent fingerprints in the infrared (IR) spectrum between 400 and 
720 nm on various substrates applying a CONDOR™ Hyperspectral Imaging System [PES2010]. 
Crane et al. propose in [CBP+2007] a method that applies FTIR (Fourier transformation infrared 
spectrometry) imaging to non-invasively detect latent fingerprint and preserve trace evidence (e.g. 
explosives or substance of abuse) associated with the prints. Gibson et al. compares in [GBB2012] three 
latent fingerprint imaging systems based on UVC (ultraviolet C) light source: 1) DEUS (digital 
enclosed ultraviolet imaging system), which applies home-made UVC-sensitive back-thinned CCD 
and camera, 2) RUVIS (reflected ultraviolet imaging system), which is a UVC-sensitive image 
intensifier, and  3) a flatbed scanner fitted with a UVC light source. Their work reveals that the DEUS 
yields the best results on porous and non-porous substrates, followed by RUVIS and the flatbed 
scanner. Further extensive study on reflected UV for the visualisation and enhancement of latent 
fingerprints can be referred to the work by Richards and Leintz described in [RL2013]. Besides IR and 
UV, SERS (surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy) is also used to visualise latent fingerprints. 
Connatser et al. applies SERS through the targeting of lipids and amino acid components that exist in 
the fingerprints [CPG+2010]. Guicheteau et al. derives an approach that applies semi-automated 
Raman-based chemical imaging to not only visualise the latent fingerprints, but also identify threat 
material present in the secretions, e.g. drugs or explosives [GST+2013]. CWL (Chromatic White Light) 
sensor is another technology that is used in digital dactyloscopy. It makes use of the chromatic 
aberration of a beam of white light to generate both intensity and topography image of the sample. 
Therefore, it is studied to classify the substrates on which latent fingerprints are left (see [GV2011] and 
[GFV2012]), localise latent fingerprints (see [JHS+2012] and [MHF+2012]), acquire latent fingerprints in 
a contactless way (see [HDP2011]), and estimate the age of latent fingerprints left on various 
substrates (see [MGD+2012] and [MPD+2013]) or even identify the deposition order of a series 
fingerprints (see [SMD2012]). In this dissertation, CWL sensor is also used for the contactless 
acquisition of latent fingerprints for the approach of separating overlapped fingerprints derived in 
Chapter 5. 
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Besides proper fingerprint acquisition technique, it is also important for crime investigations 
to have a system that provides efficient fingerprint analysis to lead to the identities behind those 
fingerprints. Therefore there are currently multiple such infrastructures, so the law enforcements can 
have acquired fingerprints uploaded, analysed and archived. The most representative one of those is 
AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System), which originates from early 1960s, when the FBI 
in the United States, the Home Office in the United Kingdom, Paris Police in France, and the Japanese 
National Police initiated projects to develop automated fingerprint identification systems, so the 
emerging electronic digital computers could be used to assist or even replace the labour-intensive 
processes of classifying, searching, and matching of fingerprints used for personal identification 
[BMW+2011]. Based on AFIS, now FBI is operating and maintaining world’s largest collection of 
criminal history information, known of IAFIS (Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System). It has enormously expedited the processing of fingerprint evidence: it is able to respond to 
“electronic criminal transactions” (in this case the uploaded raw fingerprint images to be matched 
with) in less than 20 minutes, and civil background checks in less than 3 hours [BMW+2011]. 
2.5.2 Previous achievements on separation of overlapped fingerprints 
Despite that the fingerprint related techniques have been well developed, there are always challenges 
in this field. One of these is the separation of overlapped latent fingerprints. It is often that the latent 
fingerprints acquired from crime scenes are overlaid on others. On one hand, overlapped latent 
fingerprints occurring in crime scenes contain useful biometric information that might lead to suspects 
or persons of interest. However they are difficult to process, as current fingerprint processing systems 
(like AFIS) assume the processed fingerprint images contain single fingerprints, therefore work poorly 
on overlapped ones [CFJ+2011]. On the other hand, besides identification, the application of advanced 
contactless, nanometre range sensing technology for fingerprint development has brought more 
possibilities to dactyloscopy. For example, as introduced in subsection 2.5.1, utilising a CWL sensor 
for non-invasive acquisition brings two aspects of benefits to the forensic work: First, the non-invasive 
acquisition preserves the original fingerprint evidence, so it can still be used in further invasive 
forensic procedures, e.g. it can be tested for its chemical composition using GC-MS (Gas 
Chromatography–Mass Spectrometry) [HHM+2007]. Second, the non-invasive acquisition also 
produces fingerprint images with a high resolution, so more details of the fingerprint can be revealed 
comparing to conventional methods. This in turn enables the retrieval of further context of the 
fingerprint evidence, e.g. the identification of the deposition order of the different fingerprints, 
therefore contributing to the generation of a time line [SMD2012]. However, such approach requires 
the a priori separation of the series of overlapped fingerprints. The convenient procedure to process 
overlapped fingerprints in the field work of crime investigation is to only use the nonoverlapped 
regions as partial fingerprints for analysis. However, as doing so means both the physical content and 
the biometric information in the overlapped region are abandoned, there is a salient demand for an 
approach of separating overlapped fingerprints while correctly preserving their features, not only for 
conventional biometric identification, but more importantly, also to enable further forensic analyses. 
Singh et al. developed a separation approach in [STK2006] for mixed signals based on 
Independent Component Analysis (ICA). The approach is demonstrated with three artificially and one 
genuinely overlapped fingerprints. The main drawback of this approach is that it requires the source 
images of the fingerprint, therefore does not fit the condition of crime investigations. Bhargava et al. 
proposed in [BSF+2009] to use infrared spectroscopic imaging to visualise the difference of the 
chemical composition of the overlapped fingerprints, so they can be separated. Three difference cases 
are demonstrated, yet no further validation is reported to employ the proposed method on larger test 
set. This approach still relies on cyanoacrylate fuming for the development of the latent fingerprints, 
and it is expected to be limited in the case that two overlapped fingerprints have similar chemical 
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composition. A chemical means using mass spectrometry was proposed by Tang et al. in [TLC+2010], 
which makes use of sputtering gold particles on the samples. However, this approach is demonstrated 
on only one sample and is considered as invasive, as it bears the risk of compromising the integrity of 
the evidence and preventing it from being further analysed by other means. Kärgel et al. introduced in 
[KGL+2011] a blind source separation approach based on maximum a posteriori estimation adapted 
from [TBS2006]. The approach is tested on 30 overlapped fingerprint samples on two different 
substrates, but the results showed very low resistance against noise disturbance and no error rate is 
reported. Chen et al. described a pattern separation approach based on relaxation labelling in 
[CFJ+2011]. The approach is based on image processing and requires only one source image of the 
overlapped fingerprints. However, the experimental evaluation is conducted with only genuine 
matching (i.e. match the testing fingerprint sample and the fingerprint template that belongs to the 
same finger) and a very limited test set, which contains only overlapped fingerprint images simulated 
from 4 conventionally acquired latent samples and 100 livescans ways from existing single fingerprint 
databases. VeriFinger 6.2 SDK is used to conduct the matching test after the separation, and a range of 
True Acceptance Rate (TAR) of 55% to 80% is reported corresponding to the False Acceptance Rate 
(FAR) ranging from 10−8  to 10−4 , yet no detail is give on the basis from which these rates are 
calculated. This approach is improved by Shi et al. in [SFZ2011], where the algorithm is modified and 
enhanced, however still tested in the same way with the same test set used in [CFJ+2011], yielding an 
approximate TAR range of 74% to 88% corresponding to the FAR range from 10−8 to 10−4. Zhao and 
Jain took this approach a step further in [ZJ2012], which introduces more human intervention to the 
relaxation labelling based approach to improve separation accuracy. The approach is tested on a 
further extended test set, which comprises 4 real overlapping latent fingerprints, 15 simulated 
overlapping latent fingerprints, and 100 simulated overlapping livescan fingerprints, and the 
identification ranks yielded by the fingerprint matcher show obvious improvement on all three types. 
However, this also makes the separation prone to mistakes due to human reasons, e.g. inexperienced 
users, and again the improvement is only confirmed with simulated samples. Also based on the 
approach from Chen et al., Feng et al. described an improved algorithm and constrained it for two 
special cases in [FSZ2012], where a latent overlapped fingerprint database with 100 samples 
developed with fingerprint powder and capture with digital camera is also generated and made 
publicly available. The algorithm is evaluated on 100 latent overlapped fingerprints from this database 
together with another 100 simulated overlapped fingerprints. A TAR range of 80% to 92% is reported 
on the simulated database, and a TAR range of 55% to 73% on the latent database, both corresponding 
to the FAR range between 10−8 to 10−4. Additional to preceding separation approaches, Filax et al. 
introduce in [FKW+2014] a series of evaluation metrics to assess the overlapped latent fingerprint 
images to estimate the expected separation performance using the algorithm based on [CFJ+2011], 
however no detail information is reported regarding specific criteria or details error rates.  
As the algorithm introduced in [CFJ+2011] serves as the basis of the context-aware approach 
developed in Chapter 5, it is summarised with more details in the following table. 
Processing steps Input Output 
1. Input overlapped 
fingerprint image 
Simulated fingerprint image 
𝐼 = 𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑚 
𝐼:𝐻𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 ×𝑊𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒  
2. Manually assign 
fingerprint masks 
𝐼,𝑀1,𝑀2: 
𝐻𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 ×𝑊𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒  
𝐼 ∘ 𝑀𝑁1, 𝐼 ∘ 𝑀𝑂, 𝐼 ∘ 𝑀𝑁2 
In this step the investigator manually assigns two fingerprint masks 𝑀1,𝑀2, both (0,1) matrices, on 
the image imported in step 1, resulting three region masks: an overlapped region mask 𝑀𝑂, and two 
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nonoverlapped regions masks 𝑀𝑁1,𝑀𝑁2 . These are then applied to 𝐼  by using the Hadamard 
product ∘. 
3. Apply window-wise DFT 
on the image  
𝐼, 𝑀1,𝑀2 {𝑤𝑖?̂?1, 𝑤𝑖?̂?2, … ,𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑛} 
Fixed block size 𝑏 = 16  and DFT window size 𝑤 = 64  are applied. A series blocks are then 
generated (Block function) on the masked fingerprint area: 
{𝑏𝑙1, 𝑏𝑙2, … , 𝑏𝑙𝑛} = Block(𝐼 ∘ 𝑀1 ∘ 𝑀2, 𝑏), 𝑏𝑙𝑖: 𝑏 × 𝑏, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 
Subsequently a series of DFT windows are generated (Window function) in the way that each block 
locates in the centre of the corresponding DFT window: 
{𝑤𝑖𝑛1, 𝑤𝑖𝑛2, … , 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛} = Window({𝑏𝑙1, 𝑏𝑙2, … , 𝑏𝑙𝑛},𝑤),𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖: 𝑤 × 𝑤 
For each Gaussian filtered window its two-dimensional spectrum is calculated: 
𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑖 = DFT(Gauss(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖 , 𝜎)) 
4. Extract the dominant 
orientations for each block in 
non-overlapped and 
overlapped regions 
{𝑤𝑖?̂?1, 𝑤𝑖?̂?2, … ,𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑛} ∀𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑖: 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥1,𝑖 , 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥2,𝑖 , 
𝑂𝑁 , 𝑂𝑂: ⌈
𝐻𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑏
⌉ × ⌈
𝑊𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑏
⌉ × 2 
= 𝐻𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 ×𝑊𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 × 2 
The two frequencies with the highest and the second highest amplitudes are selected in each 
window for its corresponding blocks, and contribute to the orientation field 𝑂(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘), where 𝑝 and 
𝑞 denote the position of the block and 𝑘 the label: 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥1,𝑖 = argmax
𝑓∈𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑖
|𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑖(𝑓)| 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥2,𝑖 = argmax
𝑓∈𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑖∖{𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥1,𝑖}
|𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑖(𝑓)| 
𝑂𝑁(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘) = 𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑝∙𝑏+𝑞 (arg(𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥1,𝑝∙𝑏+𝑞)) , where 𝑀𝑁[𝑘](𝑝 ∙ 𝑏, 𝑞 ∙ 𝑏) = 1, 𝑘 = {1,2} 
𝑂𝑂(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘) = 𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑝∙𝑏+𝑞 (arg(𝑓max [𝑘],𝑝∙𝑏+𝑞)) , where 𝑀𝑂(𝑝 ∙ 𝑏, 𝑞 ∙ 𝑏) = 1 
5. Perform relaxation 
labelling on the overlapped 
region 
𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂
′ : 𝐻𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 ×𝑊𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 × 2 
The relaxation labelling is an iterative approach of updating labelling probabilities 𝑝𝑝𝑞,𝑘1 and 𝑝𝑝𝑞,𝑘2, 
based on the calculated compatibilities 𝑅 between orientations of block pairs (𝑝𝑞 and 𝑝’𝑞’), using 
supports 𝑠 – in this case normalised difference between two orientations. As the result of this step, 
the orientations within 𝑂𝑂 are relabelled, yielding 𝑂𝑂
′  as the output. 
𝑠 = 1 −
𝛿(|𝑂𝑂(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘) − 𝑂𝑂(𝑝
′, 𝑞′, 𝑘′)|)
𝜋
2
, 𝑘, 𝑘′ ∈ {1,2} 
𝛿(𝑥) = {
𝑥 if 𝑥 ≤
𝜋
2
𝜋 − 𝑥 otherwise.
 
𝑅𝑝𝑞,𝑝′𝑞′ =
{
 
 
 
 [
0 0
0 0
] if |𝑝 − 𝑝′| > 6 or |𝑞 − 𝑞′| > 6 or (𝑝 = 𝑝′ and 𝑞 = 𝑞′ and 𝑘 = 𝑘′)
[0 1
1 0
] if 𝑝 = 𝑝′ and 𝑞 = 𝑞′ and 𝑘 ≠ 𝑘′
[
𝑠 1 − 𝑠
1 − 𝑠 𝑠
] otherwise
, 
𝑝, 𝑝′ = 1,2,… ,𝐻𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 , 𝑞, 𝑞
′ = 1,2,… ,𝑊𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠  
𝑝𝑝𝑞,𝑘1(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑝𝑝𝑞,𝑘1(𝑡) +
𝛼
𝑁
∑∑𝑅𝑝𝑞,𝑝′𝑞′(𝑘𝑝𝑞 , 𝑘𝑝′𝑞′)
𝑞′𝑝′
∙ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑞,𝑘1(𝑡)) , 
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𝑝𝑝𝑞,𝑘2(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑝𝑝𝑞,𝑘2(𝑡) −
𝛼
𝑁
∑∑𝑅𝑝𝑞,𝑝′𝑞′(𝑘𝑝𝑞 , 𝑘𝑝′𝑞′)
𝑞′𝑝′
∙ (𝑝𝑝𝑞,𝑘2(𝑡)) , 𝑘1 ≠ 𝑘2, 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥   
This step involves parameters 𝛼, and 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥, whereas the values of both left open in [CFJ+2011]. 
6. Merging the two 
separated orientation fields 
with non-overlapped regions 
𝑂𝑂
′ , 𝑂𝑁 , 𝑀𝑁1,𝑀𝑂 ,𝑀𝑁2 𝑂1, 𝑂2 
The merging step involves the boundaries 𝐵𝑘
′ (𝑥, 𝑦,𝐷)  between overlapped and nonoverlapped 
regions, which are defined as 
𝐵𝑘
′ (𝑥, 𝑦,𝐷) = {
1 if the block is inside the boundary with a range of 𝐷
0 otherwise
. 
The output of this step is a pair of merged orientation fields (𝑂1, 𝑂2), and the merging decision is 
based on the compatibility 𝑐𝑘 between the dilated overlapped region and the boundaries in both of 
the nonoverlapped regions. 
𝑐𝑘 =
1
2
(
 
 
1
∑ ∑ 𝐵1(𝑝, 𝑞,𝐷)𝑞𝑝
∑∑𝛿(|𝑂𝑂
′ (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘) − 𝑂𝑁(𝑝, 𝑞, 1)|) ∙ 𝐵1(𝑝, 𝑞,𝐷) +
𝑞𝑝
1
∑ ∑ 𝐵2(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝐷)𝑞𝑝
∑∑𝛿(|𝑂𝑂
′ (𝑝, 𝑞, 2 − 𝑘 + 1) − 𝑂𝑁(𝑝, 𝑞, 2)|) ∙ 𝐵2(𝑝, 𝑞,𝐷)
𝑞𝑝 )
 
 
 
𝑂𝑘(𝑝, 𝑞) = {
𝑂𝑂
′ (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘) 𝑀𝑂(𝑝 ⋅ 𝑏, 𝑞 ⋅ 𝑏) = 1
𝑂𝑁(𝑝, 𝑞, 1) (𝑘 = 1 and 𝑐1 < 𝑐2) or (𝑘 = 2 and 𝑐1 ≥ 𝑐2) 
𝑂𝑁(𝑝, 𝑞, 2) (𝑘 = 1 and 𝑐1 ≥ 𝑐2) or (𝑘 = 2 and 𝑐1 < 𝑐2)
 
7. Apply Gabor filter to 
render the separation results 
𝑂1, 𝑂2 𝐼1
′ , 𝐼2
′  
At last the merged orientation for each block from step 6 are used as the input of a Gabor filter 
applied on the corresponding block of the fingerprint. 
𝐼𝑘
′ (𝑝, 𝑞) = Gabor(𝑏𝑙𝑝∙𝑏+𝑞 , 𝑂𝑘(𝑝, 𝑞)) 
Table 5. Summary of the separation approaches in [CFJ+2011] (reproduced from [QSZ+2014]) 
2.5.3 Admissibility of forensic results in court  
Besides the weaknesses summarised at the end of last subsection, there is another essential aspect of 
general requirement for forensic techniques, towards which little endeavour has been made in the 
research field of separating overlapped latent fingerprints: as the ultimate purpose for developing 
forensic techniques is to yield statements regarding evidence that can be accepted in court as expert 
testimony [HS2010], it is also necessary to conduct relevant study on the evaluation and enhancement 
of the separation approach with regard to existing criteria regarding the admissibility of forensic 
results as scientific and technical evidence. Therefore, this subsection briefly introduces such criteria 
used in the U.S., as it has the most active legal system in the world, resulting in one of the most 
sophisticated and strictest systems of rules regarding the admissibility of evidence.  
Prior to 1923, there was no specific rule governing the admissibility of scientific evidence. In 
1923, in the Frye case, i.e. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), for the first time the 
court stated that, with respect to novel scientific evidence, besides the common relevancy standard, an 
additional hurdle must be overcome [HS2010]. The court ruled [Congress1923]:  
“Just when a scientific principle of discovery crosses the line between the experimental and 
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidence force of the 
principle must be recognized, and, while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony 
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deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction 
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to 
which it belongs.” 
Based on this ruling, a significant principle of general acceptance was set to govern the 
admissibility of novel scientific/technical evidence, derived by new scientific techniques. However, 
what constitutes general acceptance has never been clearly decided. Still, in the following decades, a 
number of novel scientific techniques were subject to “Frye challenges” in various courts in U.S., 
including voiceprint spectroscopy, blood spatter pattern analysis, polygraph analysis, and even DNA 
typing techniques [HS2010].  
On Jan. 2, 1975, U.S. Congress approved an evidence code for the first time, known as the 
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). The FRE became effective on Jul. 1, 1975 and contained a specific 
article regarding expert and opinion testimony. Under the rules in this article, specifically Rule 702, 
the proponent of expert testimony has the burden of demonstrating that the expert is qualified and 
that the opinion evidence would be helpful to the fact finder, i.e. the judge or jury [HS2010]. This rule 
at that time read [HS2010]: 
“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier-of-fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” 
This actually caused the divided opinion among federal and state courts, on whether Frye or 
the new FRE should be used. The question has not been addressed and settled till 1993, when U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled in Daubert v. Merrel Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), that federal courts could not use 
the Frye rule any more. In interpreting the Rule 702 and other relevant rules, e.g. 401, 402, 403 and 701, 
703, and 704, the Supreme Court indicated that the judge must be the “gatekeeper” who decides when 
scientific evidence is admissible [USC1993]. The Court suggested several criteria that a judge could 
use in the gatekeeper role, namely falsifiability, knowledge of error rates, peer review, and general 
acceptance [HS2010]. Based on these findings in Daubert, U.S. Congress changed some of the rules in 
FRE, including the Rule 702, which currently reads [Congress2011]: 
“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may 
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts 
of the case.” 
Since the adjudication of Daubert, it was later refined by two important following cases, 
General Electric v. Joiner, 552 U.S. 136 (1997) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999). In 
both cases the judge exercised his discretion as the “gatekeeper” under Daubert, and excluded the 
testimony [HS2010]. These three cases, also known as the “Daubert Trilogy”, serve as the basis of the 
Daubert criteria that governs the admissibility of the scientific/technical evidence, especially those 
derived using forensic techniques. A further interpretation of the Daubert criteria is summarised in 
[LII2013]: “(1) whether the expert's technique or theory can be or has been tested—that is, whether the expert's 
theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory 
approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject 
to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; 
(4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been 
generally accepted in the scientific community.” 
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Daubert criteria indeed set a high standard for forensic techniques, including digital 
dactyloscopy. In fact it was seriously challenged by Daubert in the 1999 case of United States v. Mitchell 
(Cr. No. 96-407-1), when defense moved before trial to bar the government’s fingerprint experts from 
testifying. The admissibility of fingerprint evidence was only reapproved after a 5-day hearing, which 
ended with the rule that it satisfied all Daubert criteria [BMW+2011]. Therefore, the forensic 
approaches must be as transparent as possible about how it processes the evidence, as the courts 
“may, and many will, require the experts to show that they know what the scientific method consists 
of and provide the scientific basis for their conclusions [BMW+2011]” and “can relitigate the 
admissibility of a certain type of expert evidence if a litigant can make a credible argument that there 
has been no previous scientific inquiry of the validity of the assumptions on which a forensic field has 
long rested [BMW+2011].” Despite the evidence based on latent fingerprints is in general long 
accepted and admitted in courts, this by no means automatically grants the admissibility for the 
separation results of overlapped fingerprints, unless the separation approaches which yield them 
satisfy the Daubert criteria. This actually implies the requirement of high standard non-repudiation, in 
the way that all the details about how the evidence is processed are expected to be clarified, 
confirmed, and understood. However, the existing approaches introduced in subsection 2.5.2 lack 
concerns in this matter. Therefore, the data level context modelling is proposed and applied to 
improve an overlapped latent fingerprint separation approach in Chapter 5, making effort towards the 
direction of meeting Daubert criteria.  
2.6 SUMMARY 
Plenty of academic achievements have been introduced in this chapter, meant to serve as the state of 
the art for the scientific contributions made by this dissertation (see section 1.3). Section 2.1 and 2.2 
introduce the definitions that are used as the fundaments of Chapter 3. Formula (2.1) is used as the 
basis for more sophisticated formulations, covering other introduced definitions, e.g. scientific 
modelling and context modelling. Lee’s contextual information framework is used for verifying the 
correctness and generilisability of the derived formulations, and the categorisation from Perera et al. 
inspires on the aspect of data level context modelling. Additionally, the evaluation criteria proposed 
by Bettini et al. serve as basis towards a series of evaluation metrics developed in Chapter 6. Section 
2.3 describes the security relevant concepts, which not only serve as the fundaments for the modelling 
theory in Chapter 3, but also form the basis for analysing the security issues in the specific application 
scenarios in Chapter 4 and 5. Section 2.4 and 2.5 serve respectively for Chapter 4 and 5, analysing the 
motivation to improve the work in these fields from the security point of view and offering the state of 
the art. 
However, before moving on to later chapters, it is necessary to recall the research challenges 
that have been identified at the beginning of this dissertation (see section 1.1) and ask one question: to 
what degree can those achievements respond to these research challenges already? 
The first research challenge is to collect useful information and organise it to form security-
related context for modelling. While the conception regarding security is quite maturely developed 
(see section 2.3), it is not yet clear that under what circumstances that which information constitutes 
context. As introduced in subsection 2.1.2, various definitions (e.g. in [Dey2001], [Lee2011]) and 
categorisations (e.g. in [SAW1994], [Henricksen2003], and [PZC+2014]) of context have been proposed, 
but mostly only specialise in their own specific scenarios in the field of pervasive computing, and 
none of these scenarios has its focus on security assurance. Therefore, despite that the state of the art 
provides some theory dots, the framework that connects these dots, i.e. clarifies the information 
considered as context in security scenarios and effectively organise/utilise it to serve the scenarios, is 
still missing. 
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The second research challenge is to generalise the context modelling methodology for secure 
data processing systems. Such general methodology should be developed from the induction based on 
existing modelling cases. As introduced in subsection 2.2.2, similar to the state of the art on the 
theories regarding context, current study on context modelling is also mainly restrained in the field of 
pervasive computing, and security is seldom the primary concern. Exploring the existing cases of 
applying context modelling to address security issues in pervasive computing, it is not hard to notice 
that they deal with either confidentiality/privacy (in [JL2002], [ZQZ+2007], and [SLC2009]) or 
authenticity (most realised with access control, in [BBG2004], [MK2005], [FN2006], [FM2008], 
[JSG+2011], and [KS2012]), or both (in [HAC+2004], [JSB2008], and [Johnson2009]). This reflects the 
limited security focus of their application scenarios. Outside this field, the applications have a slightly 
higher diversity in the involved security aspects (e.g. [DT2009] tackles besides confidentiality and 
authenticity also integrity). However, as the cases are rather scattered and focus little on generalising 
the approach, it is not only difficult to systematically analyse the context which is relevant to security, 
but also improbable for the user to estimate the outcome of the application of context modelling with 
regard to security assurance and enhancement. Therefore, what in the first place is missing here, is the 
specific cases on the application of context modelling in various scenarios with systematic security 
requirements, which enables the induction towards the general methodology. 
The last research challenge is to evaluate the performance of security-oriented context models. 
Little effort has been put into this direction in literature. A possible basis could be the series of factors 
raised in [BBH+2010] (see subsection 2.2.3). However, no security-related factors are included in this 
work, so such challenge remains at the time of writing this dissertation. 
Furthermore, as digital long-term preservation and digital dactyloscopy are the two 
application scenarios that this dissertation selects, some research gaps revealed by the state of the art 
(see section 2.4 and 2.5) are also summarised here: 
 In the field of digital long-term preservation, there are various theories and even 
prototypes of archives developed. However, from the security point of view, they still 
need improvements. For example, as introduced before, although the 2009 issue of the 
OAIS model references TRAC and makes some improvement to the covered security 
aspects compared to the 2002 issue, the expression of how to ensure the security for long-
term preservation of data is still rather scattered and disorganised. Therefore, it is 
essential to develop a framework which can be integrated into the existing OAIS standard 
and particularly aims for system-wide integration and management of security. 
Addressing this point, system level context modelling is introduced in Chapter 4, to 
identify security context in the field and construct a security framework to compensate 
existing system models, especially OAIS. 
 With regard to digital dactyloscopy, in specific the separation of overlapped latent 
fingerprints, the existing approaches are nowhere near to Daubert compliance: they have 
not been thoroughly tested, the reliability has not been investigated, the rather high error 
rates come with limited statistical significance, and more importantly, no endeavour has 
been made to clarify the processing steps of potential evidence for the sake of requirement 
of non-repudiation. Besides these, some of them are also too complicated for crime 
investigators to use, or not suitable with the conditions of crime investigation at all, or 
involving invasive acquisition procedures which restrain further forensic processing. 
Addressing this point, data level context modelling is introduced in Chapter 5, to identify 
the context during the processing and use it to improve the separation performance. 
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter proposes a theoretical framework for context modelling. It comprises a meta-model that 
formalises the conception of security-oriented context modelling. Furthermore, based on the meta-
model, it also specifies the meta-model on both system and data levels, according to which context 
models can be generated, contributing to the applicability of the framework. 
Section 3.1 formulates a general meta-model of context models. It starts with a basic logic 
structure describing scientific model and enriches it by gradually specifying the context and security 
related concepts in the structure to form more sophisticated meta-models. After that, section 3.2 takes 
the derived meta-model and projects it further on both system and data levels. On the system level, a 
hierarchical structure for security policies is proposed to identify and clarify the security requirements, 
while on the data level the concept of primary and secondary context in both acquisition and 
processing environments are defined, yielding the effective execution of security mechanisms. As 
section 3.1 and 3.2 together complete the conception of security-oriented context modelling, section 3.3 
proposes a descriptive scheme which approaches a step further to the application of such context 
models. At last, section 3.4 summarises the whole chapter. 
3.1 A GENERAL META-MODEL OF CONTEXT MODELS 
Based on the fundamentals on modelling and context introduced in section 2.1, this section derives a 
general meta-model to describe context models. Subsection 3.1.1 formulates a series of concepts that 
contribute to the meta-model, and then subsection 3.1.2 derives the meta-model, identifying various 
types of context. 
3.1.1 Concepts towards the meta-model 
In section 1.1, a research question is raised: how to collect and organise information that constitutes 
security related context? Interpreting this question for the sake of context modelling, this question can 
be rephrased in a more explicitly extensional way: in a given particular scenario where a context 
model is to be built, what constitutes modelling target and what to its context that is relevant to 
security issues, and how to organise the context for building the model? As summarised in the end of 
Chapter 2, this question has not yet been answered due to the gaps between the concepts of context, 
modelling, and security. To close those gaps, this dissertation proposes to start with a formalised 
representation of a meta-model, which integrates the concepts of context and security into that of 
scientific modelling. 
As introduced in subsection 2.1.1, scientific models are generated to cover one or more of the 
following aspects: phenomena, data, and theory. While there is no formalised representation of the 
model in the first two cases, Hodges proposes in [Hodges1997] to describe model of theory with a 
structure of 3-tuple 
 𝑺 = (𝑈,𝑂, 𝑅),𝑈 ≠ ∅, 𝑅 ≠ ∅ (2.1) 
which is widely used in modern logic [FH2012]. As a matter of fact, as such structure is formalised on 
a highly abstract level, it is also suitable to describe a selected part of world, with proper adjustment of 
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the definitions of its elements. Furthermore, as the existing context modelling approaches (see 
subsection 2.2.2) all emphasise the representation of the relationships existing among those being 
modelled, this structure already possesses a solid potential to be further extended for context 
modelling: among the three elements of the 3-tuple, E covers what being modelled, R identifies the 
connections on E, whereas O depicts the nature of the connections. Therefore, in this dissertation, such 
structure is also proposed to represent scientific model, again on a highly abstract level: 
 𝑴 = (𝐸, 𝑂, 𝑅), 𝐸 ≠ ∅, 𝑅 ⊆ 𝐸 × …× 𝐸, 𝑅 ≠ ∅ (3.1) 
where 1) the non-empty set E is the domain of M, and it denotes all the entities contained in the 
modelling scenario regarding the modelling target, 2) O is an indexed set which can be empty, and it 
denotes the operations on E, and 3) R is a non-empty indexed set and denotes the relations on E. 
Similar to the definition given by [Hodges1997], if the interpretation of the elements of M holds with 
the modelling scenario, M is a model of it. In scientific modelling, depending on the nature of the 
modelling target, the modelling approach can either start from the very basic knowledge and be 
progressed by gradually adding necessary information to achieve proper complexity (“top-down”) or 
from the vivid representation of the physical world and be progressed by gradually removing the 
redundancy to achieve the proper simplicity (“bottom-up”). Nevertheless, both ways yield scientific 
model with proper granularity, which can be generally described by the structure of 3-tuple in 
formula (3.1). 
After the representation of general scientific model is defined, it can be further specified for 
computer science, where this dissertation lies in. As a scientific discipline, computer science is defined 
in [Britannica2013b] as “the study of computers, including their design (architecture) and their use for 
computations, data processing and system control”. This definition implicitly points out the core 
concern of computer science, at the same time what distinguishes it from other scientific disciplines: 
the processing of data or information (which can be regarded as data with semantics). Interestingly 
enough, this is in fact reflected by how the discipline is named in various European countries, e.g. 
Datalogi (Danish), Informatik (German), informatique (French). Therefore, when modelling is applied 
within the range of such discipline, the modelling target is therefore restrained to either data 
processing procedures in small scales, or data processing systems (one encompasses multiple data 
processing procedures) in large scales. In this dissertation, the former is referred to as data level, 
whereas the latter as system level. Nevertheless, on both levels the resulting model, as a special case of 
the scientific model defined in formula (3.1), can be further defined using the following meta-model: 
 𝑴𝑪𝑺 = (𝐸,𝑂, 𝑅), 𝐸 ≠ ∅,𝑂 ≠ ∅,𝑅 ⊆ 𝐸 × …× 𝐸, 𝑅 ≠ ∅  (3.2) 
where 1) E is the domain of MCS and denotes a non-empty set of entities contained in the data 
processing procedure/system, 2) O denotes the operations on E, and it is a non-empty indexed set, as 
data processing always yields operations on data in case of computer science, 3) R is a non-empty 
indexed set which denotes the relations on E. Notice the highlighted specified part in formula (3.2) 
comparing to (3.1). Similarly, if the interpretation of the elements of MCS holds with the modelled data 
processing procedure/system, MCS is a model of it.  
3.1.2 The meta-model identifying the context 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, now that a meta-model is derived for the general 
scientific model in computer science, the follow-up step is to reveal the context in it. Based on the 
preceding definitions of modelling and context, the concept of context modelling can be derived within 
the academic discipline of computer science and regarded as the modelling approach with context 
awareness, i.e. the resulting model recognises and takes into consideration the context of its target, so 
that it becomes flexible, adaptive and capable of autonomously handling the evolved context. To 
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integrate the concept of context introduced in section 2.1, i.e. to make the model context-aware, it is 
necessary for the domain of MCS to cover at the same time the modelling target and its context in the 
modelling scenario. In other words, for a context model, an entity within the scope of the modelling 
target can be either target entity (TE) or context entity (CE). Furthermore, as O and R together actually 
describe the connections among the entities, they can both be regarded as context. 
Therefore, a context model CM in computer science is defined using following meta-model: 
 
𝑪𝑴 = (𝐸, 𝑂, 𝑅), 𝐸 ≠ ∅, 𝑂 ≠ ∅, 𝑅 ⊆ 𝐸 × …× 𝐸,𝑅 ≠ ∅
𝐸 = {𝐸𝑇 , 𝐸𝐶}, 𝐶 = {𝐸𝐶 , 𝑂, 𝑅}
 (3.3a) 
while the sets ET and EC respectively denoting TE and CE and C being the generalised context. Notice 
the highlighted specified part in formula (3.3a) comparing to (3.2). 
To further elucidate the definition given in (3.3a), an example is provided here in the scenario 
of evidence processing pipeline: suppose a latent fingerprint is first acquired from a crime scene, and 
then analysed in the forensic lab, then in the end it enters an evidence archive before it can be used as 
court evidence. In an extremely simplified case, i.e. the evidence archive contains only this piece of 
evidence and only very basic forensic steps are deployed on it, the processing pipeline can be 
described as follows, based on (3.3a): 
Example 1.  Let 𝑪𝑴′ = (𝐸′, 𝑂′, 𝑅′) denote the evidence archive, then an exemplary entity set of E’ 
of 𝑪𝑴′ can be further specified as: 
 
𝐸′ = {𝐸𝑇
′ , 𝐸𝐶
′ }, 𝐸𝑇
′ = {𝑒𝑡}, 𝐸𝐶
′ = {𝑒𝑐0, 𝑒𝑐1,… , 𝑒𝑐𝑖}, 𝑖 = 0,1, … ,11
𝑒𝑡 refers to the fingerprint
𝑒𝑐0 refers to the time of acquisition
𝑒𝑐1 refers to the location of acquistion
𝑒𝑐2 refers to the crime scene investigator who acquired the fingerprint
𝑒𝑐3 refers to the crime case the fingerprint is related to
𝑒𝑐4 refers to the time when the evidence arrives in the forensic lab 
𝑒𝑐5 refers to the address of the forensic lab
𝑒𝑐6 refers to the fingerprint expert who analysed the fingerprint
𝑒𝑐7 refers to the identification of the person of interest that the fingerprint 
       leads to
𝑒𝑐8 refers to the address of the evidence archive
𝑒𝑐9 refers to the time the fingerprint enters the archive
𝑒𝑐10 refers to the location of the fingerprint in the archive
𝑒𝑐11 refers to the chain-of-custody document of the fingerprint
 
 while its corresponding operation set O’ and relation set R’ can be specified as: 
 
𝑂′ = {𝑜0, 𝑜1, … , 𝑜𝑛}, 𝑅
′ = {𝑟0 , 𝑟1 , … , 𝑟𝑛}, 𝑛 = 0,1,… ,7
𝑜0 refers to responding, 𝑟0 = (𝑒𝑐2, 𝑒𝑐3)
𝑜1 refers to fingerprint acquisition, 𝑟1 = (𝑒𝑐2, 𝑒𝑡, 𝑒𝑐0, 𝑒𝑐1)
𝑜2 refers to entering, 𝑟2 = (𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐5, 𝑒𝑐4)
𝑜3 refers to fingerprint analysis, 𝑟3 = (𝑒𝑐6, 𝑒𝑡)
𝑜4 refers to yielding, 𝑟4 = (𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐7)
𝑜5 refers to entering, 𝑟5 = (𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐8, 𝑒𝑐9)
𝑜6 refers to documenting, 
      𝑟6 = (𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐11, 𝑒𝑐0, 𝑒𝑐1, 𝑒𝑐2, 𝑒𝑐4, 𝑒𝑐6, 𝑒𝑐9, 𝑒𝑐10)
𝑜7 refers to storing, 𝑟7 = (𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐11, 𝑒𝑐10)
 
As Example 1 shows, a context model (in this case 𝑪𝑴′) always covers its TEs (in this case 𝐸𝑇
′ , 
which contains only one element 𝑒𝑡) and the CEs to their corresponding TEs (in this case 𝐸𝐶
′ , which 
covers i items that serve as the CEs to 𝑒𝑡). The connections between the TEs and CEs are identified by 
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the operations (in this case 𝑂′) together with the relations (in this case 𝑅′). Both indexed sets comprises 
n elements, so the nth element of 𝑅′ identifies the involvement of TE and CEs in a connection, while its 
corresponding nth element of 𝑂′ defines the nature of this connection. Notice here while the semantics 
in this example is clearly defined, the syntactic rules on the expression of the relations remain open, 
i.e. 𝑟𝑛  is only defined in general as a finitary relation, whereas its grammar of expression is not 
regulated. This flexibility is considered as necessary for such definition on a rather abstract level. Also 
notice neither 𝑜𝑛  nor 𝑟𝑛 is supposed to be atomic, i.e. an operation or relation element defined here can 
be further split. This is also shown later in this subsection. 
To further validate the sufficiency of the meta-model of context model in (3.3a) regarding its 
general representability of various types of context, here the nine-class framework introduced 
in [Lee2011] (see subsection 2.1.2) is selected due to its generality, and the meta-model can be further 
specified to cover each of its nine different context classes:   
 As either actual or virtual item to be modelled, a context entity in EC can appear as either 
object, agent, or concept, depending on the restraining context that comes with it. 
Furthermore, as time and space also possess specific nature of existence, the coverage of EC 
can be extended on these two classes. In other words: 
 𝐸𝐶 = 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∪ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∪ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 ∪ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 ∪ 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 (3.3b) 
For instance, in Example 1, among all the entities identified in 𝐸′, 𝑒𝑡 and 𝑒𝑐11 are classified 
as object, 𝑒𝑐2 and 𝑒𝑐6 as agent, 𝑒𝑐3 and 𝑒𝑐7 as concept, 𝑒𝑐0, 𝑒𝑐4, and 𝑒𝑐9 as time, 𝑒𝑐1, 𝑒𝑐5, and 𝑒𝑐8 
as space. 
 As relationship describes general association between two or more context entities, it can 
be described by an unspecific operation and its corresponding relation, i.e. an operation 
element of indexed set O describes the nature of the association, and a relation element of 
indexed set R points out the involved entities in E, as shown as follows:  
 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 = {(𝑜𝑛 , 𝑟𝑛)|𝑜𝑛 ∈ 𝑂, 𝑟𝑛 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑛 ≥ 0, 𝑛 ∈ ℕ}
𝑟𝑛 = (𝑒0, 𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑖), 𝑒0, 𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑖 ∈ 𝐸, 𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 ∈ ℕ
 (3.3c) 
where rn denotes an element in R, demonstrating an i-ary relation on E.  
In Example 1, the relationship in 𝑪𝑴′ is simply 
 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝′ = {(𝑜𝑛 , 𝑟𝑛)|𝑜𝑛 ∈ 𝑂
′ , 𝑟𝑛 ∈ 𝑅
′, 𝑛 = 0,1,… ,7} 
 Within the scope of the meta-model, occurrence can be regarded as a special case of 
relationship described by as follows:  
 
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = {(𝑜𝑛 , 𝑟𝑛
𝑂)|𝑜𝑛 ∈ 𝑂, 𝑟𝑛
𝑂 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑛 ≥ 0, 𝑛 ∈ ℕ} ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝑜𝑛  refers to specific process or event 
𝑟𝑛
𝑂 = {
(𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏 , 𝑒𝑜𝑏𝑗 , 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 , 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒) in case of action
(𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏 , 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 , 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒) in case of general phenomenon
𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏 , 𝑒𝑜𝑏𝑗 ∈ 𝐸, 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ∈ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 ⊂ 𝐸𝐶 , 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ⊂ 𝐸𝐶
 (3.3d) 
In the formula, 𝑜𝑛  refers to the specific process or event, 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏 , 𝑒𝑜𝑏𝑗 , 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 , and 
𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 respectively denote subject entity, object entity, time entity, and space entity. 
Therefore, 𝑜𝑛and 𝑟𝑛
𝑂together can describe either an action, in terms of that 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏takes an 
action (specified by 𝑜𝑛) on 𝑒𝑜𝑏𝑗at the time of 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 and at the location of 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒, or a general 
phenomenon, in terms of that 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏occurs (specified by 𝑜𝑛) at the time of 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 and at the 
location of 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒. Both 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏 and 𝑒𝑜𝑏𝑗 can be either TE or CE, and can also be extended to a 
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series of entities of their kinds, while 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  and 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒  sometimes can be omitted, 
depending on the actual situation. 
In Example 1, among all the 2-tuples in 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝′, an example of occurrence is the 
(𝑜1, 𝑟1), which describes an action that the crime scene investigator (denoted by 𝑒𝑐2 ) 
acquires (specified by 𝑜0) a fingerprint (denoted by 𝑒𝑡) at the time of 𝑒𝑐0 and at the location 
of 𝑒𝑐1 . Similarly, among the rest of the elements in 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
′ , the tuples (𝑜2, 𝑟2) , 
(𝑜3, 𝑟3), (𝑜4, 𝑟4), (𝑜5, 𝑟5), (𝑜6, 𝑟6), and (𝑜7, 𝑟7) also describe actions.  
 Form of expression can similarly be regarded as a special case of relationship: 
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚 = {(𝑜𝑛 , 𝑟𝑛
𝐹)|𝑜𝑛 ∈ 𝑂, 𝑟𝑛
𝐹 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑛 ≥ 0, 𝑛 ∈ ℕ} ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝑜𝑛  refers to particular expressive forms
𝑟𝑛
𝐹 = {
(𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏 , 𝑒𝑜𝑏𝑗) in case of expression
(𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏) in case of property
, 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏 ∈ 𝐸, 𝑒𝑜𝑏𝑗 ∈ 𝐸𝐶
 (3.3e) 
so it can be used either to describe an expressive relation between entities as introduced in 
[Lee2011], or for an extension to the property of certain entity, which is not 
specified in [Lee2011] yet quite important. In the former case it describes that the subject 
entity 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏is expressed with the object entity 𝑒𝑜𝑏𝑗, which can also be extended to a series of 
entities of its kind if needed. In the latter case, 𝑟𝑛
𝐹  degenerates to a unary relation to 
identify the referred entity 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏, while 𝑜𝑛  specifies the property. An example of form of 
expression can be given here, extended from the evidence archive scenario which is 
already set in Example 1. 
Example 2.  Let 𝑒𝑐12 ∈ 𝐸𝐶
′  denote the minutiae extracted from the fingerprint 𝑒𝑡 , an 
exemplary form of expression can be defined as 
 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 = (𝑜8, 𝑟8), 𝑜8 ∈ 𝑂
′, 𝑟8 ∈ 𝑅′
𝑜8 refers to biometric expression
𝑟8 = (𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐12)
 
where the minutiae are connected to the corresponding fingerprint in the form 
of its biometric expression. 
 As purpose mainly answers the “why” question, it can be induced to a special form of 
relationship between entity and concept, which in this case specifies the “mandates, 
norms, values, intentions, rules, standards, virtues, functions [Lee2011]” that explain for 
the entity, i.e. 
 
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 = {(𝑜𝑛 , 𝑟𝑛
𝑃)|𝑜𝑛 ∈ 𝑂, 𝑟𝑛
𝑃 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑛 ≥ 0, 𝑛 ∈ ℕ} ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝑜𝑛  refers to conformity
𝑟𝑛
𝑃 = (𝑒, 𝑒𝑐), 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸, 𝑒𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 ⊂ 𝐸𝐶
 (3.3f) 
An example of purpose can be given from Example 1 by the 2-tuple (𝑜0, 𝑟0), which 
describes the crime scene investigator (denoted by 𝑒𝑐2 ) responds, because of the 
committed crime (denoted by 𝑒𝑐3). 
 Furthermore, for a particular entity e to be modelled, it is possible that it has its own 
surrounding context and at the same time also serves as context for other entities, in other 
words: 
 ∃𝑒 ∈ 𝐸𝑇 ∩ 𝐸𝐶 (3.3g) 
To demonstrate this situation, the scenario set in Example 1 and 2 is now further adapted: 
Example 3.  Suppose the fingerprint 𝑒𝑡 is acquired from the scene on its substrate, a piece of 
paper, and it enters the forensic lab together with its substrate, where both of 
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them are examined. Let 𝑒𝑡
′ denotes the substrate, 𝑒𝑐13 ∈ 𝐸𝐶
′  the trace evidence 
expert. Then the analysis of fingerprint should now be described as 
  𝑜3 refers to fingerprint analysis, 𝑟3 = (𝑒𝑐2, 𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡
′) 
where 𝑒𝑡 is trivially the TE, whereas 𝑒𝑡
′ serves as a CE, because the substrate 
needs to be considered in the selection of specific analysing method. Yet 
similarly, the analysis of the substrate for trace evidence can be described as 
 𝑜9 refers to trace analysis, 𝑟9 = (𝑒𝑐13, 𝑒𝑡
′ , 𝑒𝑡) 
where this time 𝑒𝑡
′ is the TE, while 𝑒𝑡 serves as a CE, because the trace analysis 
method must be designed in the way that the fingerprint evidence is not 
compromised. 
Therefore, among all the entities defined in the two subsets of 𝐸′ 
 𝐸𝑇
′ ∩ 𝐸𝐶
′ = {𝑒𝑡, 𝑒𝑡
′} 
In summary, by flexibly specifying the modelled items denoted by ET and EC, the content of 
operation O as well as the arity and coverage of the relations in R, the meta-model proposed in 
formula (3.3) is capable of describing any context model in general. A typical embodiment of such 
meta-model would appear as follows: 
 
𝑪𝑴 = (𝐸, 𝑂, 𝑅), 𝐸 ≠ ∅, 𝑂 ≠ ∅, 𝑅 ⊆ 𝐸 × …× 𝐸,𝑅 ≠ ∅
𝐸 = {𝐸𝑇 , 𝐸𝐶}, 𝐶 = {𝐸𝐶 , 𝑂, 𝑅}
𝐸𝑇 = {𝑒𝑡|𝑒𝑡  refers to target entities}
𝐸𝐶 = {𝑒𝑐|𝑒𝑐  refers to context entities}
𝑂 = {𝑜0, 𝑜1, … , 𝑜𝑛}, 𝑅 = {𝑟0 , 𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑛}, 𝑛 ≥ 0, 𝑛 ∈ ℕ
𝑟𝑛 = (𝑒0, 𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑖), 𝑒0, 𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑖 ∈ 𝐸, 𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 ∈ ℕ
 (3.4) 
where the extension is highlighted comparing to the definition in (3.3a). 
3.2 SECURITY-ORIENTED CONTEXT MODELLING 
As the meta-model is defined and also validated for general context modelling in computer science, 
this section further integrates the concepts regarding IT security into the meta-model developed in last 
section, deriving the concept of security-oriented context modelling. Subsection 3.2.1 specifies the 
security context in the meta-model, subsection 3.2.2 focuses on system level security and formulates 
security policies on various granularities, subsection 3.2.3 focuses on data level security and identifies 
various types of context in the both data acquisition and processing environments. 
3.2.1 Recognising security context in the meta-model 
As more and more security related requirements are raised in various IT application scenarios, the 
modelling applied in those scenarios subsequently involves more and more security relevant context. 
Therefore to emphasise the existence of such context, this dissertation proposes the concept of security-
oriented context modelling, which is defined as the context modelling recognising security context 
applied for security assurance of large scale data processing systems. Specifying the existence of 
security context, the meta-model described in (3.4) can be further extended to describe the concept: 
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𝑪𝑴𝑺 = (𝐸,𝑂, 𝑅), 𝐸 ≠ ∅,𝑂 ≠ ∅,𝑅 ⊆ 𝐸 × …× 𝐸, 𝑅 ≠ ∅ 
𝐸 = {𝐸𝑇 , 𝐸𝐶}, 𝐸𝐶 = {𝐸𝐺𝐶 , 𝐸𝑆𝐶}
𝐸𝑇 = {𝑒𝑡|𝑒𝑡  refers to target entities}
𝐸𝐺𝐶 = {𝑒𝑔𝑐|𝑒𝑔𝑐  refers to general context entities}
𝐸𝑆𝐶 = {𝑒𝑠𝑐|𝑒𝑠𝑐  refers to security context entities}
𝑂 = {𝑂𝐺 , 𝑂𝑆}, 𝑅 = {𝑅𝐺 , 𝑅𝑆}
𝑂 = {𝑜0, 𝑜1, … , 𝑜𝑛}, 𝑅 = {𝑟0 , 𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑛}, 𝑛 ≥ 0, 𝑛 ∈ ℕ
𝑟𝑛 = (𝑒0, 𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑖), 𝑒0, 𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑖 ∈ 𝐸, 𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 ∈ ℕ 
𝐶 = {𝐸𝐶 , 𝑂, 𝑅}, 𝐶𝑆 = {𝐸𝑆𝐶 , 𝑂𝑆 , 𝑅𝑆}
 (3.5a) 
where the highlighted part specifies the security-relevance in the definition: EC is further split into 
general context entities EGC and security context entities ESC, O into general operations OG and security-
oriented operations OS, R into general relations RG and security-oriented relations RS. ESC, OS together 
with RS form the security context CS.  
Recalling the scenario presented in Example 1, based on (3.5a) now the elements in 𝑪𝑴′ can be 
further categorised according to their security relevance: 
Example 4.  Suppose in such forensic scenario the security requirement covers only the processed 
fingerprint, i.e. its confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, availability, and non-
repudiation, let 𝑪𝑴𝒔
′  be the security-oriented context model, it can then be derived by 
clarifying the security relevance of the elements in 𝑪𝑴′: 
 
𝑪𝑴𝒔
′ = (𝐸′, 𝑂′, 𝑅′)
𝐸′ = {𝐸𝑇
′ , 𝐸𝐶
′ }, 𝐸𝐶
′ = {𝐸𝐺𝐶
′ , 𝐸𝑆𝐶
′ }
𝐸𝑇
′ = {𝑒𝑡}, 𝐸𝐶
′ = {𝑒𝑐0, 𝑒𝑐1, … , 𝑒𝑐𝑖}, 𝑖 = 0,1,… ,11
𝐸𝐺𝐶
′ = {𝑒𝑐5, 𝑒𝑐8},𝐸𝑆𝐶
′ = { 𝑒𝑐0, 𝑒𝑐1, 𝑒𝑐2, 𝑒𝑐3, 𝑒𝑐4, 𝑒𝑐6, 𝑒𝑐7, 𝑒𝑐9, 𝑒𝑐10, 𝑒𝑐11}
𝑒𝑡 refers to the fingerprint
𝑒𝑐0 refers to the time of acquisition
𝑒𝑐1 refers to the location of acquistion
𝑒𝑐2 refers to the crime scene investigator who acquired the fingerprint
𝑒𝑐3 refers to the crime case the fingerprint is related to
𝑒𝑐4 refers to the time when the evidence arrives in the forensic lab 
𝑒𝑐5 refers to the address of the forensic lab
𝑒𝑐6 refers to the fingerprint expert who analysed the fingerprint
𝑒𝑐7 refers to the identification of the person of interest that the fingerprint 
       leads to
𝑒𝑐8 refers to the address of the evidence archive
𝑒𝑐9 refers to the time the fingerprint enters the archive
𝑒𝑐10 refers to the location of the fingerprint in the archive
𝑒𝑐11 refers to the chain-of-custody document of the fingerprint 
𝑂′ = {𝑜0, 𝑜1, … , 𝑜𝑛}, 𝑅
′ = {𝑟0 , 𝑟1 , … , 𝑟𝑛}, 𝑛 = 0,1,… ,7
𝑂′ = {𝑂𝐺
′ , 𝑂𝑆
′}, 𝑅′ = {𝑅𝐺
′ , 𝑅𝑆
′ }
𝑂𝐺
′ = {𝑜0}, 𝑂𝑆
′ = {𝑜1, 𝑜2, 𝑜3, 𝑜4, 𝑜5, 𝑜6, 𝑜7}
𝑅𝐺
′ = {𝑟0}, 𝑅𝑆
′ = {𝑟1 , 𝑟2, 𝑟3, 𝑟4, 𝑟5, 𝑟6 , 𝑟7}
𝑜0 refers to responding, 𝑟0 = (𝑒𝑐2, 𝑒𝑐3)
𝑜1 refers to fingerprint acquisition, 𝑟1 = (𝑒𝑐2, 𝑒𝑡, 𝑒𝑐0, 𝑒𝑐1)
𝑜2 refers to entering, 𝑟2 = (𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐5, 𝑒𝑐4)
𝑜3 refers to fingerprint analysis, 𝑟3 = (𝑒𝑐6, 𝑒𝑡)
𝑜4 refers to yielding, 𝑟4 = (𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐7)
𝑜5 refers to entering, 𝑟5 = (𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐8, 𝑒𝑐9)
𝑜6 refers to documenting,
𝑟6 = (𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐11, 𝑒𝑐0, 𝑒𝑐1, 𝑒𝑐2, 𝑒𝑐4, 𝑒𝑐6, 𝑒𝑐9, 𝑒𝑐10)
𝑜7 refers to storing, 𝑟7 = (𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐11, 𝑒𝑐10)
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𝐶 = {𝐸𝐶 , 𝑂, 𝑅}, 𝐶𝑆 = {𝐸𝑆𝐶 , 𝑂𝑆 , 𝑅𝑆} 
As shown above, among all the CEs, the address information of forensic lab (𝑒𝑐5) and 
that of evidence archive (𝑒𝑐8) is classified as general context, as it is not directly 
related to the security assurance of the TE. All the other CEs are classified into 
security context, e.g. the time and space information constitutes the chain-of-custody, 
which is directly related to integrity and non-repudiation, the human agents, i.e. the 
crime scene investigator and fingerprint experts, both are related to the authenticity 
of the fingerprint. Similarly, the operations and relations are also classified in this 
way.  
As already established in section 1.3, a well-developed data processing system should achieve 
its security on two levels: on the system level the security requirements are analysed and clarified, 
then on the data level specific processing procedures are realised to meet those security requirements. 
Therefore despite its nature being consistent as described in (3.5a), the content of CS varies on system 
and data levels, and this is further discussed in later subsections.  
Based on the difference content of security context on system and data levels, the security-
oriented context modelling also plays different roles on different levels in their contribution to the 
overall security assurance of the whole data processing system.  
 
Figure 8. Security-oriented context modelling contributes on both levels to the security assurance of data 
processing system 
As Figure 8 illustrates, the aim of system level security-oriented context modelling is to 
identify and clarify the context CS on the system level, so the security assurance can be introduced via 
CS either to improve an already existing system model or in the early stage of the development of a 
system model. In the meantime, data level security-oriented context modelling is applied to identify 
and interpret security context CS on the data level, so the data processing procedures can be better 
designed, organised and implemented to eventually realise the security assurance. Embracing the 
different types of entities defined in (3.5a), in a digital data processing system, the data is always 
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considered as ET, and while its EGC together with OG, RG is usually introduced within the scope of the 
system, its ESC, OS, and RS are introduced by security-oriented context modelling on both system and 
data levels. 
The following subsections describe how security context is identified, extracted, organised, 
and expressed on system and data levels, respectively. 
3.2.2 Contextualise the security on the system level 
As defined previously, system level security focuses on identifying and clarifying the security 
requirements with regard to various system components. Since security policy is defined as statement 
of what is allowed and what is not [Bishop2002] to regulate what in the system should be protected 
[BS2002], it serves ideally to describe the required security assurance on various granularities in a 
system. To better clarify the content of security context on different granularities, the following series 
of concepts are derived from the original definition of security policy, reflecting various context 
classes described in subsection 3.1.2.  
On the level of coarsest granularity, abstract security policy (ASP) can be defined as 
 
𝑨𝑺𝑷 = (𝐸, {𝑜}, {𝑟𝑠})
𝐸 = {𝐸𝑇 , 𝐸𝐶}, 𝐸𝐶 = {𝐸𝐺𝐶 , 𝐸𝑆𝐶}
𝐸𝑇 = {the overall system}
𝐸𝑆𝐶 = {authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, availability, non-repudiation}
𝑜 refers to conformity
𝑟𝑠 ∈ 𝑅𝑆 ⊆ 𝐸𝑇 × 𝐸𝑆𝐶
 (3.5b) 
specifying the definition in (3.5a) by integrating the context class of purpose described in (3.3f). By 
definition, abstract security policy simply identifies the security context CS by regulating the security 
aspects that the overall data processing system needs to be in conformity with. Despite its simplicity, 
the abstract security policy implicitly regulates the conditions under which the data objects are 
processed. Taking the forensic scenario set in Examples 1, 2, 3, and 4 for instance, if the forensic 
processing pipeline being modelled is regarded as a system, then an exemplary ASP for this system 
can be: 
Example 5.  ASP1: The forensic system shall be in conformity with data authenticity. 
then the forensic system, which is always the TE in abstract security policy, shall be at least designed 
in the way as the CE requires, in this particular policy i.e. the provenance/authenticity information of 
the data objects (i.e. the fingerprint evidence in the scenario set in the examples) shall be processed, 
and they should even be actively authenticated on regular basis. 
It is expected that the proper processing of data objects involves interactions among different 
objects (including data objects and system components), sometimes human agents or even virtual 
concepts, restrained by time and/or space. Therefore, specific security policy (SSP) is subsequently 
defined to regulate those interactions in the forms of security-oriented occurrence or form of 
expression (see (3.3b-e)). It is formulated as follows: 
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𝑺𝑺𝑷 = (𝐸, 𝑂𝑆 , 𝑅𝑆)
𝐸 = {𝐸𝑇 , 𝐸𝐶}, 𝐸𝐶 = {𝐸𝐺𝐶 , 𝐸𝑆𝐶}
𝐸𝑇 = {𝑒𝑡|
𝑒𝑡  refers to target system components, data objects, 
human agents, or virtual concepts.
}
𝐸𝐺𝐶 = {𝑒𝑔𝑐|𝑒𝑔𝑐  refers to relevant system components, time, space, data objects, etc.}
𝐸𝑆𝐶 = {𝑒𝑠𝑐|𝑒𝑠𝑐  refers to security-oriented system components, data objects, etc.  }
𝑂𝑆 = {𝑜𝑠|𝑜𝑠  refers to security-oriented processes, events, or expressive forms.  }
𝑅𝑆 ⊆ 𝐸 ×…× 𝐸
 (3.5c) 
In formula (3.5c), os denotes a security-oriented operation which reflects requirement from 
abstract security policies. et refers to the TE of the operation, which can be either object (either data 
object or system component), human agent, or virtual concept. esc is security context entity (SCE) that 
developed only for security assurance, and it can similarly appear as either object, agent, or concept. 
egc is general context entity (GCE), which is involved with the operation yet exists for non-security 
related system functionality. Therefore besides object, agent, and concept, it can cover time and space 
as restraining factors. 
Taking the previous ASP1 for example, a possible specific security policy reflecting it can be: 
Example 6.  Suppose a human archive managing agent takes charge of all the actions within the 
evidence archive, an exemplary SSP derived from ASP1 can be: 
SSP1: When the fingerprint enters the evidence archive, the archive managing agent 
shall store it in an indexed location and assures its authenticity by updating its chain-
of-custody document with this location information.  
Let 𝑒𝑐14 denote the human archive managing agent, interpreting SSP1 with regard to formula 
(3.5), Table 6 analyses the semantics of SSP1, using notations established in Examples 1, 2, 3, and 4, and 
the entity types are also marked in brackets according to the nine-class classification from [Lee2011]. 
Context entities Target entities 
r egc esc os et 
(𝑒𝑐14, 𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐9) 
Entering time 𝑒𝑐9  
(time) 
Archive 
managing agent 
𝑒𝑐14  
(human agent) 
store 𝑜7 
Fingerprint 𝑒𝑡 
(object) 
(𝑒𝑐14, 𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐9, 𝑒𝑐11) 
Chain-of-
custody 
document 
𝑒𝑐11 
(object) 
Entering 
time 𝑒𝑐9  
(time) 
document𝑜6 
Fingerprint 𝑒𝑡  
(object) 
Table 6. Identify the context and target entities of an exemplary specific security policy 
The definition of SSP bears high flexibility regarding its granularity, therefore suitable for 
systems with different scales and complexities. In fact, when the complexity of a data processing 
system reaches a certain level, it is necessary to introduce certain mechanism, e.g. a policy hierarchy, 
to organise the large number of SSPs. This is further explained and implemented in Chapter 4. 
Comparing to ASP, SSP in general encompasses more details, but its flexible structure 
constrains its potential to be directly executed. Therefore, on the finest granularity the concept of 
security rule (SR) is defined, as an atomic SSP that describes strictly one operation targeting one TE 
from one SCE, if necessary restrained by GCE/GCEs, described as follows:  
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𝑺𝑹 = {𝐸, {𝑜𝑠}, {𝑟𝑠}}
𝐸 = {𝑒𝑠𝑐 , 𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑔𝑐0, 𝑒𝑔𝑐1,… , 𝑒𝑔𝑐𝑖}, 𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 ∈ ℕ
𝑒𝑔𝑐0, 𝑒𝑔𝑐1, … , 𝑒𝑔𝑐𝑖 ∈ 𝐸𝐺𝐶 ⊂ 𝐸𝐶 , 𝑒𝑠𝑐 ∈ 𝐸𝑆𝐶 ⊂ 𝐸𝐶 , 𝑒𝑡 ∈ 𝐸𝑇  
𝑜𝑠 ∈ 𝑂𝑆
𝑟𝑠 = (𝑒𝑠𝑐, 𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑔𝑐0, 𝑒𝑔𝑐1, … , 𝑒𝑔𝑐𝑖), 𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 ∈ ℕ
 (3.5d) 
Based on this definition, an exemplary SR can be easily derived from SSP1 directly: 
Example 7.  SR1: When the fingerprint enters the evidence archive, the archive managing agent 
shall store it in an indexed location. 
Similar to Table 6, the following Table 7 identifies the semantics in SR1: 
Context entities Target entities 
r egc esc os et 
(𝑒𝑐14, 𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑐9) 
Entering time 𝑒𝑐9  
(time) 
Archive managing agent 
𝑒𝑐14  
(human agent) 
store 𝑜7 
Fingerprint 𝑒𝑡  
(object) 
Table 7. Identify the context and target entities of an exemplary security rule 
As shown in Table 7, SR1 strictly projects one operation on one TE, describing an atomic 
action. Comparing to SSP1, it gains a huge advantage with regard to the simplicity for further 
execution. In the case of a data object as TE of the SR (like SR1), the SR can be regarded as an atomic 
data processing procedure. Therefore, all such SRs together describe the overall data processing 
environment in the system, serving as the basis for the further data level security-oriented context 
modelling. 
Summing this subsection up, to introduce the security assurance to a data processing system, 
the system level security-oriented context modelling contextualises the security requirements on 
various levels of granularity with a top-down structure. As illustrated in Figure 9, security-oriented 
context modelling takes the system level security context, which comes in a rather raw form (hence 
covered by general sets of E, O, and R in the figure) as input. Then it uses ASP to identify the general 
security aspects for the overall system on the coarsest granularity, SSP to clarify the specified security 
operations with regard to specified roles in the system on intermediate granularities, and SR to 
regulate the atomic actions to be executed on the finest granularity. As SR comprises atomic 
operations involving individual entities, i.e. (𝑜𝑠 , 𝑟𝑠) that connects all et, egc, and esc (see (3.5d)), it 
directly describes the processing environment (see the definition of PE in (3.5e) in subsection 3.2.3) 
and serves as the basis of data level analysis. A further instantiation of system level security-oriented 
context modelling is described in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 9. System level security-oriented context modelling introduces security assurance using security 
policies on various granularities 
3.2.3 Contextualise the security on the data level 
While the security assurance of the system is introduced on the system level by the development of 
security policies on various granularities, it is realised on the data level by specific mechanisms. As 
defined in last subsection, SRs on the finest granularity on the system level yield processing 
procedures on the TEs, including the data objects. Therefore, for a particular data object that the 
system processes, its processing environment can be described by clustering all the SRs with this 
object as TE (see also Figure 9):  
 
𝑷𝑬 = {𝑆𝑅0, 𝑆𝑅1, … , 𝑆𝑅𝑚},𝑚 ≥ 0,𝑚 ∈ ℕ
𝑆𝑅𝑚 = (𝐸𝑚 , {𝑜𝑠𝑚}, {𝑟𝑠𝑚})
𝐸𝑚 = {𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝑚 , 𝑒𝑔𝑐0
𝑚 , 𝑒𝑔𝑐1
𝑚 , … , 𝑒𝑔𝑐𝑛
𝑚 }, 𝑛 ≥ 0, 𝑛 ∈ ℕ
𝑒𝑡  refers to data object 
𝐶𝑝 = {(𝐸0 ∪ 𝐸1 ∪…∪ 𝐸𝑚) ∖ {𝑒𝑡}, {𝑜𝑠0, 𝑜𝑠1, … , 𝑜𝑠𝑚}, {𝑟𝑠0 , 𝑟𝑠1, … , 𝑟𝑠𝑚}}
 (3.6a) 
where PE refers to the processing environment of the data object et, and its context in this environment 
is defined as processing context, which is denoted as 𝐶𝑝.  
Besides the processing environment, for some systems it is also necessary to consider the 
acquisition environment. When the data object is acquired before it enters the processing environment, 
it is usually expected that additional information is also acquired simultaneously. Such information is 
defined here as acquisition context. Let AE be the acquisition environment, it can be formalised as the 
following 3-tuple: 
Processing 
environment 
PE 
Digital data 
processing system 
coarse 
fine 
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security 
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s 
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s 
Processing procedures (𝑜𝑠 , 𝑟𝑠) 
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SSP 
SSP 
SSP 
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𝑨𝑬 = (𝐸𝐴 , 𝑂𝐴 , 𝑅𝐴)
𝑜𝑎 ∈ 𝑂𝐴 , 𝑜𝑎  refers to acquistion
𝑅𝐴 ⊆ 𝐸𝐴 ×…× 𝐸𝐴
𝐸𝐴 = {𝑒𝑡} ∪ 𝐸𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∪ 𝐸𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖
𝐶𝑎 = {𝐸𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∪ 𝐸𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖 , 𝑂𝐴 , 𝑅𝐴}
 (3.6b) 
where the domain 𝐸𝐴 comprises three subsets: the target entity, in this case the data object 𝑒𝑡 being 
processed, together with 𝐸𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, which denotes the context entities that represent the property of 𝑒𝑡, 
and 𝐸𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖, which denotes the context entities introduced to 𝑒𝑡 by the acquisition environment itself. For 
instance, in the forensic scenario set in earlier examples, if a fingerprint is acquired in a crime scene 
using a digital camera, its own properties like size or clarity of details  would constitute 𝐸𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, while 
the further information introduced by the acquisition environment like temperature, humidity, 
substrate, or camera settings would constitute 𝐸𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖. The operation set 𝑂𝐴 not only covers the specific 
action of acquisition (denoted here by 𝑜𝑎) but also specifies further relationships existing among the 
entities in 𝐸𝐴, while the relation set 𝑅𝐴 identifies the involved entities in those relationships. Therefore, 
regarding the acquired data object 𝑒𝑡, its acquisition context is defined as 𝐶𝑎 in the formula. 
The context in processing and acquisition environment can be further specified, based on the 
categorisation from Perera et al. in [PZC+2014]. In the processing environment, the GCEs and SCEs 
that come directly from the environment belong to the primary processing context with regard to the 
processed data object. Subsequently, the secondary processing context can be derived by further 
interpreting the primary one (see Chapter 5 for more details). Additionally, the processing 
environment can be organised differently based on different GCEs in the primary processing context. 
For instance, based on time and/or space entities, a processing environment can appear as 
temporal/geographical processing pipeline. Similarly, in the acquisition environment, primary 
acquisition context is defined as the additional information which is directly collected during the 
acquisition of the data object and covers in general all entities that are relevant to the concerned 
application scenario in the acquisition environment. Despite that it does not necessarily interact with 
the data object immediately in the phase of acquisition, it enters the processing environment together 
with the data object. Therefore, similar to the secondary processing context, the secondary acquisition 
context can also be derived in the processing environment by interpreting the primary acquisition 
context. The two kinds of secondary context together yield the execution of the processing procedures, 
which directly interact with the processed data object. 
Figure 10 illustrates contextualisation of the security on the data level. In the acquisition 
environment, the primary acquisition context is generated simultaneously with the acquisition of the 
data object. After it enters the processing environment together with the acquired data object et, the 
secondary acquisition context is derived from it. In the meantime, the primary processing context is 
generated by clustering the related SRs from the system level context modelling, sometimes also by 
further interpreting the secondary acquisition context. The secondary processing context is then 
derived from the primary one. Therefore, the two kinds of secondary context are together used to 
guide the specific execution of the processing procedures on the data object et. In this way, not only 
can the security assurance introduced by the system level modelling be fully realised on the data level, 
additionally it gains the potential of addressing non-repudiation for the system, as the data level 
context model possesses the ability of clarifying all the interaction between the concerned data object 
and other system entities. Chapter 5 describes a further instantiation of the data level security-oriented 
context modelling, especially on how to interpret primary context to derive secondary context. 
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Figure 10. Data level security-oriented context modelling realises security assurance by collecting primary 
context and derive it to secondary context (adapted from [QSZ+2014]) 
3.3 DESCRIPTIVE SCHEME OF SECURITY-ORIENTED CONTEXT MODELS 
The last two sections elucidate the conception of security-oriented context modelling. 
Following the conception, security-oriented context models can be derived. However, to close the last 
gap between the derived context models and the application of them for data processing systems or 
procedures, this section proposes a descriptive scheme. As shown in Figure 11, the descriptive scheme 
of security-oriented context model comprises the following four parts: 
 Identifier describes the application scenario that the context model is planned to be used 
for. 
 Version describes the status of the context model, as the model evolves with the 
evolvement of its context, resulting in an iterative modelling process. 
 Security-oriented context model is the result of the modelling technique, and as shown 
respectively in Chapter 4 and 5 in two different yet connected application scenarios, it can 
either be a system level model or a data level one. 
 Evaluation metrics cover two aspects: the scenario-unspecific evaluation metrics assess the 
quality of a context model, regarding its universal properties irrelevant to the nature of its 
application scenario, whereas the scenario-specific evaluation metrics assess the performance 
of the context model, i.e. the data processing system that the model yields on the system 
level, or the data processing procedure it yields on the data level, both with regard to its 
specific application scenario. According to subsection 2.2.3, the scenario-unspecific 
metrics are yet to be formed, thus this is addressed in Chapter 6. As introduced in 
subsection 2.4.2 and 2.5.2, the scenario-specific metrics vary from approach to approach 
and scenario to scenario. The relationship between the application scenario and the two 
aspects of evaluation metrics is also further explored in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 11. Descriptive scheme of security-oriented context model 
3.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter depicts the theoretical framework of security-oriented context modelling proposed in this 
dissertation. The framework comprises a series of concepts, which are founded on existing definitions 
on general modelling and enriched by gradually introducing further related ones regarding both 
context and IT security. The resulting meta-model covers all the general context types identified in the 
state of the art, and it also handles IT security on two different levels: the security assurance is 
introduced on the system level, and then realised on the data level. On the system level, security 
policies on various granularity levels are derived from system level security context as the carrier of 
specific security requirements, yielding processing procedures of various entities in the system. On the 
data level, security context are collected and interpreted from both acquisition and processing 
environments, yielding specific operations on the processed data objects. As the “hook” connecting 
both levels, the security policy on the finest granularity level, namely the security rule, is on one hand 
the expression of atomic actions derived from system level security context, and on the other hand the 
specific requirement to be implemented on the data level, contributing to the processing environment 
as well as the data level security context in it. Furthermore, this chapter also proposes a descriptive 
scheme for the security-oriented context model, clarifying the role of its evaluation metrics. 
The framework derived in this chapter answers to research challenge 1) with the formalised 
meta-model, and it also serves as the theoretical basis of the general methodology, which answers to 
research challenge 2). Despite it does not directly answer to the research challenge 3) regarding the 
evaluation issue, a descriptive scheme additional to the framework is proposed to identify the 
association of the evaluation metrics to the model, as well as the functionality of the metrics 
summarised in two aspects.  
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Context modelling for IT security in selected application scenarios 
 
 51 
4 CONTEXT MODELLING ON THE SYSTEM LEVEL 
This chapter describes a system level instantiation of the security-oriented context modelling in the 
application scenario of digital long-term archiving. Such instantiation directly answers to the two 
events of security compromise in digital archiving introduced in Chapter 1. The theoretical framework 
derived in Chapter 3 is applied in this scenario, resulting in a system-level context model of an 
archiving environment, which is capable of securely preserving data for a relatively long-term of time. 
The model is based on the OAIS standard and specific use-cases and derives security context from 
them. The security context is then further interpreted, so that corresponding system components can 
be derived to introduce security assurance through a security policy hierarchy. 
The evolving digital era presents an unusual challenge for law enforcement: not only more 
and more evidence is found digital, due to the ever-increasing involvement of digital equipment in the 
crimes, but a growing amount of digitised evidence also emerges with the development of modern 
forensic technology. Therefore it is becoming a salient concern not only regarding the collection and 
processing of such electronic evidence but also its storage and long-term preservation. Despite the fact 
that such concern has been raised in U.S. at least since 2006 [Schilling2006], until recently the law 
enforcement personnel there is still guided to preserve electronic evidence in the conventional way, i.e. 
transferring digital information onto a CD-R or other write-once read-many (WORM) media and 
preserve it in a chain of custody, just like other physical evidences [Cameron2011]. Similar 
preservation means are also enforced by law enforcements in China [NPC1996] [SAA1999] [SAA2012] 
and Germany [RFJ2007]. Applying conventional preservation methods on electronic evidence fulfils 
certain demand for security, yet it has some severe drawbacks [Garfinkel2010]. First, the storage 
medium itself, like CD-R, is vulnerable and prone to damage. Second, the hardware and software 
interface for the storage medium can become obsolete in the case of long-term preservation. Third, the 
formats in which the digital data is stored can also become obsolete in the case of long-term 
preservation. At last, neither the currently used hardware nor the software is intended for efficient 
management of huge amounts of electronic evidence. All the above drawbacks would eventually lead 
to the inaccessibility of the data, which can cause fatal consequences if the preserved data is a 
significant piece of electronic evidence, and this is unfortunately already reflected by the dismissal 
DEA case against the fugitive doctor, as described and analysed in Chapter 1. To some degree, 
employing naive preservation strategies is fatal as much as no preservation strategies at all. For 
example, the WORM (write-once read-many) concept gets effectively undermined by simply copying 
data from one obsoleting storage device to an up-to-date one, as from the point of view of data the 
“write-once” principle is violated here. 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop a digital long-term preservation environment, which 
meets certain security requirements in managing large amounts of data. This necessity is almost 
salient, given the lack of endeavour towards this direction reflected by the state of the art (see section 
2.4). As a first step towards such environment, based on the state-of-the-art achievement within the 
scope of SHAMAN (Sustaining Heritage Access through Multivalent AchiviNg, see subsection 2.4.2), 
this chapter proposes an OAIS (Open Archival Information System)-compliant framework which 
applies system level security-oriented context modelling as solution for security policy generation, 
4 Context modelling on the system level 
 
 52 
implementation and enforcement: Section 4.1 presents the design of the framework for 
contextualisation and policy-based security realisation. Section 4.2 demonstrates the application of the 
framework by applying it to one functionality entity of the archival system. Section 4.3 demonstrates a 
security assessment based on selected criteria from SHAMAN assessment framework. Section 4.4 
summarises the whole chapter. 
The research presented in this chapter was sponsored within the scope of SHAMAN project1, 
and parts of it have been published in [QSK+2011a], [SQK+2011], and [QSK+2011b]. 
4.1 DESIGN OF THE CONTEXTUALISATION FRAMEWORK 
This section describes the proposed framework for contextualisation of security for digital long-term 
archiving. Considering the application scenario of the framework, there are some basic requirements: 
first, the framework must be able to introduce the security assurance in all aspects within a long-term 
archiving system for electronic evidence, especially those barely covered by the OAIS standard. 
Second, it must provide effective mechanism to manage a large quantity of security policies coming 
with a rather complex system. Third, it must at the same time serve as a seamless integration with the 
OAIS standard to ensure the accessibility and availability of all concepts and functions defined by the 
OAIS standard. At last, the framework must provide central management and audit service, similar to 
OAIS standard as well as any other complex systems. 
As embodiment of the system level security-oriented context modelling explained in 
subsection 3.2.2, a contextualisation framework is developed with four major functional blocks, each 
aiming at one of the preceding four basic requirements [QSK+2011b]: a) context analysis, b) policy 
hierarchy, c) Information Package (IP) processing, and d) central control. The context analysis block consists 
of two distinct parts: global (system-wide) and local context analysis, both helping the system identify 
security-related requirements from its application scenario. The policy generation hierarchy is a 
hierarchy of stages beginning at the top with the generation of system-wide global policies and ending 
in the deviation and invocation of rules for IP processing operations. As shown later, the policy 
hierarchy is a satisfactory solution for large quantity of policies. The IP processing itself identifies the 
IPs (or related system data) to be processed, which can be various pieces of electronic evidence, and 
applies the rules as sequences of atomic data processing operations. Depending on their status in the 
archival system, IPs can be further specified as Submission IPs (SIPs) which are submitted to the 
archive, or Archival IP (AIPs) which are preserved in the archive, or Dissemination IPs (DIPs) which 
are disseminated from the archive on request. This block is based on the already existing functions 
defined by OAIS standard thus offers the seamless integration required. The control block controls the 
context analysis and the policy generation hierarchy and acts as a central policy repository as well as a 
central audit service for the overall system.  
Figure 12 visualises the embodiment of the system level security-oriented context modelling 
in the application scenario of digital-term preservation discussed in this chapter, specifying the 
concepts in the theory using the entities appearing in the scenario. As shown in the figure, here three 
parts contribute to the system level security context: 1) the already established OAIS standard (see 
[OAIS2002] and [OAIS2009]), 2) the Information Lifecycle Model (ILM) developed within the scope of 
SHAMAN (see [BKJ+2010]), 3) the use-cases derived within the scope of SHAMAN. All three together 
cover the involved context domain E, as well as all the operations O and relations R on the domain. 
From the system level security context, a policy hierarchy is then derived, covering various 
granularity levels from the system to its module, then to the functional entities, and eventually to the 
                                                        
1 Funded in part by the European Commission through the FP7 ICT Programme under Contract FP7-ICT-216736 
SHAMAN. 
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functions, where SRs yield specific processing procedures (which can be described by 2-tuple (𝑜𝑠 , 𝑟𝑠) 
according to preceding definitions) on various entities processed on the function level, denoted by 𝑒𝑡, 
𝑒𝑔𝑐, and 𝑒𝑠𝑐 depending on the roles that the entities play in the specific procedures. The following 
subsections describe further in details how to model the context, as well as how to generate, 
implement, and enforce security policies based on use-cases from a data intensive, complex, security-
oriented data processing system, like an archive for digital long-term preservation. 
 
Figure 12. Embodiment of system level security-oriented context modelling in the application scenario of 
digital long-term preservation 
4.1.1 System level context analysis and interpretation 
A complex data processing system usually contains a large amount of components with different 
types of relationships among the components. Therefore, the “bottom-up” modelling approach is not 
suitable, as achieving a complete and vivid representation as a starting point in context modelling is 
not feasible under these circumstances. Instead, it is more appropriate to first extract typical functions 
(workflows) from use-cases in such systems and then gradually extend these into a fully developed 
context model, which clearly depicts the system components as well as relationships among them, 
expressed here in the form of policies and rules. In other words, the progress of system level security-
oriented context modelling here is a progress of gradually specifying all the elements (i.e. 𝑒𝑡, 𝑒𝑔𝑐, 𝑒𝑠𝑐, 
𝑜𝑠 and 𝑟𝑠) in the system level context (i.e. E, O and R) introduced into the scenario at the beginning. As 
the first step towards in modelling progress, the system level context is analysed and interpreted here 
in this subsection.  
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Figure 13. Basic structure of the archiving system based on the ILM introduced in [BKJ+2010] 
As mentioned previously, Brocks et al. extended in [BKJ+2010] the OAIS model by 
introducing an extended ILM, as shown in Figure 13. In this the OAIS-compliant archiving module 
including all its functional entities are considered as one phase of the lifetime of a data object. The ILM 
extends this by including the “life” of data objects before and after being archived within the module. 
The phase before a digital object enters an archival system is called “Pre-Ingest”, which further 
contains the actual creation of the data later to be ingested and its assembly into a package supported by 
the archive. The phase after a digital object leaves the module is called “Post-Access” and it contains 
adoption where the received data is unpacked, examined, transformed, displayed or in short all tasks 
that are needed for repurposing the content and reuse where the content is actually exploited. Notice 
that reuse may also include the re-ingest of this data object or a derivation thereof into an archival 
system, leading to a real lifecycle as shown in Figure 13. Such connection between reuse and creation is 
especially the case for collaborative environments. In the discussed scenario in this chapter, such ILM 
contributes to the system level context in the way of serving as the skeleton of the secure long-term 
archive to be developed. 
As a further extension of the work of Brocks et al., in this chapter the considerations are 
limited on the central phase of the ILM, i.e. the functional entities within the OAIS-compliant 
archiving module, together with the corresponding security considerations. As one part of the system 
level context, OAIS together with its already established system components (which in both 
[OAIS2002] and [OAIS2009] are referred to as “functional entities”, see Figure 5) provides the skeleton 
of the central archiving phase of the ILM, which is the core of the secure long-term archive to be 
developed. However, as explained previously in subsection 2.4.2, the original OAIS standard lacks 
detailed information about security requirements, thus it needs to be enhanced in this regard. To 
apply context modelling towards such enhancement, the application scenario is analysed with its 
security concerns so its context can be extracted and processed. In the scope of SHAMAN, the 
application scenario is described by the use-cases provided by corresponding project partners. These 
use-cases are regarded as the other part of system level context that describes the secure long-term 
archive in the discussed application scenario (as illustrated in Figure 13), and the first step to process it 
is to review all these use-cases and select those security-related ones, yielding the global security context. 
The results of this step can be referred to in see Appendix A.  
As Appendix A shows, the global security context reveals the security related events expected 
for the archiving system, so the basic security aspects involved in this application scenario can be 
easily identified, trivially leading to the ASPs of the system, following the formalisation described in 
formula (3.5b): 
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ASP1: The archiving system must be in conformity with both data origin and entity authenticity. 
ASP2: The archiving system must be in conformity with integrity. 
ASP3: The archiving system must be in conformity with confidentiality. 
ASP4: The archiving system must be in conformity with availability. 
ASP5: The archiving system must be in conformity with non-repudiation. 
These ASPs serve as the basis and reference for further security policies on finer granularities.  
 
Figure 14. Required extension of the OAIS functional entities from a security point of view  
(adapted from [QSK+2011b]) 
More importantly, as here use-cases can be further formulated to clarify the involved entities 
(marked as “roles” and “objects” in Appendix A), the global security context can be conveniently 
interpreted into local security context, i.e. the use-cases can be categorised into their corresponding 
functional entities existing in OAIS model, and as such the additional specified security-related 
functions and services (e.g. hash calculation, certificate management, logging service, trusted time-
stamping, etc.) can be revealed for these established functional entities, including the security service 
entity, to provide better context representation in terms of security. Figure 14 shows these newly 
derived functions extended in [QSK+2011b] to meet the security requirements regulated by the ASPs 
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for the original OAIS functional entities, whereas their original functions from [OAIS2002] and 
[OAIS2009] are omitted for the sake of clarity.  
4.1.2 Security policy hierarchy 
As explained in subsection 3.2.2, the ASPs (in this case together with the global context) are used to 
derive SSPs on finer granularities, eventually yielding executable SRs. For the sake of more vivid 
representation of the complicated relationships among the entities in complex data processing systems 
as well as the implementation of the means of governance or orchestration, a hierarchical organisation 
of the policies is necessary. Therefore, a security policy hierarchy is adapted from [BS2002] and 
introduced here, serving for the generation, implementation and enforcement of huge amount of SSPs, 
which covers on various granularities of IPs in the ILM. As already shown in Figure 12, such security 
policy hierarchy comprises the following levels of SSPs: meta-SSP (𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒂)/high-level SSP (𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉), 
mid-level SSP (𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒅), and low-level SSP (𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒍𝒐𝒘): 
 𝑺𝑺𝑷 = {𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒂, 𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉, 𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒅, 𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒍𝒐𝒘} (4.1a) 
Within the scope of OAIS standard, the policy generation is the responsibility of the function 
of “develop preservation strategies and standards” within the preservation planning functional entity. 
Integrating with the theory of system level security-oriented context modelling introduced in 
subsection 3.2.2, such generation starts on a global system level with the most abstract types of SSPs – 
meta-SSPs and high-level SSPs. Meta-SSPs make statements about other SSPs, which can be described 
based on the previous definition of general SSP given in (3.5c):  
 
𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒂 = (𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 , {𝑜}, 𝑅𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎)
𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 = {𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑇 , 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝐶}, 𝐸𝐶 = {𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝐺𝐶 , 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑆𝐶}
𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑇 = 𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉 ∪ 𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒅 ∪ 𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒍𝒐𝒘
𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝐺𝐶 = {𝑒𝑔𝑐|𝑒𝑔𝑐  refers to general requirements as virtual concepts. }
𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑆𝐶 = {𝑒𝑠𝑐|𝑒𝑠𝑐  refers to security-oriented requirements as virtual concepts.}
𝑜 refers to conformity
𝑅𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 ⊆ 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 ×…× 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎
 (4.1b) 
where either general or security-related requirements (denoted respectively by 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝐺𝐶  and 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑆𝐶) 
are regulated for the conformity with the TEs of 𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒂, namely all other SSPs. 
High-level SSPs make statements about general security goals and acceptable procedures on a 
system-wide perspective throughout the lifecycle of IPs. Similar to (4.1b), it can also described as  
 
𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉 = (𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ , {𝑜}, 𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ)
𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = {𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇 , 𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶}, 𝐸𝐶 = {𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐺𝐶 , 𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝐶}
𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇 = {𝑒𝑡|𝑒𝑡  refers to the virtual concepts on the system level.}
𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐺𝐶 = {𝑒𝑔𝑐|𝑒𝑔𝑐  refers to general requirements.}
𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝐶 = {𝑒𝑠𝑐|𝑒𝑠𝑐  refers to general security goals as virtual concepts.}
𝑜 refers to conformity
𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ ⊆ 𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ ×…× 𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
 (4.1c) 
while its TE is mostly the whole system, or unspecific operation/data object on the system level. 
As shown in (4.1b) and (4.1c), both meta-SSP and high-level SSP regulates requirements on a 
quite coarse granularity level and can be derived from either the global security context, or directly 
the ASPs that reveal general understanding of the system and/or the application scenario. 
Comparing to the three-layer policy model introduced in [BS2002], a new layer of mid-level 
SSP is added on a finer granularity than that of meta-SSPs and high-level SSPs, for better handling of 
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larger complex system modules. This reflects the fact that many use-cases in the global security 
context do not make assertions about the system that covers the ILM as a whole, but about certain 
functionalities. Such use-cases are restricted to larger system modules (here equivalent to OAIS, the 
central archiving phase in ILM) and their domain of various functions. Therefore, the mid-level SSP 
can be described similar to (4.1b) and (4.1c) as: 
 
𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒅 = (𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑 , 𝑂𝑆 , 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑑)
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑 = {𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇 , 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑𝐶}, 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑𝐶 = {𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑𝐺𝐶 , 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑆𝐶}
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇 = {𝑒𝑡|
𝑒𝑡  refers to OAIS archiving module as system components,
data objects or virtual concepts on the module level.
}
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑𝐺𝐶 = {𝑒𝑔𝑐|
𝑒𝑔𝑐  refers to general virtual concepts,
time, or space.
}
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑆𝐶 = {𝑒𝑠𝑐|𝑒𝑠𝑐  refers to security-oriented virtual concepts.  }
𝑂𝑆 = {𝑜𝑠|
𝑜𝑠  refers to security-oriented processes, events,  
or expressive forms.
}
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑑 ⊆ 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑 ×…× 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑑
 (4.1d) 
In the policy generation hierarchy these mid-level SSPs on the one hand serve as a process-
based filter for the large quantity of system global security context, and on the other hand they also 
serve to verify if the high-level SSPs themselves make sense by not contradicting the existing context 
(i.e. verify the consistency between global and local context modelling). 
The mid-level SSPs are used to act as the basis for the generation of low-level SSPs, which 
provide sufficient information within particular OAIS functional entities about what needs to be 
implemented as a SR in the enforcement. Similar to (4.1b–d), low-level SSP can be described as: 
 
𝑺𝑺𝑷𝒍𝒐𝒘 = (𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤 , 𝑂𝑆 , 𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤)
𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤 = {𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑇 , 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐶}, 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐶 = {𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐺𝐶 , 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑆𝐶}
𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑇 = {𝑒𝑡|
𝑒𝑡 refers to data objects, human agents,
or virtual concepts in one fuctional entity.
}
𝐸𝐺𝐶 = {𝑒𝑔𝑐|
𝑒𝑔𝑐  refers to fdata objects, human agents, virtual
concepts, time, or space in one functional entity.
}
𝐸𝑆𝐶 = {𝑒𝑠𝑐|
𝑒𝑠𝑐  refers to security-oriented data objects, human
agents, or virtual concepts in one functional entity.
}
𝑂𝑆 = {𝑜𝑠|
𝑜𝑠  refers to security-oriented processes, events,  
or expressive forms.
}
𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤 ⊆ 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤 ×…× 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤
 (4.1e) 
In the ideal case, such low-level SSPs are precise enough for the direct derivation of SRs in a 
formalised language (see formula (3.5d)) from them. 
As proposed in [QSK+2011b], for the sake of clarity as well as the traceability of the policy 
origins, a SSP derived from a higher level SSP comes with an identifier indicating its parent SSPs. If 
high-level SSPs have identifiers of the format Px (with x being an unique identifier), their children 
mid-level SSPs are appointed with identifiers that include their parent’s identifiers (e.g. Px-y), and 
similarly the grandchildren low-level policies are derived with identifiers identifying their parent and 
grandparent policies (e.g. Px-y-z). As policies need to be updated or even removed at certain times, 
this form of traceability eases the browsing of the hierarchical tree structure of the policies that would 
be required in these cases. This is further shown in section 4.2. 
For highly complex systems some issues raise regarding the implementation and enforcement 
of policies: First, when introducing a new policy into such systems, there could be multiple possible 
methods to implement it. Thus it requires specific analysis (e.g. complexity-based) to identify the 
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optimal method. Second, complex systems are with a high probability also heterogeneous, therefore 
considerations have to be included on the interoperability, distribution and orchestration of policies 
and policy descriptions (for instance how to interpret between possible different policy syntaxes used 
in different parts of a heterogeneous system). Third, due to the quantity and complexity of the 
policies, it is necessary to develop an assurance and auditing mechanism to make sure that all the 
policies are enforced properly. 
Within the range of proposed framework in this chapter, the SSPs are basically descriptions in 
natural language of what the archiving system (or system components) does, which creates barriers 
for actual enforcement. Therefore, in this framework, after the SSPs are generated by the function 
“develop preservation strategies and standards” in the scope of preservation planning functional entity, 
they are sent to the function “establish standards and policies” within the scope of administration 
functional entity, where the SSPs are implemented by applying a manual and iterative procedure 
which turns low-level SSPs into enforceable SRs. The procedure is described in [QSK+2011a], 
[SQK+2011], and [QSK+2011b] as follows: 
 SR creation: This turns low-level SSPs, which define what needs to be done, into SRs, 
which define how the SSP is enforced. It analyses the statement in a SSP by utilizing 
validation criteria that consist for the significant properties, format validation, 
organisational and domain information. Then a sequence of steps is derived, describing 
specific actions. Each step shall be as atomic as possible, ideally performing one action 
and also verifiable, so it can be considered as one abstract SR. Optionally a SR can 
comprise sub-SRs if one of the steps is too complex to be described as a single action. 
Therefore the output here is a sequence of abstract SRs. 
 SR instantiation: Abstract SRs are not executable as they only describe actions in natural 
language. Therefore it is necessary to derive executable SRs from abstract ones. Templates 
containing the grammar and syntax for rule-engines can be used by a SR instantiation tool 
to create realisations of the abstract SRs. Such tool must also keep track of the realisation 
process so that it is possible to track from an executable SR back to the abstract SR and 
then back to the low-level SSP. Additionally, similar to Event-Condition-Action (ECA) 
rules which always have the form of if…then…else, the executable SRs are formalised 
with regard to the structure described in formula (3.5d), thus each SR becomes an 
executable atomic data processing operation. 
 SR validation: Here it is ensured by validation that the instantiated executable SRs are 
correct implementations of the policies. The functionality of the used validation tools 
would be defined by the validation criteria, which are the adherence to the global and 
local security context (developed in subsection 4.1.1). After a SR passes the validation, it is 
deployed with records of its deployment time and intended deployment enforcement 
point in the production system and ready to be enforced. 
As the policy enforcement in this framework is designed to be realised by enforcing the 
formalised and validated SRs, a specific solution for such realisation is also proposed in [QSK+2011b] 
by adapting the concepts introduced in [YPG2000]: A Rule Decision Point (RDP) is set as a component 
of the function “establish standards and policies”, where all the enforceable SRs are developed. Rule 
Enforcement Points (REPs) are set as components of all the security-related functions within OAIS (see 
Figure 14). A RDP takes responsibility of making rule decisions and those decisions are sent to 
corresponding REPs to be enforced. The basic interaction between these components begins with the 
REP, when the function it belongs to requires enforcing a SR. Then the REP formulates a request for a 
rule decision and sends it to the RDP. The RDP generates the proper rule decision based on the 
received request and returns it to the REP, and then the REP executes the rule decision.  
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Figure 15. Security policy implementation and enforcement (re-sketched from [QSK+2011b]) 
In complex systems like the archiving system discussed in this chapter, it is expected that the 
quantity of rules may overwhelm the RDP, thus it is necessary to introduce the concept of Local Rule 
Decision Points (LRDPs), which locate in different functional entities and are responsible for 
generation local rule decisions within the scope of the entity. In this case, the request for rule decision 
is sent to the corresponding LRDP first and a local rule decision is returned, whereas the RDP remains 
as final authority and it gives final rule decisions if necessary, which override the LPDPs. 
Furthermore, when an unusual situation occurs (e.g. a conflict between two rule decisions is detected), 
the related information is collected and sent back to the function “develop preservation strategies and 
standards” through the RDP. Then the function sends a feedback about the situation to the function 
“security policy review and adaptation”, which has the authority to make necessary adjustment to 
involved policies and communicates with the function “develop preservation strategies and 
standards” with policy adjustments. The technical details on the communication among RDP, REPs 
and LPDPs are out of the scope of this dissertation, therefore not discussed here. However interested 
readers are recommended to refer to COPS protocol described in [BCH+2000], as this protocol can be 
served as a valid fundamental in this case. Figure 15 visualises the interactions among involved 
functions, RDP, LRDP and REPs during the security policy implementation and enforcement. 
It should be noted that as the archiving system discussed here aims for long-term 
preservation, it is expected that the expression and format of the policies and rules evolve during the 
preservation with the alternation of global and local context. Therefore, the related components 
should also evolve accordingly. Furthermore, as in the proposed framework the distribution, 
communication and encoding of policies in the form of rules is solely done via the rule points (LRDP 
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↔ REP, RDP → LRDP), any changes necessary due to the long time periods involved are isolated from 
the other functional parts of the system. 
4.1.3 IP processing and central control 
In the IP processing block a function within a system functional entity enforces rules on IP from the 
archival system and/or system data (like search indexes, the user database, etc.). The result of the 
enforcement has to be communicated by the responsible REP to the central audit service. This central 
audit is part of the functionality of the control block. Besides this audit functionality there are also 
mechanisms for the storage of the policy tree (all policies are communicated to this storage during the 
construction of the policy hierarchy) as well as the policy conflict analysis and conflict resolve. The 
corresponding OAIS authority responsible for these operations would be the function “security 
policies review & adaptation” in the preservation planning entity (see Figure 14). It is designed to keep 
track of all the policies to ensure they operate properly, especially no policy from one phase conflicts 
with those from other ones. 
4.1.4 Security framework construction by combination of functional blocks 
Figure 16 on page 61 extends the low detail description of the contextualisation framework explained 
in the preceding three subsections by the data, information and control flows described for the four 
functional blocks introduced in the beginning of section 4.1. 
In the figure the importance of the control block especially sticks out as a dominant factor. 
Each context modelling block, the different stages of the policy generation hierarchy and the IP 
processing communicate their actions to the control block. This is on one hand done to audit all 
operations for purposes of transaction control and non-repudiation of transactions as. On the other 
hand this functional block also acts as central policy storage repository and performs policy conflict 
analysis and resolve. 
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Figure 16. General overview over the security contextualisation framework 
(adapted from [QSK+2011b]) 
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4.2 APPLICATION OF THE CONTEXT MODEL 
This section shows the application of the proposed framework on one of the functional entity within 
the extended OAIS described in subsection 4.1.1. As digital long-term preservation systems like many 
other are rather complex with a large amount of functional entities, for demonstration purposes here 
the considerations are restricted only on the ingest functional entity. 
The application is performed in four stages, following the framework overview shown in 
Figure 16. 
4.2.1 Global preservation planning and policy generation 
For the preservation planning the precise functionality of the ingest functional entity needs to be 
specified at first. The functions from the original OAIS standard include [OAIS2009]:  
 “Receive submission” where the producer uploads its content as a SIP into the system. 
 “Quality assurance” validates this SIP, checking whether it is conform to the specification 
of the system, whether it is a valid SIP, and if any security related issues like non-integer 
transmissions are solved.  
  “Generate AIP” transforms one SIP into one or more AIPs and generates audit 
information.  
 “Generate descriptive info” can receive the generated AIP, create or extract metadata of 
the AIP, and indexes to aid the later search mechanisms.  
 “Coordinate updates” stores the AIPs as well as the descriptive information in the 
archival storage.  
Furthermore, as introduced in subsection 4.1.1 there are extended security-related functions:  
 “Provenance info copy and enrichment” ensures the completeness of the provenance 
information contained in the metadata as part of authenticity assurance. 
 “Integrity assurance” prevents data from being manipulated either by accidence or ill will.  
 “Access restriction info collection” collects necessary information for access control. 
Additionally, this functional entity also applies some of the functions which are contained in 
the security services entity defined by OAIS standard [OAIS2009]:  
 “Identification/authentication service” identifies the identities of the producers. 
 “Access control service” restricts access to sensitive resources, using the information 
collected by “access restriction info collection”.  
 “Data confidentiality service” prevents the disclosure of information.  
 “Non-repudiation service” provides irrefutable proof that two subjects have 
communicated with each other and exchanged certain objects (data). 
All these functions are either provided with global/local security context or are meant to be 
representing certain use-cases in the context. As such, all these functions serve a double purpose of 
being the system outline (or enforcement points for SSPs/SRs) and their specifications and description 
provide a basic context which is used here to derive from, align to and finally enforce the policies. 
Following the method explained in subsection 4.1.2 the following high-level SSPs can be 
derived from the global and local security context on the system level that covers the ILM, as shown in 
Table 8. Following the definition given in formula (4.1c), different parts of the semantics are 
highlighted, representing TEs, GCEs and SCEs as well as the corresponding operations, thus also 
implicitly revealing the relations. In this case no meta-policy is derived, only because none of the use-
cases from the system level context leads to such policies.  
Context modelling for IT security in selected application scenarios 
 
 63 
Policy Description 
P01 The system provides the means to authenticate all objects by providing/identifying the sources 
it was created from. 
P02 The system ensures authenticity of digital objects for all steps of processing. 
P03 Each operation must be logged including what the operation has processed, on whose behalf, 
when and with which result. 
P04 To ensure their correct working, operations must be validated/verified that they correspond to 
the policies. 
P05 The system provides mechanisms to authenticate subjects. 
P06 Originals of Content Information in the system must not be altered but only copies thereof. 
P07 The integrity of object must be guaranteed for all processing steps. 
P08 The system’s integrity must be verified periodically. 
P09 The system must be able to recover from integrity violations. 
P10 The actual performance of the system’s integrity preservation must be audited by an 
independent mechanism. 
P11 The system must employ access restriction mechanisms. 
P12 The system’s access control must allow backups, data replication and other prevention and 
recovery measures for disaster handling. 
P13 The system must review its security policies at certain time intervals and adapt it to newly 
identified risks. 
P14 The system shall meet or exceed specified availability requirements. 
P15 The system must employ measures to prevent non-availability. 
P16 The system must employ measures to detect actions aiming at non-availability. 
P17 The system must employ measures to recover from non-availability. 
P18 The audit trail must be available at any time, conversely the system must not operate without 
an audit trail although this will result in non-availability. 
P19 Confidential information in the system must not be disclosed. 
Table 8. High-level SSPs for the archival system that covers the ILM, with TEs, GCEs, SCEs and operations 
highlighted respectively in blue, green, red, and orange (based on [SQK+2011]) 
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4.2.2 Local policy generation 
In the next stage, based on the derived high-level SSPs, the layer of mid-level SSPs are subsequently 
generated as explained in subsection 4.1.2. These SSPs refer to the larger system module, which in this 
case is equivalent to the OAIS archiving module. Thus the mid-level SSPs refine the requirements of 
the high-level SSPs for the archiving module. They act as a mediator between the general high-level 
SSPs which consider the system scope and low-level SSPs which are very concrete policies that 
provide sufficient information what needs to be implemented as a SR in an enforcing mechanism to 
adhere to the high-level SSPs. In the following only selected and refined policies are shown, i.e. the 
considerations are limited to the ingest functional entity of the archiving module and high-level SSPs 
which also have sufficient power of expression or are otherwise directly usable for this level are 
omitted as the derived mid-level SSPs would have the same description. For the sake of clarity a mid-
level SSP derived from a high-level SSP Px is noted as Px-y. The actual mid-level SSPs in the OAIS-
compliant archiving module are: 
Policy Description 
P02-01 The archiving module ensures authenticity of digital objects for all steps of processing. 
P03-01 Each operation in the module must be logged including what the operation has processed, on 
whose behalf, when and with which result. 
P07-01 Objects where an operation is applied on, must be checked if they and their references are 
integer anymore, at least for operations with write access. 
P07-02 If SIP is ingested and thus becoming one or more AIP or AIP are accessed and delivered as 
one or more DIP, the archiving model must preserve the integrity, especially the semantic and 
referential integrity between the SIP to AIP and the AIP to DIP conversion processes. 
P08-01 The module’s integrity must be verified periodically. 
P09-01 The module must be able to recover from integrity violations. 
P11-01 The module must employ access restriction mechanisms. 
P19-01 Confidential information in the module must not be disclosed. 
Table 9. Mid-level SSPs in the archiving module/OAIS, with their TEs, SCEs, GCEs and operations 
highlighted respectively in blue, green, red, and orange (based on [SQK+2011]) 
Similar to Table 8, highlighting is applied to denote the TEs, GCEs, SCEs and corresponding 
operations in the mid-level SSPs shown in the table. These mid-level SSPs act as the basis for the 
generation of low-level SSPs in specific functional entities. The following Table 10 shows the derived 
low-level SSPs for the ingest functional entity. In the table a low-level SSP derived from a mid-level 
SSP Px-y is noted as Px-y-z. Similarly, highlighting is also used here to mark the TEs, GCEs, SCEs, 
together with operations in the SSPs. 
Policy Description 
P02-01-01 If SIP is ingested and thus becoming one or more AIP, the ingestion must preserve the 
authenticity/provenance, by including the SIP Provenance information and enriching it with 
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data about the ingest (authenticated Provider, time, etc.). 
P02-01-02 If external systems are responsible for ingestion, these preserve the actual provenance but 
must also be referred to in the provenance information. 
P03-01-01 The ingestion must ensure it is provable which ingest preparation policies were applied. 
P07-01-01 All metadata linking to other SIP or their metadata must link to the corresponding AIP or 
their metadata to preserve the authenticity/provenance information. 
P07-01-02 If objects are migrated, for example conversion into a newer format, the integrity of the 
old and the new version must both be enforced, and the newer version should be at least 
semantic integer with the older version directly after the conversion. 
P07-02-01 If SIP is ingested and thus becoming one or more AIP, the ingestion must preserve the 
integrity which especially includes semantic and referential integrity that the SIP are 
ingested as AIP completely. 
P08-01-01 To preserve the integrity of objects, prevention and recovery measures must at least 
include data replication and backups, while after a recovery the whole system must be 
checked for integrity. 
P09-01-01 Although the ingestion should be as fault tolerant as possible, SIP must be ingested either 
wholly/completely or not at all, but not partially. 
P11-01-01 The ingestion must consider access restrictions provided stated within the SIP and include 
these for the actual access restrictions of the AIP. 
P19-01-01 If SIP is ingested and thus become one or more AIP, the appropriate AIP must contain the 
confidentiality conditions. 
Table 10. Low-level SSPs in ingest function entity, with their TEs, SCEs, GCEs and operations highlighted 
respectively in blue, green, red, and orange (based on [SQK+2011]) 
4.2.3 Policy implementation 
As explained in subsection 4.1.2, the implementation of the low-level SSPs is realised by further 
deriving executable SRs. Based on the low-level SSPs listed in Table 10, the corresponding executable 
SRs can then be derived. The following table shows these derived SRs, where a SR derived from a 
low-level SSP Px-y-z is noted as Rx-y-z-w. These SRs are formulated with regard to the definition 
introduced in formula (3.5d) in subsection 3.2.2, so the comprised TEs, SCEs and GCEs as well as the 
operations on them are explicitly clarified. 
Rule 
Context entities Target entity 
egc esc os et 
R02-01-
01-01 
SIP ingestion (time) Identification/authentic
ation service (function) 
identify Authenticity info of the SIP 
R02-01-
01-02 
SIP ingestion (time) Provenance info copy 
and enrichment 
(function) 
retrieve Authenticity/provenance info 
of the SIP 
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R02-01-
01-03 
SIP ingestion (time), 
Generate descriptive 
info (function) 
Authenticity/provenan
ce info of the SIP 
update Metadata of AIP/AIPs 
R02-01-
02-01 
Involvement of 
external system 
(time) 
Provenance info copy 
and enrichment 
(function) 
retrieve Actual provenance info from 
the external system 
R02-01-
02-02 
Involvement of 
external system 
(time) 
Generate descriptive 
info (function) 
Actual provenance 
info from the external 
system 
update Metadata of AIP/AIPs 
R03-01-
01-01 
Generate AIP 
(function) 
SIP to be ingested generate Info regarding the ingest 
preparation policies for the 
SIP 
R03-01-
01-02 
- Non-repudiation 
service (function) 
document Info regarding the ingest 
preparation policies for the 
SIP 
R07-01-
01-01 
SIP ingestion (time), 
Generate descriptive 
info (function) 
Metadata of SIP link Corresponding metadata of 
AIPs 
R07-01-
02-01 
AIP migration (time), 
Quality assurance 
(function) 
Old AIP, new AIP verify Integrity report 
R07-01-
02-02 
AIP migration (time) Integrity assurance 
(function), 
Integrity report 
accept 
/reject 
New AIP 
R07-02-
01-01 
SIP ingestion (time), 
Quality assurance 
(function) 
SIP, AIP/AIPs verify Integrity report 
R07-02-
01-02 
SIP ingestion (time) Integrity assurance 
(function), 
integrity report 
accept 
/reject 
AIP/AIPs 
R08-01-
01-01 
- Coordinate updates 
(function), AIP 
store Redundant copy/copies of 
AIP 
R08-01-
01-02 
System recovery 
(time) 
Integrity assurance 
(function) 
verify Various copies of AIP 
R09-01-
01-01 
SIP ingestion (time) Integrity assurance 
(function), 
Integrity report 
accept 
/reject 
SIP to be ingested 
R11-01-
01-01 
SIP ingestion (time) Access restriction info 
collection (function) 
collect Access restriction info of the 
SIP to be ingested 
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R11-01-
01-02 
SIP ingestion (time) Access control service 
(function) 
restrict Access to corresponding 
AIP/AIPs 
R19-01-
01-01 
SIP ingestion (time) Data confidentiality 
service (function)  
enforce Confidentiality conditions of 
AIPs 
Table 11. Formulated SRs in ingest function entity, the expressions of relation rs are omitted as they all 
conform with that in formula (3.5d) 
As shown in Table 11, each of these SRs describes an atomic action sourced from one function 
on one target entity in ingest functional entity, so they are ready to be directly enforced. 
4.2.4 Policy enforcement/IP processing 
As depicted in the theory of system level security-oriented context modelling in subsection 3.2.2 and 
also reflected in 4.2.3, the SRs represent atomic processing procedures on the data, which in this case is 
IPs in various forms. Therefore the framework enforces the policies by actually executing the SRs 
derived from them. Figure 17 on page 68 illustrates the enforcement of SRs derived in Table 11 within 
the scope of ingest functional entity.  
As shown in the figure, the SRs are processed by the LRDP of the functional entity and 
enforced by the appropriate REPs of the respective functions. Some functions may receive no SRs (e.g. 
“Receive submission”, which nevertheless would certainly receive general rules to process SIPs) 
whereas others may receive multiple ones (e.g. “Generate descriptive info”). Furthermore, the 
enforcement of certain SRs also involves the general security services defined in OAIS standard, 
therefore they are also shown in the figure. 
Although not shown, all the operations and interactions within the scope of this functional 
entity are monitored by the central audit service, hence managed by the central management service. 
Both of these central services are provided by the control block of the framework, as already shown in 
Figure 16 on page 61. 
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Figure 17. Functions and SRs related to the ingest functional entity 
4.3 EXEMPLARY SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
As introduced in subsection 2.4.2, an assessment framework has been developed in SHAMAN to 
evaluate the performance of the long-term archiving system that realises the preservation framework, 
consisting of three parts: 1) the general assessment of the SHAMAN project, 2) the assessment of 
SHAMAN preservation system based on both TRAC (Trustworthy Repositories Audit & Certification: 
Criteria and Checklist) and DRAMBORA (Digital Repository Audit Method Based on Risk 
Assessment) toolkit, and 3) the assessment of individual SHAMAN work-packages based on iRODS (i 
Rule Oriented Data System) rules. As the security framework developed in this chapter aims at its 
ultimate realisation towards a preservation system, only the second part of the assessment framework 
is considered as relevant here.  
However, as DRAMBORA toolkit applies a bottom-up approach which meant for the 
assessment of the outcome of the implementation of the SRs, it is not directly applicable on the SRs. 
Therefore, this section selects a group of audit and certification criteria in TRAC from Appendix B and 
uses them to demonstrate a security assessment on the SRs developed in section 4.2 as an example. 
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As shown in Appendix B, the TRAC audit and certification criteria cover three main 
categories [TRAC2007]:  
 A. Organisation infrastructure, in which the criteria regulate all the organisational attributes, 
used as indicators of the digital archive’s comprehensive planning, readiness, ability to 
address its responsibilities, and trustworthiness.  
 B. Digital object management, in which the criteria regulate both organisational and 
technical aspects of the requirements for the functions, processes, and procedures of 
handling digital objects, grouped under OAIS functional entities. 
 C. Technologies, technical infrastructures, & security, in which the criteria regulate the 
requirements for general best practices for data management and security. 
To evaluate the SRs derived for the ingest functional entity, the criteria developed in category 
B2 Ingest: creation of the archivable package are subject to further selection, resulting the security-related 
ones. Table 12 summarises the assessment using these security-related criteria. It identifies the related 
security aspects for selected criteria, and then uses them to assess the SRs derived in section 4.2, to see 
whether the SRs adequately address them or not.  
Security-related TRAC criteria 
Related security 
aspect 
Assessment 
Corresponding 
SRs 
B2.3 Repository has a description of how AIPs 
are constructed from SIPs. 
Authenticity Addressed R02-01-01-01, 
R02-01-01-02, 
R02-01-01-03, 
R07-01-01-01 
B2.4 Repository can demonstrate that all 
submitted objects (i.e., SIPs) are either accepted 
as whole or part of an eventual archival object 
(i.e., AIP), or otherwise disposed of in a 
recorded fashion. 
Integrity Addressed R09-01-01-01 
B2.5 Repository has and uses a naming 
convention that generates visible, persistent, 
unique identifiers for all archived objects (i.e., 
AIPs). 
Authenticity Addressed R02-01-01-01, 
R02-01-01-02, 
R02-01-01-03 
B2.6 If unique identifiers are associated with SIPs 
before ingest, the repository preserves the 
identifiers in a way that maintains a persistent 
association with the resultant archived object 
(e.g., AIP). 
Authenticity Addressed R02-01-01-01, 
R02-01-01-02, 
R02-01-01-03 
B2.7 Repository demonstrates that it has access 
to necessary tools and resources to establish 
authoritative semantic or technical context of 
the digital objects it contains (i.e., access to 
appropriate international Representation 
Information and format registries). 
Authenticity Addressed R02-01-02-01, 
R02-01-02-02 
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B2.8 Repository records/registers 
Representation Information (including formats) 
ingested. 
Authenticity Addressed R02-01-01-01, 
R02-01-01-02, 
R02-01-01-03, 
R07-01-01-01, 
R07-01-02-01, 
R07-01-02-02 
B2.9 Repository acquires preservation metadata 
(i.e., PDI) for its associated Content Information. 
Authenticity Addressed R07-01-01-01 
B2.10 Repository has a documented process for 
testing understandability of the information 
content and bringing the information content 
up to the agreed level of understandability. 
Availability Addressed R03-01-01-01, 
R03-01-01-02 
B2.11 Repository verifies each AIP for 
completeness and correctness at the point it is 
generated. 
Integrity Addressed R07-02-01-01, 
R07-02-01-02 
B2.12 Repository provides an independent 
mechanism for audit of the integrity of the 
repository collection/content. 
Integrity,  
non-repudiation 
Not addressed  
B2.13 Repository has contemporaneous records 
of actions and administration processes that are 
relevant to preservation (AIP creation). 
Non-repudiation Not addressed  
Table 12. Exemplary security assessment of the SRs derived for ingest functional entity using selected TRAC 
criteria 
As shown in Table 12, 11 out of 13 criteria are addressed by one or multiple SRs derived 
previously for the ingest functional entity. Furthermore, it should be noted that the requirement for 
non-repudiation reflected in the last two criteria, which are not directly addressed by the SRs, should 
nevertheless be adequately covered by the audit service provided on the module level (see Figure 16).  
4.4 SUMMARY 
As an embodiment of the system level security-oriented context modelling explained in Chapter 3, 
this chapter instantiates the proposed theory into the application scenario of digital long-term 
archiving, resulting a theoretical framework developed in a “top-down” way. As beneficial 
complement to the theory, the system level security context appears in the form of use-cases, and by 
analysing and categorising these use-cases, the context is further interpreted into global security 
context and local security context. Aiming at closer integration with the OAIS standard, the context 
model takes into consideration the security-related issues introduced in both versions of the 
standard [OAIS2002] [OAIS2009]. A solution for security policy generation, implementation and 
enforcement by adapting the concepts introduced in [BS2002] for policy-based admission control to 
the OAIS standard, therefore the SSPs on the granularities between coarsest level of ASPs and finest 
level of SRs can be better organised. Furthermore, with a specific example it is also illustrated that 
how the policies within one functional entity are generated hierarchically before they are 
implemented to be ready for the enforcement.  
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To sum up, this chapter demonstrates that the proposed framework is ready for its application 
on a security-oriented archival system, which 1) can be constructed with more reasonable storage 
solution for huge amounts of data (e.g. RAID) instead of WORM media, 2) ensures specific security 
requirements using specific security policies, 3) manages large amounts of security policies reflecting 
its high complexity using policy hierarchy, 4) introduces context awareness so the system evolves 
itself with evolving context (e.g. obsolescence issue) by introducing and adopting new policies while 
abolishing old policies if necessary. Therefore, such system can not only handle the data obsolescence 
issue (as introduced in Chapter 1 that NASA encountered), but also pose as a revolutionary solution 
for the salient need of electronic evidence archive that is capable of preserving large amount of data 
(as also introduced in Chapter 1 that DEA requires). Furthermore, this chapter also shows an 
exemplary security assessment, using the relevant criteria selected from an existing assessment 
framework.  
However, securing evidence is never that easy: while the work in this chapter closes the gaps 
regarding the security issues on the system level, there are further concerns that how to ensure the 
security of evidence throughout its specific processing procedures, and this rests on a further detailed 
data level. Therefore, in next chapter the author proposes another instantiation of applying data level 
security-oriented context modelling. Furthermore, as already shown in the demonstrated assessment 
section, the current existing assessment framework is designed to be applied on an already realised 
preservation system, other than the system model itself. This gap is therefore addressed later in 
Chapter 6. 
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5 CONTEXT MODELLING ON THE DATA LEVEL 
In the last chapter an instantiation of the conception of security-oriented context modelling is 
presented on the system level. As proposed in Chapter 3, the conception can be applied on both 
system and data levels, resulting either a data processing system or certain data processing 
procedures. Therefore, this chapter describes a data level instantiation in the application scenario of 
forensic dactyloscopy, yielding an overlapped latent fingerprint separation approach and its 
application.  
As summarised in Chapter 2, besides the identified weaknesses existing for the state of the art 
separation approaches for overlapped fingerprints, there is a huge gap for them to contribute to sound 
forensic techniques, as very limited effort has been made to have them meet certain standards, e.g. 
Daubert criteria. Therefore in this chapter, as a first attempt towards Daubert compliance, a context-
based approach is derived, adapted from the relaxation labelling based technique originally proposed 
in [CFJ+2011], for the high-resolution samples of overlapped fingerprints captured by a CWL sensor 
and aiming at an improved separation performance. For the sake of Daubert compliance, it is essential 
that all influences on potential evidence are well identified and clarified. This provides the non-
repudiation, which significantly contributes to the admissibility of such techniques in court. As 
introduced in Chapter 2, it is already proven in the field of pervasive computing that large-scale 
systems with context awareness are capable of handling sophisticated, sometimes even evolving 
influential factors. In this chapter, such context awareness is also introduced to the development of a 
digitised forensic 1  approach: the influences are reflected by various context entities along the 
processing procedures, so they can be processed for further improvement of the approaches.  
Following the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3, the digitised forensic approach is 
considered as a cluster of various data processing procedures in the processing environment, serving 
for its corresponding SRs, within the scope of a forensic framework on the system level (see Figure 9 
on page 47 and Figure 10 on page 49). Despite that this dissertation does not focus on such framework, 
as its development would be another system level instantiation like the one described in detail in 
Chapter 4, some exemplary SRs can be derived here based on the information provided in section 2.5 
as well as expert advices from the field work of forensic investigation2, to regulate the separation 
environment of overlapped latent fingerprints in a digitised forensic scenario.  
Example 8. SR0: A fingerprint expert must oversee the whole process of the separation. 
SR1: The fingerprint expert must observe the overlapped fingerprint image to be 
processed and decide if separation is potentially plausible. 
                                                        
1 In this dissertation, digitised forensics refers to the forensic science that works with the digitised version of 
conventional physical evidence (e.g. digital scan of fingerprints or fibres), in comparison to digital forensics that 
works with digital evidence found in digital device (e.g. data captured from confiscated hard disk). 
2 The author thanks Sabine Wabnitz from the State Criminal Police Office of Saxony-Anhalt (Landeskriminalamt 
Sachsen-Anhalt) for her professional consultation as forensic expert during the derivation of the exemplary 
security rules. 
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SR2: If separation is considered as plausible, the fingerprint expert shall decide which 
method to apply for the separation. 
SR3: The fingerprint expert must select a separation method that is suitable to 
process the fingerprint images according to their origin (e.g. means of acquisition). 
SR4: The fingerprint expert must select a separation method which is able to 
maintain the fingerprint features on different levels (see subsection 2.5.1) to the 
largest degree according to the requirements of further processing steps after the 
separation. 
SR5: The selected separation method shall be subject to proper standard (e.g. 
Daubert criteria) regarding the admissibility of the separation results as court 
evidence. 
SR6: The fingerprint expert shall apply the separation method selected by SR4 and 
document the separation results. 
SR7: The separation results must be able to be reproduced, as a second fingerprint 
expert must verify the documented separation results. 
SR8: Only the separation results verified by SR7 can be stored and used for further 
processing. 
SR9: If further processing requires the original overlapped latent fingerprint sample 
to remain intact, the selected separation method shall not employ invasive processing 
steps.  
SR10: All decisions and actions made by the fingerprint experts must be documented 
and updated to the chain-of-custody information. 
By no means would these SRs precisely describe the situation, if the separation of overlapped 
fingerprint were to be conducted in actual forensic work. However, they nevertheless conform to 
general requirements of forensics. Therefore, they can be considered here as the atomic actions with 
finest granularity on the system level, which need to be executed by their data level realisation, i.e. the 
context-aware separation approach this chapter presents. 
In this chapter, section 5.1 describes the contextualisation of the forensic scenario and 
proposes the overlapped fingerprint separation approach with context awareness. Section 5.2 
introduces the evaluation on the performance of the proposed approach. Section 5.3 subjectively 
assesses the developed approach with regards to the preceding exemplary SRs, comparing to the state 
of the art approaches. Section 5.4 summarises this chapter. 
The research presented in this chapter was partially funded within the scope of research 
project DigiDak3, and parts of it have been published in [QSS+2012], [QSD2013], and [QSZ+2014]. 
5.1 A CONTEXT-BASED SEPARATION APPROACH FOR OVERLAPPED LATENT 
FINGERPRINTS 
Embracing a cutting-edge nanometre range contactless sensing technology, in this section a separation 
approach is developed with compliance with the utilisation of CWL sensor for non-invasive 
acquisition of the fingerprint evidence. Therefore, the general theoretical framework introduced in 
Chapter 3 is applied for the scenario of separating overlapped fingerprints in high-resolution images, 
clarifying various context entities, so an improved separation algorithm can be derived to address 
them. As the improved algorithm involves parameters which are mutually connected hence 
                                                        
3 Funded in part by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Science (BMBF) through the research program 
under the contract no. FKZ: 13N10818. 
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complicate the situation, the approach also includes a parameter optimisation by further interpreting 
the context, so the scale of the testing needed can be significantly reduced.  
5.1.1 Contextualisation of the forensic scenario  
The first step towards a context-based forensic approach is to contextualise its application scenario, i.e. 
the acquisition and processing environments (see Figure 10 on page 49), the latter also described by 
the SRs in Example 8. 
Aiming at the embodiment of data level security-oriented context modelling proposed in 
subsection 3.2.3, Figure 18 on page 74 illustrates the forensic scenario discussed in this chapter, with 
SRs from Example 8 marked at where they are supposed to be executed.  
In the acquisition environment, the overlapped latent fingerprints are acquired in a contactless 
way by using a CWL sensor, yielding high-resolution (typically 2540 ppi) intensity and topography 
images. In the processing environment, the separation approach processes the acquired intensity 
image and yield two separated fingerprint. Such separation results can then be used for further 
forensic investigations, e.g. non-invasive ones like aging estimation, or invasive ones like chemical 
composition analysis using GC-MS (Gas Chromatography–Mass Spectrometry). Figure 18 also shows 
that in alternative scenarios the fingerprints can also be acquired from other methods in forms of 
simulated [CFJ+2011] or conventionally captured overlapped fingerprints [FSZ2012]. 
 
Figure 18. Embodiment of data level security-oriented context modelling in the forensic scenario, in 
comparison with other acquisition approaches in literature (adapted from [QSZ+2014])4 
Recalling the formula (3.6b) from subsection 3.2.3 that defines the acquisition environment 
and its context:  
                                                        
4 The original context visualisation was sketched by Jana Dittmann and is/will be part of different figures of 
several publications to visualise context aspects in different research fields of her research group. 
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𝑨𝑬 = (𝐸𝐴 , 𝑂𝐴 , 𝑅𝐴)
𝑜𝑎 ∈ 𝑂𝐴 , 𝑜𝑎  refers to acquistion
𝑅𝐴 ⊆ 𝐸𝐴 ×…× 𝐸𝐴
𝐸𝐴 = {𝑒𝑡} ∪ 𝐸𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∪ 𝐸𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖
𝐶𝑎 = {𝐸𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∪ 𝐸𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖 , 𝑂𝐴 , 𝑅𝐴}
 (3.6b) 
the acquisition context 𝐶𝑎 regarding its TE, which in this case is the overlapped fingerprint image and 
denoted by𝑒𝑡, comprises information introduced to the image from two aspects:  
 the own properties of the fingerprint sample itself (denoted by 𝐸𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 ), e.g. the 
appearance of the fingerprint sample,  
 the properties of the acquisition mechanism (denoted by 𝐸𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖), e.g. the acquisition devices 
and the operating human agents.  
Such information comes from the acquisition environment with a coarse granularity. 
Therefore, it is considered as primary acquisition context, as previously defined in subsection 3.2.3. It 
covers a general cluster of context entities 𝐸𝐴 (in this case the cluster of various properties) as well as 
the operations 𝑂𝐴 and relations 𝑅𝐴 on 𝐸𝐴. As 𝐸𝐴, 𝑂𝐴 and 𝑅𝐴 are unspecified in the primary acquisition 
context, they need to be interpreted to form the secondary acquisition context, so it can be further 
addressed by specific processing procedures.  
Table 13 summarises such interpretation: the specific CEs in 𝐸𝐴  that are relevant to the 
proposed separation approach are interpreted from 𝐸𝐴, and listed with remarks on if they are also 
addressed in the state-of-the-art literature, while 𝑂𝐴  and 𝑅𝐴  together are specified to identify the 
connection between those entities and the fingerprint image 𝑒𝑡 . The table also highlights the esc
Ai 
occurring only in the acquisition environment particularly discussed in this chapter. As shown by the 
table, the secondary acquisition context shares the same TE (the overlapped fingerprint image 𝑒𝑡) with 
the primary acquisition context.  
𝐸𝐴 in 
primary 
acquisition 
context 
Specified 𝐸𝐴  for 
secondary acquisition 
context 
Specified 𝑂𝐴 , 𝑅𝐴  for secondary 
acquisition context 
Remarks 
Information 
regarding 
properties 
of the 
fingerprint 
sample 
𝐸𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 
Type of fingerprint sample 
𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴0 
Various types of overlapped 
fingerprint images (e.g. 
authentic/simulated/computer 
generated) contributes to different 
levels of difficulty for separation 
Test sets in previous 
publications consist of 
single or multiple types 
of fingerprints.  
Overlapping 
behaviour 
𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴1 
Contact 
pressure 
𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴11 
Image intensity reflecting the 
contact pressure 
Most image processing 
based approaches 
work on intensity 
images, e.g. 
[TWZ+2001], 
[STK2006], [CFJ+2011], 
[FSZ2012] 
Overlapping 
angle 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴12 
Various intersection situations of 
the ridges in the image 
- 
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Smearing 
𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴13 
Smeared regions on the 
fingerprint images 
Smearing affects 
chemical approaches 
less, e.g. [TLC+2010] 
Overlapping 
percentage 
𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴14 
Area of overlapped and 
nonoverlapped regions 
Important for 
relaxation labelling 
based approaches, e.g. 
[CFJ+2011], [FSZ2012] 
Trace source 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴2 Degree of similarity among the 
images reflecting the trace source 
(same finger, different fingers from 
same person, or different fingers 
from different persons)  
- 
Chemical trace 
composition 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴3 
Image intensity partially reflecting 
the chemical composition 
Tackled in [BSF+2009] 
Information 
regarding 
properties 
of the 
acquisition 
environment 
𝐸𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖 
Substrate 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴4 Extra noise in the image reflecting 
the substrate that the fingerprint is 
left on 
- 
Fingerprint development 
technique (in case of latent 
fingerprint) 
𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴5 
Image properties (e.g. quality, 
resolution, appearance) 
dominated by the development 
technique employed on latent 
fingerprints 
[FSZ2012] involves 
different development 
techniques, yet does 
not discuss further. 
Sensor settings 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴6 Image quality reflecting the 
parameter settings of the sensor 
- 
Table 13. Acquisition context entities (CEs) for separating overlapped fingerprints, with those occurring only 
in the acquisition environment in this chapter highlighted in blue  
(adapted from [QSZ+2014]) 
As revealed by the SRs in Example 8, multiple aspects of security requirements are expected 
to be met regarding the TE (e.g. regarding its integrity as stated in SR4), whose quality is directly 
influenced by the CEs identified in Table 13. Therefore, in this case all such CEs are security relevant 
and considered as esc, denoted in the table as 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴𝑛 , where 𝑛 = 0,2,… ,6. 
After the secondary acquisition CEs are clarified, they can contribute to the formation of 
primary processing context by analysing the outcome of processing them. In the case, the processing 
environment is regulated by the SRs Example 8. To meet the requirements of these SRs, the relaxation 
labelling based processing approach introduced in [CFJ+2011] is selected as the basis, into which 
further enhancements with context awareness is introduced to develop the processing environment in 
this chapter. Comparing to other state-of-the-art separation approaches, the relaxation labelling based 
on shows the best compatibility with the contextualised forensic scenario: First, it requires only a 
digital representation of the overlapped latent fingerprints, so it is not mandatory to apply invasive 
methods to acquire the fingerprints – in fact it does not even require for the physical presence of the 
evidence. Second, it is based on image processing, so it also does not introduce further invasive 
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manipulation of the evidence. At last, as depicted in Table 5 on page 32, it does not introduce any sort 
of interpolation or other similar ways to generation new data, so it does not introduce any risk of 
potentially tampering of the evidence. Therefore, due to the fact that the basic processing method 
already exists in a coarse way, it is relatively easier in this case to analyse the outcome of processing 
the acquisition context with the method. Among all the 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴𝑛  listed in Table 13, it is the overlapping 
behaviour entity 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴1  that poses the main issue to be solved. The relaxation labelling that the 
processing procedures utilise is an iterative method that sorts extracted fingerprint ridge orientations 
(see Table 5 in subsection 2.5.2 on page 32). Orientation being the core element of relaxation labelling, 
the overlapping behaviour of two fingerprints is eventually represented by that of two orientations. 
Therefore, as the outcome of using the processing procedures described in Table 5 on the overlapping 
behaviour entity, the corresponding primary processing context can be derived, in the form of three 
separation error classes, which constitutes the primary processing CEs 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝑝𝑛
 (𝑛 = 0,1,2): 
 the class of orientation extraction errors 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝑝0
 denotes the incorrect extraction of the dominant 
orientations in the overlapped region, despite they are perceptual in the image, 
 the class of labelling errors 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝑝1
 denotes the correct extraction yet incorrect labelling of the 
dominant orientations, and 
 the class of merging errors 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝑝2
 denotes the false matching of the two orientation fields 
achieved by the relaxation labelling to wrong nonoverlapped regions. 
Addressing the identified primary processing context, an improved algorithm is developed to 
introduce context awareness, with highlights on its improvement with regard to the one in [CFJ+2011]. 
It is described in the following Table 14. 
Processing steps Input Output 
1. Input overlapped 
fingerprint image 
Authentic overlapped latent 
fingerprint image acquired using 
CWL sensor 
𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ:𝐻𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 ×𝑊𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒  
2. Manually assign 
fingerprint masks 
𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ ,𝑀1,𝑀2: 
𝐻𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 ×𝑊𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒  
𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ ∘ 𝑀𝑁1, 𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ ∘ 𝑀𝑂 , 𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ ∘ 𝑀𝑁2 
3. Context-based parameter 
calculation  
𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ ,𝑀1,𝑀2,𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑓1,𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑓2 {𝑤𝑖?̂?1, 𝑤𝑖?̂?2, … ,𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑛} 
The step starts with the estimation of the block size parameters depending on the ridge distances. 
The investigator assigns two additional masks, 𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑓1  and 𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑓2 , respectively locating in each 
nonoverlapped regions, covering areas with mainly parallel and smoothly curved ridges. Then 
Fourier representations of both masked areas are achieved with a reference window size 𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑓 , 
which is calculated based on the image resolution 𝑅𝐼 in ppi and the statistical average ridge distance 
0.46 mm [Moore1989]: 
𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑓 =
0.46 ⋅ 𝑅𝐼
2540
⋅ 4 ≅ 𝑅𝐼 1380⁄  
𝑅𝑅𝑘 = {𝑟𝑟𝑘,1, 𝑟𝑟𝑘,2, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑘,𝑚} = Block(𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ ∘ 𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑓[𝑘], 𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑓), 
𝑟𝑟𝑘,𝑖:𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑓 ×𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑓 , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚, 𝑘 ∈ {1,2} 
𝑟?̂?𝑘,𝑖 = DFT(𝑟𝑟𝑘,𝑖) 
Then the frequency vector with highest amplitude is extracted in each window and used to 
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calculate the actual block size, so each block covers one ridge: 
𝑑𝑘 =
1
𝑚
∑
𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑓
|argmax
𝑓∈𝑟?̂?𝑘,𝑖
|𝑟?̂?𝑘,𝑖(𝑓)||
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
𝑏 = max(𝑑𝑘) 
Afterwards a series blocks are generated on the masked fingerprint area: 
{𝑏𝑙1, 𝑏𝑙2, … , 𝑏𝑙𝑛} = Block(𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ ∘ 𝑀1 ∘ 𝑀2, 𝑏), 𝑏𝑙𝑖: 𝑏 × 𝑏, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 
Subsequently a series of DFT windows {𝑤𝑖𝑛1, 𝑤𝑖𝑛2, … , 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛} are generated as previously written, 
using 𝑤 = 4𝑏 . At last, for each Gaussian filtered window its two-dimensional spectrum is 
calculated, with a 𝜎 selected so that two ridges in the centre of each window get clearly filtered: 
𝜎 =
3
2
𝑏 ⋅
1
√−2ln0.35
 
𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑖 = DFT(Gauss(wini, σ)) 
4. Extract the dominant 
orientations for each block in 
non-overlapped and 
overlapped regions 
{𝑤𝑖?̂?1, 𝑤𝑖?̂?2, … ,𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑛}  𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥1,𝑖 , 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥2,𝑖 , 𝑂𝑁 , 𝑂𝑂 
The two frequencies with the highest and the second highest amplitudes are selected in each 
window for its corresponding blocks, and contribute to the orientation field 𝑂(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘), where 𝑝 and 
𝑞 denote the position of the block and 𝑘 the label: 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥1,𝑖 = argmax
𝑓∈𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑖
|𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑖(𝑓)| 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥2,𝑖 = argmax
𝑓∈𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑖∧𝛿(|arg(𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥1,𝑖)−arg(𝑓)|)>𝜏
|𝑤𝑖?̂?𝑖(𝑓)| , 𝜏 = 22° 
𝑂𝑂 , 𝑂𝑁 remain unchanged 
5. Perform relaxation 
labelling on the overlapped 
region together with the 
boundaries 
𝑂𝑂 , 𝑂𝑁 , 𝜀 𝑂𝑂
′ : 𝐻𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 ×𝑊𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 × 2 
In this step relaxation labelling is performed on not only the overlapped region but also predefined 
boundary regions, where the labels already discriminate the origins of both nonoverlapped 
orientation fields. Therefore, during relaxation labelling the labels of the overlapped regions 
converge to the respective labels of boundary regions. 
𝑀𝐵(𝑝, 𝑞) = {
1 if the block (𝑝, 𝑞) is inside the boundary with a width of 𝜀, 𝜀 = 2
0 otherwise
 
𝑂𝑂
′ (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘) = {
𝑂𝑂(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘) 𝑀𝑂(𝑝 ∙ 𝑏, 𝑞 ∙ 𝑏) = 1
𝑂𝑁(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘) 𝑀𝐵(𝑝, 𝑞) = 1
 
𝑠𝑘𝑘′ = 1 −
𝛿(|𝑂𝑂
′ (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘) − 𝑂𝑂
′ (𝑝′, 𝑞′, 𝑘′)|)
𝜋
2
, 𝑘, 𝑘′ ∈ {1,2} 
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𝑅𝑝𝑞,𝑝′𝑞′ =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [
0 0
0 0
] if |𝑝 − 𝑝′| > 6 or |𝑞 − 𝑞′| > 6 or (𝑝 = 𝑝′ and 𝑞 = 𝑞′ and 𝑘 = 𝑘′)
[
0 1
1 0
] if 𝑝 = 𝑝′ and 𝑞 = 𝑞′ and 𝑘 ≠ 𝑘′
[
𝑠11 𝑠12
𝑠21 𝑠22
] if 𝑀𝐵(𝑝, 𝑞) = 0 and 𝑀𝐵(𝑝′, 𝑞′) = 0
[
𝑠11 𝑠12
𝑠12 𝑠11
] if 𝑀𝑁1(𝑝 ⋅ 𝑏, 𝑞 ⋅ 𝑏) = 1 and 𝑀𝐵(𝑝′, 𝑞′) = 0
[
𝑠22 𝑠21
𝑠21 𝑠22
] if 𝑀𝑁2(𝑝 ⋅ 𝑏, 𝑞 ⋅ 𝑏) = 1 and 𝑀𝐵(𝑝′, 𝑞′) = 0
, 
𝑝𝑝𝑞,𝑘1, 𝑝𝑝𝑞,𝑘2, 𝛼 and 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 remain unchanged. 
6. Combine the two 
separated orientation fields 
with non-overlapped regions 
with corresponding labels 
𝑂𝑁 , 𝑂𝑂
′ ,𝑀𝑂 𝑂1, 𝑂2 
Due to the involvement of boundary regions in step 5, this step simply combines each 
nonoverlapped region with the separated one with its corresponding label to from the two 
complete orientation fields. 
𝑂𝑘(𝑝, 𝑞) = {
𝑂𝑂
′ (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘) if 𝑀𝑂(𝑝 ⋅ 𝑏, 𝑞 ⋅ 𝑏) = 1
𝑂𝑁(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑘) otherwise
 
7. Apply Gabor filter to 
render the separation results 
𝑂1, 𝑂2 𝐼1
′ , 𝐼2
′  
At last the merged orientation for each block from step 6 are used as the input of a Gabor filter 
applied on the corresponding block of the fingerprint. 
𝐼𝑘
′ (𝑝, 𝑞) = Gabor(𝑏𝑙𝑝∙𝑏+𝑞 , 𝑂𝑘(𝑝, 𝑞)) 
Table 14. The improved separation algorithm, with its modification w.r.t. the algorithm in Table 5 highlighted 
in blue and parameters optimised in subsection 5.1.2 marked in red  
(reproduced from [QSZ+2014]) 
From the point of view of data level security-oriented context modelling (see Figure 10 on 
page 49 and Figure 18 on page 74), the algorithm proposed here contributes to the secondary 
processing context: it is fundamentally a cluster of sorted processing steps that execute a series of 
operations between the TE (in this case the fingerprint ridges) and its CEs (which are various in 
different processing steps, including the assigned fingerprint masks, the appointed parameters, the 
iteratively updated labels, etc.). Such secondary processing context addresses the primary one by 
introducing two new features, comparing to the previous algorithms in [CFJ+2011], [QSS+2012], and 
[QSD2013]:  
 An angle threshold is introduced to address the orientation extraction errors (𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝑝0
). One of 
the complications that come with the high-resolution images is that the ridges are largely 
magnified to become “stripes” rather than “lines”. Such “stripes” come with a certain 
width and are made up of particles with various sizes, shapes and intensities. Therefore, it 
is often that such heterogeneity of the ridges yield multiple similar orientations, which 
would be erroneously extracted as dominant orientations in a block and conceal the actual 
second dominant orientation. With the assignment of angle threshold, after the first 
dominant orientation is extracted, the second one could appear in the following three 
ways: 
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1. Its angle difference to the first one is larger than the value of the threshold, so 
it can be correctly located and extracted, while the automatic omission of the 
candidate orientations that are close, i.e. similar, to the first one. 
2. Its angle difference to the first one is smaller than the angle threshold, thus it 
cannot be extracted. However, in case of properly chosen value for the 
threshold, this would only happen when the two ridge lines in the block are 
completely overlaid on each other and appearing as one, so they are 
essentially not separable in the first place. Therefore, for the sake of further 
forensic analysis, it is more reasonable to output no result instead of a 
potential misleading one, so no second orientation is rendered in this case. 
3. There exists no second dominant orientation at all, due to either a ridge 
ending or relatively weak intensity in the block. The frequency representation 
of this situation would be similar to that of last case, and it would also yield 
the lack of second orientation rendered in the block, which is consistent with 
its physical appearance. 
 
Figure 19. Three overlapping behaviours in DFT windows, with the central parts of their frequency 
representations on the right side, with red line referring to the first dominant orientation, green the second, 
and blue dashed lines denoting the angle threshold applied in the frequency domain  
(re-sketched from [QSZ+2014]) 
Figure 19 shows the three preceding situations respectively, together with their 
representations in frequency domain. Notice here that the figure only illustrates the 
zoomed-in central parts, so the bright pixels are more perceptual, corresponding to the 
dominant orientations. 
 The enhanced algorithm uses the orientation information of the boundaries already at the 
beginning of the relaxation labelling step, instead of in the merging step (as in [CFJ+2011]), 
to address labelling and merging errors (𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝑝1
 and 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝑝2
). In [CFJ+2011], the application of 
1. 
2. 
3. 
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relaxation labelling involves only the overlapped region. The two resulting separated 
orientation fields are subsequently taken over by the merging step, which is supposed to 
match them to their corresponding nonoverlapped regions. Despite that this merging step 
takes boundary information into its consideration, labelling and merging errors still often 
occur in previous tests. After investigating those testing results, it appears that most of 
such errors occur because some areas of the overlapped region on the boundaries come 
with relatively weak quality (due to smeared ridges, dust or fibres on the substrate, etc.), 
causing labelling errors. Because these errors appear on the boundaries, they directly 
compromise the correctness of the subsequent merging step, causing merging errors. 
Addressing this issue, the proposed algorithm takes the boundary information into 
consideration in the relaxation labelling step (as shown in Table 14), so it yields two 
orientation fields which already match their corresponding boundaries hence also the 
corresponding nonoverlapped region. Therefore, no merging step is needed, and this is 
also beneficial from the point of view of computational complexity. In Figure 20 a typical 
example is given, showing the improvement of separation performance that this 
modification introduces. 
 
Figure 20. Comparison of separation results using (a) the previous approach from [CFJ+2011], (b) the current 
approach (re-sketched from [QSZ+2014]) 
This proposed algorithm differs from the one from [FSZ2012] in the following two aspects:  
 [FSZ2012] treats each overlapped block as single object to simplify the relaxation labelling 
procedure. However, as explained later, in this scenario the high-resolution brings more 
details, resulting more complications to the overlapping behaviour of the orientations. 
Therefore, the algorithm here treats each single orientation separately for a more precise 
separation decision.  
 Despite it also utilises the information from the nonoverlapped regions in the relaxation 
labelling procedure, the algorithm here calculates the compatibilities differently with 
[FSZ2012]. 
Furthermore, as already marked in Table 5 and Table 14, the proposed algorithm introduces 
six parameters, which contributes further to secondary processing context: 
 Iteration control factors α and tmax are inherited from the approaches in [CFJ+2011]. With 
regard to the convergence of the iterative relaxation labelling, the parameter α works as 
the oscillation factor, while tmax is the iteration time (see Table 5) 
 Angle threshold τ in degrees ensures the second dominant orientation to be correctly 
identified in each block, as explained earlier (see Table 14); 
 DFT window size w (see Table 14); 
 Gaussian factor 𝜎 controls the Gaussian filter that is applied on each DFT window to filter 
out the ridges in its centre region (see Table 14); 
 Boundary width ε is the width in blocks of the boundaries used in the relaxation labelling 
step (see Table 14).  
CWL 
scan 
(a) (b) 
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5.1.2 Context-based parameter optimisation 
As mentioned previously, the parameters involved in the implementation of the proposed algorithm 
also serve as part of the secondary processing context to its TE, the fingerprint ridges. As shown in 
Table 14, the assigned value of the parameters directly affect the outcome of the processing steps, 
hence the correctness of the final separation results. Therefore, this subsection describes a context-
based parameter optimisation, yielding optimised parameter values. As described in formula (3.3g) in 
subsection 3.1.2, it is possible that an entity in a context model serves as context for other entities and 
at the same time has its own surrounding context. This is revealed here: to perform the optimisation, 
the parameters themselves are considered in this case as TEs, while their corresponding CEs are 
further identified and derived with reference to both acquisition and processing context in two classes: 
inter-parameter context, i.e. the context that reflects how one parameter correlates with the rest, and 
intra-parameter context, i.e. the context that constrains one parameter due to its physical nature. Table 
15 summarises the functionalities of all the parameters investigated here, together with their inter- and 
intra-context entities. The clarified CEs are highlighted with different colours according to the sources 
they are derived from. Based on these CEs, the corresponding parameter optimisation can be further 
conducted. 
Parameter Functionalities Intra-parameter context 
Inter-parameter 
context 
α Controls the initial 
amplitude of the 
oscillation of the iterative 
relaxation labelling 
> 0 to start an oscillation  positively 
correlated with tmax 
requires an upper limit for the sake of 
computational complexity 
tmax Controls the duration of 
the iterative relaxation 
labelling 
> 0 to start an oscillation positively 
correlated with α 
saturates when growing larger than 
certain value after the oscillation 
converges 
requires an upper limit for the sake of 
computational complexity 
τ Controls the area 
around the first 
extracted dominant 
orientation eliminated 
from the extraction of 
the second dominant 
orientation 
in degrees - 
> 0° to make the threshold to function 
≤ 45° as the DFT domain is centro-
symmetric 
w Controls the size of the 
DFT window processing 
the block, therefore the 
number of ridges in 
each DFT window 
in pixels resulting DFT 
window shall 
exceed the 
Gaussian filtered 
area 
reflects the number of ridges in each DFT 
window 
shall enable each DFT window to cover 
enough number of ridges for the 
following Gaussian filter 
requires an upper limit for the sake of 
computational complexity 
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𝜎 Controls the area of 
filtered centre region of 
DFT window, therefore 
the number or filtered 
ridges 
reflects the number of ridges being 
filtered  
resulting filtered 
area must not 
exceed the DFT 
window 
must filter appropriate number of ridges 
for orientation extraction 
requires upper limit as the Gaussian filter 
must filter at least one ridge 
ε Controls the amount of 
boundary orientation 
information for 
relaxation labelling 
in blocks negatively 
correlated with b 
≥ 1 to form a boundary 
requires an upper limit as orientation bias 
accumulates 
requires an upper limit for the sake of 
computational probability 
Table 15. Parameters and their intra- and inter-context entities, those derived from acquisition context are 
highlighted in red, while those from processing context in blue  
(reproduced from [QSZ+2014]) 
Optimisation of the iteration control factors α and tmax 
As shown in Table 15, parameters α and tmax control the iterative relaxation labelling. The values of 
both parameters show a positive correlation with each other, and both stay in certain ranges. 
Therefore, here they are investigated together, aiming at a pair of proper value settings. In the 
optimisation, one of the two parameters is assigned with a constant while adjusting the other, 
followed by the visual examination of the resulting separation results. This procedure is repeated on 
10 images of authentic overlapped latent fingerprints. 
Figure 21 shows one group of separation results with various α values with tmax being 
constantly assigned as 2500. Obviously the separation quality is best when α = 0.2 or 0.3. As similar 
observations can be made in all 10 groups of results from the tested images, it is concluded here that 
0.2 or 0.3 is the most suitable value for parameter α. For the sake of not only the consistency but also a 
lower computational complexity, α = 0.2 is chosen for later tests. 
 
Figure 21. Separation results (left print only) with tmax = 2500 for various α values (applying the minimum 
granularity value 0.1 allowed by the implementation)  
(re-sketched from [QSZ+2014]) 
Figure 22 shows one group of separation results with various tmax values with α being 
constantly assigned as 0.2. As shown in the figure, with a constant α value, the increase of tmax 
contributes in a logarithmic behaviour to the accuracy of separation. Considering the similar 
observations in all results of the 10 different original scans, it is concluded here that the most suitable 
parameter value is tmax = 2500.  
α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.4 α = 0.3 α = 0.5 CWL scan 
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Figure 22. Separation results (left print only) with α = 0.2 for various tmax values (applying a granularity value 
of 500 which yields enough perceptual difference on the results)  
(re-sketched from [QSZ+2014]) 
As α and tmax are closely correlated, there could exist other combinations of larger values of 
these two parameters, also yielding satisfactory convergence. However, the convergence would 
nevertheless consumes longer time, as stronger oscillation that comes with a larger α value would take 
longer to converge. Therefore, the least time-consuming pair of suitable values is selected here. 
Optimisation of the angle threshold τ 
The angle threshold τ is introduced with the new features described in subsection 5.1.1. As shown in 
Table 15, the value of this parameter lies in the range of (0°, 45°], due to the centrosymmetry of the 
DFT domain in which the threshold functions. As explained, this parameter is set to address the error 
caused by the appearance of multiple orientations from single ridge, and this phenomenon can be 
assumed to occur only randomly in the blocks. Considering the sample space (which covers all the 
blocks in all the fingerprint images in the test sets) being big enough, it is reasonable to assume that 
the occurrence of such phenomenon follows a normal distribution. Therefore, the mean value of the 
range (0°, 45°] is the best candidate. In the implementation, the integer τ = 22° is used to avoid 
additional computational complexity of using floating-point numbers.  
Optimisation of the DFT window size w 
As explained in Table 15, its CEs constrain the parameter w in following aspects: 
 A DFT window needs to cover more ridges than the block in its centre does, thus the 
value of w requires a lower limit;  
 A DFT window needs to also cover enough number of ridges for the following Gaussian 
filter; 
 Considering computational complexity, the value of w also requires an upper limit.  
As Table 14 shows, the block size b is assigned with the measured ridge distance so that each 
block covers one ridge. Therefore, here w is assigned with four times the block size, so that each DFT 
window covers around four ridges, addressing all three preceding aspects. 
Optimisation of the Gaussian factor 𝝈 
The Gaussian factor 𝜎 decides the area of the filtered centre region of a DFT window, therefore also 
decides the number of ridges that directly contribute to the extracted orientations. As described in 
Table 14, here the 𝜎 value is set in a dynamic way that two ridges clearly appear in the centred filtered 
region. 
CWL scan tmax = 1000 tmax = 1500 tmax = 2500 tmax = 2000 tmax = 3000 
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Optimisation of the boundary width ε 
According to Table 15, the value of boundary width ε needs to be assigned in a range: the lower limit 
of such range is trivially 1, as a boundary must be at least one block wide, and the upper limit exists 
for the following two aspects of its context:  
 The orientation bias accumulates with the growth of the distance between the block in the 
boundary and the overlapped region;  
 The value of ε should be as small as possible for the sake of computational complexity. 
Additionally, as its value is in blocks, it is reasonable that a larger b yields a smaller ε, and vice 
versa.  
A test is therefore conducted to approach the optimised value of ε. Similar to previous tests 
for α and tmax, 10 images of authentic overlapped latent fingerprints are processed with fixed 
parameter setting except for various ε values. Figure 23 shows a representative group of test results, 
where separation errors are highlighted with red ellipses. 
 
Figure 23. Separation results with various ε values, while the rest of parameter settings appointed as optimised 
previously (α = 0.2, tmax = 2500, τ = 22°, w = 4b), with separation errors marked with red ellipses (re-sketched 
from [QSZ+2014]) 
As shown by the results in Figure 23 together with the rest nine groups of them, better 
separation results can be observed when ε is assigned as 1, 2, or 3. To achieve the balance in the trade-
off between the amount of boundary information and the computational complexity, it is concluded 
here that ε = 2 is most suitable. 
 
With the preceding optimised parameters, the developed algorithm is realised with C++ 
within the scope of the forensic processing toolkit developed in DigiDak research project. Figure 24 
shows the user interface of the toolkit that implements the separation algorithm as one of its 
processing components. As shown in the figure, with the help of the user interface, the user (in this 
case fingerprint expert), has full access to the whole separation process: he can easily import the 
overlapped latent fingerprint image, apply the fingerprint masks (rendered in red and green in Figure 
24) together with the additional reference masks (rendered in blue in Figure 24), assign the parameters 
(highlighted in the orange rectangle in Figure 24), initialise the separation process, and observe and 
store the separation results. It should be noted here, that for the demonstration the exemplary 
CWL scan 
ε = 1 ε = 2 ε = 3 ε = 4 ε = 5 ε = 6 
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overlapped fingerprints shown in the figure being separated is generated artificially using SFinGe5 
[Cappeli2009], printed using the method introduced in [HSD+2013] and captured using CWL sensor. 
 
Figure 24. User interface of the toolkit implementing the proposed separation algorithm, developed within the 
scope of DigiDak research project6 
5.2 EVALUATION WITH OPTIMISED PARAMETERS 
There are various ways of evaluating the separation results regarding their correctness and 
applicability for subsequent forensic testing procedures, e.g. assessing the quality of the fingerprint-
like pattern in the separation results as described in [HMQ+2013]. This section assumes for the 
primary goal of dactyloscopy, which is to examine fingerprints and yield identifications of persons of 
interest, thus it applies here a biometric-based evaluation mechanism. The evaluation is performed in 
two stages: A preliminary stage aims to establish the premise that the original CWL scan of 
overlapped fingerprint is not applicable even for single identification, followed by the main stage that 
focuses on assessing the correctness of the separated fingerprint ridges. 
5.2.1 Test sets generation 
Two test sets are generated for the evaluation. Test set 1 (TS1) is generated as follows to address the 
secondary acquisition CEs: 
 Trace source 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴2: TS1 comprises four fingerprints from two different volunteers. FP1 and 
FP2 are collected from a male volunteer, while FP3 and FP4 from a female one. As a 
compromise between the highest potential similarity with same finger and highest 
                                                        
5 “Fingerprint generation”, Biometric System Laboratory, DISI, University of Bologna,  
http://biolab.csr.unibo.it/research.asp?organize=Activities&select=&selObj=12&pathSubj=111%7C%7C12&, 
(accessed on Jun. 18, 2014). 
6 The author thanks Marcus Leich, Wolfgang Büschel, Maik Schott, and Wenju Zheng for their contribution to the 
implementation. 
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potential dissimilarity with different fingers from different persons, the test set employs 
different fingers from same person, i.e. FP1 overlaid on FP2, and FP3 on FP4. 
 Substrate 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴4 : three substrates are used, namely hard disk platter (Sub1), white paint-
coated metal surface commonly seen on kitchen furniture (Sub2), and aluminium foil 
(Sub3).  
 Overlapping behaviour 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴1: The volunteers are asked to press their appointed fingers on the 
substrates with random pressure, overlapping angle and percentage, but not to smear. 
However, the occurrence of the resulting overlapped fingerprints exhibit nevertheless 
slight random behaviour of smearing. 
 Sensor settings 𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴6: The sample images are acquired by scanning the overlapped latent 
fingerprints using a CWL sensor with the settings of scanning frequency at 2000 Hz and 
dot distance at 10 µm, to achieve a high resolution (in this case 2540 ppi) and image 
quality. Depending on the actual fingerprint area, a single scan typically takes 1–2 hours. 
TS1 consists in total of 60 sample images, among those 28 on Sub1, 8 on Sub2, and 24 on Sub3. 
Furthermore, the evaluation also employs the “Tsinghua Overlapped Latent Fingerprint 
Database (Tsinghua OLF)” published in [FSZ2012] as a second test set (TS2). TS2 consists of 100 latent 
overlapped fingerprint images at 500 ppi, developed conventionally with fingerprint powder. Despite 
that the separation approach introduced in this chapter is not developed or tuned for these samples, it 
is nevertheless worth investigating if it can still be used for lower resolution samples that come with 
different context. 
5.2.2 Evaluation methods 
The evaluation utilises NBIS (NIST Biometric Image Software) for fingerprint verification. NBIS 
applies the MINDTCT (minutiae detector) algorithm to locate and identify the minutiae in fingerprint 
images, and the Bozorth3 matcher to determine a matching score between two fingerprint 
images [GWM+2004]. The higher the matching score is, the more similar the two fingerprints are. As 
shown in Figure 25, two kinds of templates are used in the evaluation: one is the original CWL scan 
image (TempO), the other is the black and white representation of TempO (TempBW), which is 
binarised by processing them only using the processing steps 1 – 4 and 7 described in Table 14 on 
page 55. 
 
Figure 25. Examples of the two types of templates used for verification  
(re-sketched from [QSZ+2014]) 
The evaluation starts with the preliminary stage. In this stage, a group of matching scores are 
run using NBIS on 20 original overlapped scans from TS1 with their corresponding TempO images. 
This stage aims to explore for the applicability of overlapped fingerprint without separation as 
forensic evidence. 
After that, the evaluation proceeds with the main stage. In this stage, separation is performed 
on both TS1 and TS2, with the optimised parameter setting derived in subsection 5.1.2, i.e. α = 0.2, tmax 
TempO TempBW 
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= 2500, τ = 22°, w = 4b. Therefore, it achieves 120 separation results from TS1 and 200 from TS2. 
Subsequently, NBIS (NIST Biometric Image Software) is applied cross-examine the separation results 
and the templates, i.e. matching scores are achieved between each separation result and all templates 
of two types. After that, these scores are compared with the previous ones to observe performance 
differences. FAR (False Acceptance Rate) and FRR (False Rejection Rate), together with the ROC 
(Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves are plotted to reach the proper threshold score. 
5.2.3 Evaluation results 
The matching scores achieved in the preliminary stage are illustrated in Figure 26. As clearly shown 
by the figure, the overlapped fingerprint, even acquired with high resolution hence high richness of 
detail, is not applicable in forensics, as neither the minutiae from the complete scan nor those from 
nonoverlapped parts are capable of yielding a convincing identification result. 
  
Figure 26. Matching scores between 20 samples from TS1 and their corresponding TempO images 
(re-sketched from [QSD2013]) 
Figure 27 on page 89 illustrates the matching scores of each separation result on TS1 with all 
four TempO templates in (a) and all four TempBW templates in (b). In both subfigures, series 1 refers 
to the scores with the corresponding template, whereas the remaining three the non-corresponding 
ones. Among all 120 separation results, no. 1-56 are on Sub1, no. 57-72 on Sub2, and no. 72-120 on 
Sub3. Observing both (a) and (b), the separation results on all three substrates show clear tendency of 
yielding correct matching, whereas the type of template poses no significant influence on the overall 
performance. Figure 28 on page 90 illustrates the ascending FRR curve based on the 240 matching 
scores from series 1 in Figure 27 (a) and (b), and the descending FAR curve based on the 720 matching 
scores from the remaining three series in them. The intersection of two curves indicates an EER of 5.7% 
with the corresponding threshold value of matching score of 14. This is also confirmed with the ROC 
curve illustrated in Figure 29 on page 90. Similar to Figure 28 and Figure 29, in Figure 30 (page 91) and 
Figure 31 (page 91) FAR, FRR and ROC curves are also plotted for the total 4800 matching scores for 
TS2, and an EER of 17.9% is indicated, with the corresponding threshold of 8. 
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Figure 27. Matching scores (log scale) on TS1 with (a) TempO and (b) TempBW  
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Figure 28. FAR/FRR curves of TS1 (re-sketched from [QSZ+2014]) 
 
Figure 29. ROC curve of TS1 (re-sketched from [QSZ+2014]) 
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Figure 30. FAR/FRR curves of TS2 (re-sketched from [QSZ+2014]) 
 
Figure 31. ROC curve of TS2 (re-sketched from [QSZ+2014])  
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The EER of 5.7% on TS1 shows the improvement in performance, comparing to the EER of 8.3% 
reported in [QSD2013], which applies an earlier version of relaxation labelling based separation 
algorithm without context awareness, tested with a smaller test set of 20 authentic samples. This 
justifies the advantages of applying data level context modelling into various aspects of the data 
processing in the separation approach. As the state-of-the-art literature (including [CFJ+2011] and 
[SFZ2011]) a) did not conduct imposter tests, b) applied a more sophisticated fingerprint matcher 
(VeriFinger 6.2 SDK), and c) did not specified that on what basis the TARs are calculated on the FAR 
range of 10−8 to 10−4 (see subsection 2.5.2), the evaluation results achieved in this chapter cannot be 
directly used for comparison, as the current statistical evaluation method bases on matching/non-
matching cases would have needed a much larger test set to yield a similar FAR range. 
Comparing to TS1, the evaluation results show that the performance of the approach 
evidently degrades on TS2, showing no obvious enhancement comparing to the results reported 
in [FSZ2012]. Besides the same three factors as explained before regarding [CFJ+2011] and [SFZ2011] 
making it difficult for the direct comparison of evaluation results, this could also be explained, as all 
the modifications made to the approach are derived from the context of TS1, and the context of TS2 
differs already in the phase of acquisition, thus would require different corresponding adjustment on 
the algorithm.  
Nevertheless, observing the results on both test sets, the samples with higher richness of detail 
and clarity (TS1) yield better separation results comparing to those with lower ones (TS2), implying 
the advantage of applying advanced sensing technology for fingerprint acquisition. As analysed in 
Table 13, the secondary acquisition CEs “overlapping behaviour” (𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴1) and “fingerprint development 
technique” (𝑒𝑠𝑐
𝐴5 ) are the most dominant factors with regard to such richness and clarity, they 
introduce the largest impact on the separation performance. 
It should also be mentioned that the topic of separation of overlapped latent fingerprint is 
further addressed in a Master thesis that the author co-supervised (see [Zheng2014]). The thesis 
applies the same separation algorithm as proposed in this chapter and published in [QSZ+2014], and 
evaluates its implementation with an extended test set of overlapped latent fingerprints acquired 
using CWL sensor, as described in Table 16. 
Substrate Resolution 500 ppi 1000 ppi 2540 ppi 
Hard disk platter 16 16 28 
Smooth white paint-coated metal surface - - 8 
Aluminium foil 18 18 24 
Table 16. The extended test set of overlapped latent fingerprints generated in [Zheng2014] 
(re-sketched from [Zheng2014]) 
As shown in the table, the extended test set comprises overlapped latent fingerprint samples 
acquired using CWL sensor with three different resolutions (500 ppi, 1000 ppi, and 2540 ppi) on the 
same three types of substrates as used in this section. Similar statistical analysis is conducted 
respectively on the separation results of samples with the same resolution from the same type of 
substrate to the same two types of fingerprint templates as used also in this chapter. The evaluation 
results are shown in Table 17. 
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Template 
type 
Substrate 
EER  
(500 ppi) 
EER  
(1000 ppi) 
EER  
(2540 ppi) 
TempO Hard disk platter 8.4% 8.1% 1.8% 
Smooth white paint-coated metal surface - - 6.2% 
Aluminium foil 17.9% 15.3% 8.0% 
TempBW Hard disk platter 13.0% 14.7% 3.6% 
Smooth white paint-coated metal surface - - 6.2% 
Aluminium foil 25.6% 20.5% 9.2% 
Table 17. The achieved EERs on the extended test set w.r.t. the two types of fingerprint templates reported in 
[Zheng2014], with best/worst performances highlighted (re-sketched from [Zheng2014]) 
Table 17 clarifies several factors that influence the separation: First, the acquisition resolution 
of the overlapped latent fingerprints shows a positive correlation with the separation performance. 
Second, the hard disk platter shows the highest cooperativeness, while the aluminium foil shows the 
lowest, presumably with regard the amount of noise the substrate introduces to the fingerprint images. 
Third, the TempO yields better separation performance than TempBW. Besides the results reported in 
Table 17, the test set in [Zheng2014] also includes the 100 conventionally acquired overlapped latent 
fingerprints from TsinghuaOLF, on which the testing yields EERs of 11.9% and 20.6%, respectively 
with TempO and TempBW. 
To sum up, the evaluation reported in [Zheng2014] further verifies the applicability of the 
propose separation approach, especially on fingerprint samples acquired in various ways and with 
different resolutions. 
5.3 ASSESSMENT REGARDING THE SECURITY RULES 
At the beginning of this chapter, several exemplary SRs are derived as Example 8, describing the 
general working environment and requirements for latent fingerprint separation in the forensic 
scenario. Therefore, besides the objective evaluation of the performance of the developed separation 
approach described in last section, it is also necessary to subjectively apply a scenario-specific 
assessment on the approach with regard to those SRs to see if it addresses them well. It should be 
noted here that the following assessment is conducted by the author as a demonstration from the 
point of view of a developer of a forensic toolkit. Therefore, the assessment results will need to be 
verified through a joint work of both developer and expected end-user, in this case forensic experts. 
This falls out of the scope of this dissertation, yet it is worth mentioning that at the time of writing this 
chapter related work has already been planned in DigiDak research project  
Based on the nature of the regulation that the SR represents, the eleven SRs listed in Example 
8 can be divided into two classes: 1) the SRs that directly regulates what the separation approach shall 
achieve, including SR3-SR5, SR7, and SR9, 2) the SRs that regulates how the separation approach shall 
be used, including SR0-SR2, SR6, SR8, and SR10. Therefore, for the first class, the developed approach is 
directly assessed to see if the requirements regulated by the SRs are either “sufficiently addressed”, 
“partially addressed”, or “not addressed”. For the second class of SRs, the developed approach is 
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assessed from the angle that if it is compatible or not with the ways of usage regulated by the SRs. The 
assessment results are given and further elucidated in Table 18. 
SRs SR Class Assessment results Reasoning 
SR0 2 Compatible The execution of the separation can be easily accessed 
and overseen. 
SR1 2 Compatible With the toolkit the fingerprint image can be easily 
imported and examined by the fingerprint expert. 
SR2 2 Compatible With the toolkit the fingerprint expert can easily select 
proper processing method for the image. 
SR3 1 Sufficiently addressed As established by the evaluation testing, the approach can 
be used on overlapped latent fingerprint samples 
developed in various ways with various resolutions. 
SR4 1 Partially addressed While the global flow of friction ridges can be well 
preserved on the separated fingerprints, the evaluation 
conducted based on minutiae shows that the separation 
cannot always preserve all the minutiae information. 
However, it should be noted that in case the third level 
feature is shown on the original sample (like the ones 
acquired using CWL sensor) the developed approach has 
a good potential to preserve it as well.  
SR5 1 Partially addressed Endeavour towards Daubert compliance is put into the 
development of the approach: it has been tested for its 
reliability and a series of publications, in which the 
approach is clearly elucidated, have been published and 
subject to peer review. However, its error rate is 
established on limited test sets, and it needs further 
improvement to form its corresponding standards, and 
eventually towards its general acceptance. 
SR6 2 Compatible The user interface enables easy operation on the 
separation procedures and proper interference from the 
fingerprint experts. 
SR7 1 Sufficiently addressed The fingerprint masks and parameters applied by the first 
fingerprint expert can be easily reused to reproduce the 
separation results for the verification by the second expert. 
SR8 2 Compatible The separation results can be easily stored for further 
usage. 
SR9 1 Sufficiently addressed The whole acquisition and processing flow does not 
employ any invasive procedure on the original latent 
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fingerprint samples. 
SR10 2 Compatible With the user interface, all the actions (e.g. the assignment 
of fingerprint masks, the appointment of parameters) can 
easily be accessed and documented for the completion of 
chain-of-custody information. 
Table 18. Subjective assessment of the developed separation approach with regard to SRs in Example 8 
As explained in Table 18, despite its performance limitation shown in by the evaluation, the 
developed approach manages to support all the derived SRs. To better compare this approach with 
the state-of-the-art ones introduced in subsection 2.5.2, the first class of SRs are also used to similarly 
assess these separation approaches, as the second class of SRs are not applicable here due to the lack of 
necessary information in the state-of-the-art literatures, especially regarding the implementation 
environments of these approaches. The assessment is summarised in Table 19. 
Table 19 on page 95 clearly shows the advantage of the developed context-aware separation 
comparing to the state-of-the-art ones. Besides their common lack of consideration of Daubert criteria 
or any standard regarding the admissibility of their separation results to be accepted as court evidence 
(required by SR5), a few additional remarks should be mentioned here regarding the assessment: The 
fact that the ICA based approach requires the source image refrains its application in the forensic 
scenario (reflected by SR3, SR4, and SR7), yet it indeed applies invasive processing (required by SR9). 
The infrared spectroscopic imaging and mass spectrometry based approaches both require the 
application of chemical agents as pre-processing, compromising the intactness of the original 
fingerprint sample (SR9) and the reproducibility of the examination procedures (SR7). The blind source 
separation approach applies non-invasive processing (SR9), yet its testing reveals that its performance 
is severely limited regarding the evidence type (SR3) and there is no mechanism to assure the 
reproducibility (SR7). The previous relaxation labelling based approaches suit better to the forensic 
scenario comparing to the rest, yet still show limitations regarding to the evidence type that they are 
able to process (SR3) and the reproducibility (SR9). Furthermore, despite no perfect separation 
correctness has been reported (SR4), it should be noted that the size of the test set is more convincing 
with the relaxing labelling based approaches other than the rest. 
 SR3 SR4 SR5 SR7 SR9 
ICA based approach [STK2006] NA PA NA PA SA 
Infrared spectroscopic imaging based approach 
[BSF+2009] 
PA PA NA NA NA 
Mass spectrometry based approach [TLC+2010] PA PA NA NA NA 
Blind source separation approach [KGL+2011] PA PA NA PA SA 
Previous relaxation labelling based approaches 
[CFJ+2011] [SFJ2011] [ZJ2012] [FSZ2012] 
PA PA NA PA SA 
The developed context-aware approach SA PA PA SA SA 
Labels used in this table SA: sufficiently addressed, PA: partially addressed, NA: not addressed 
Table 19. Subjective assessment of the state-of-the-art separation approach with regard to the first class SRs in 
Example 8; comparing to the context-aware approach developed in this chapter 
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5.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter provides an instantiation of the theory of data level security-oriented context modelling 
proposed in Chapter 3. Within the scope of digitised forensics, it works in a “bottom-up” way, i.e. 
extracts and interprets useful context from the acquisition and processing environments, and 
eventually derives a context-based approach of separating non-invasively captured high-resolution 
overlapped latent fingerprints. The approach shows obvious improvement to previous approaches in 
both objective and subjective evaluations. Therefore, for the first time context awareness is introduced 
for the development and enhancement of a specific algorithm and its realisation. 
Following the proposed conception (see subsection 3.2.3), this chapter specifies those defined 
context types:  
 Primary acquisition context comprises the information describing the property of the 
acquired data, namely the overlapped latent fingerprints, and the information introduced 
to it by the acquisition environment. 
 Secondary acquisition context is achieved by interpreting the primary one, resulting specific 
context entities along with the information that comes with them (see Table 13 on page 76). 
 Primary processing context is derived by processing the secondary acquisition context using 
the chosen previous processing approach with no context awareness, which nevertheless 
potentially conforms with the processing environment regulated by SRs. In this case it is 
described in the form of separation error classes. 
 Secondary processing context is achieved by interpreting the primary one. In this case, it 
comprises several parts: 1) the new features introduced to the algorithm to tackle the 
identified separation errors, 2) the parameters that come with the enhanced algorithm, 3) 
the intra- and inter-context of the parameters, leading to their optimised values. 
This chapter clearly demonstrates the advantages gained by introducing security-oriented 
context modelling on the data level to derive specific data processing procedures, e.g. an algorithm 
and its implementation. The SRs with formalisation depicts clearly the expectations for the approach 
to achieve from the angle of application scenario, thus can be directly used for its scenario-specific 
evaluation. The development and interpretation of various types of context guides the design and 
realisation of the separation algorithm, and the enhancement that has been brought to it is also 
reflected by the performance improvement shown by the evaluation. More importantly, by applying 
the conception, all the influential factors that the data processing approach introduces to the processed 
data object, in this case potential fingerprint evidence, are clearly organised and described by these 
various context types on different levels. Therefore, this provides a further advantage that contributes 
to non-repudiation, which is an essential security aspect that expected for general forensic approaches. 
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6 MODELLING SECURITY WITH CONTEXT AWARENESS 
A theoretical framework for security-oriented context modelling has been established in Chapter 3, 
and two instantiations based on this framework have been presented in Chapter 4 and 5, respectively 
on system and data level. However, as first raised in section 1.2, then pointed out again in section 2.6, 
further explained in section 3.3, and reflected in section 4.3 and 5.3, one issue remains unsolved: 
currently, there is a lack of proper systematic means for the assessment of such context models. 
Therefore, in this chapter, the first goal is to close this gap between context model generation and its 
evaluation. Section 6.1 derives and applies a series of applicable scenario-unspecific evaluation metrics, 
and also discusses the basic principles for the scenario-specific ones. After that, based on the previous 
established theoretical framework and its instantiations together with the evaluation metrics, section 
6.2 induces a general methodology, which is meant for guiding the application of security-oriented 
context modelling in future security-related application scenarios.  
 6.1 EVALUATION METRICS FOR SECURITY-ORIENTED CONTEXT MODELS  
This section addresses the lack of means for evaluation in the field of context modelling with regard to 
the two phases of security-oriented context modelling. First, after a context model is generated, the 
model itself needs to be assessed to estimate its general quality. Despite the assessment in this phase 
needs to refer to the expected application scenario of the model, the applied criteria must nevertheless 
be scenario-unspecific, i.e. the criteria shall stay consistent even if the nature of the application scenario 
changes. This is elucidated in subsection 6.1.1. Second, after the generated context model is applied to 
yield a data processing system or a series of data processing procedures, the performance of such 
application also needs to be assessed. In this case, the applied criteria shall reflect the actual 
requirements of the application scenario, hence be scenario-specific. This is explained in subsection 6.1.2.  
6.1.1 Evaluation of the model’s quality 
What properties constitute a “good” context model? To answer this question, Bettini et al. summarise 
several criteria to evaluate context models applied in pervasive computing in [BBH+2010] (see 
subsection 2.2.3), namely heterogeneity and mobility, relationship and dependency, timeliness, imperfection, 
reasoning, usability of modelling formalism, efficient context previsioning. These criteria manage to cover 
several important properties expected for context models, but there are also limitations: first, they are 
derived specifically with regard to pervasive computing; second, they do not take consideration from 
the perspective of security. 
Therefore, based on the criteria enumerated above, the evaluation metrics derived here need 
to meet following requirements: 
 The metrics need to be used to assess the pros and cons in the properties of the context 
model itself. 
 The metrics need to be applied on a more general level, i.e. not specifically only for 
pervasive computing or any other single application scenario, hence scenario-unspecific. 
 The metrics must reveal the requirements from a security point of view. 
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 Regarding the different nature of the context models on system and data levels, the 
metrics need to be able to cover such difference and be applicable on both levels. 
 The metrics shall also be able to reveal the dynamics of the context, as it might further 
develop over time and space. 
As the first step towards the quality evaluation metrics of security-oriented context models, 
addressing the above five requirements, ten criteria are developed here as listed in Table 20. 
Criteria in the evaluation metrics Potential security contribution 
Heterogeneity  
Relationships  
Imperfection Integrity 
Reasoning Integrity 
Provenance Authenticity, non-repudiation 
Evolvability  
Automatability Confidentiality 
Completeness Integrity 
Complexity and clarity Non-repudiation 
Trustiness Authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, non-
repudiation, availability 
Table 20. Criteria defined here for evaluation metrics of security-oriented context models 
These ten criteria are defined in the form of core questions and further elucidated as follows: 
 Heterogeneity – “How well can the context model process various types of context?”: Similar to 
the definition in [BBH+2010], security-oriented context models must be able to handle 
various types of context entities collected from various sources, with various forms, 
evolving rates and qualities, and on various levels of granularity. Mobility defined in 
[BBH+2010] is no longer emphasised here in particular, as it is a feature that pervasive 
computing specifically requires and in fact already covered by the nature of heterogeneity. 
For example, on the system level, this could mean that the context model needs to 
synchronise various system components in different locations, while on the data level, it 
needs to be able to combine various data types. 
 Relationships – “How well can the context model represent the relationships in the context?”: 
Similar to the definition in [BBH+2010], security-oriented context models must be able to 
interpret and express the relationships among various context entities. According to the 
theoretical framework proposed in this dissertation, dependencies defined in [BBH+2010] 
can be considered as one type of relationships (see subsection 3.1.2). For instance, a system 
level context model is required to assign various functionalities to various agents in the 
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system, while a data level context model needs to reflect various influential factors on the 
collection of data objects. 
 Imperfection – “How well can the context model tolerant with incomplete or erroneous 
information?”: Inherited from [BBH+2010], it is necessary for security-oriented context 
models to be able to tolerate incomplete or even erroneous context information in the 
processing. For example, such information could be some object or concept that fall out of 
the required formalism on the system level, or data biased by noise on the data level. 
Therefore, the ability of handling such imperfection also contributes to integrity among the 
five security aspects (see subsection 2.3.1). 
 Reasoning – “How well can the context model apply reasoning to interpret and derive context 
entities?”: Also inherited from [BBH+2010], one important benefit of using context 
modelling is its ability of reasoning, i.e. security-oriented context models shall be able to 
interpret context with reasoning techniques for necessary adaptations to be deployed and 
new context to be derived, and they shall also be able to verify the consistency of the 
context regarding its accuracy and completeness before and after the interpretation (hence 
constitute integrity). On the system level, this could mean that the model needs to deduct 
specific functionalities from more general ones, while on the data level it could mean that 
specific operations can be derived from certain features of data objects. 
 Provenance – “How available is the provenance information of the context entities in the context 
model?”: Security-oriented context model shall preserve the provenance information of 
context entities, so the previous status of entities can be traceable. This contributes directly 
to authenticity and to non-repudiation, if the well preserved records of the previous status 
can be subject to auditing. A system level example would be, in case that a combination is 
deployed on two system components to form a new one, the status of the original two 
together with their functionalities must be documented in advance. On the data level, the 
source and all following processing procedures applied on a data object must go to its 
meta-data and the audit trail. 
 Evolvability – “How well can the context model absorb new context and evolve accordingly?”: 
Within the scope of context modelling, it is expected that the context entities might evolve 
through time and space. Correspondingly, it is also expected that security-oriented 
context models are able to evolve themselves to better process its changing context. On the 
system level, when the security requirements change due to stricter protocols, new 
functionalities need to be realised accordingly by including new system components. On 
the data level, when some old data format becomes obsolete and gets replaced by a new 
one, the operations designed to process it also need to be adjusted accordingly. 
 Automatability – “To what degree is the context model able to function automatically / how much 
human intervention does it need?”: This assesses the ability of security-oriented context 
models to execute their functionalities automatically, reflecting the level of required 
human intervention. The involvement of human agents is considered as a major dynamic 
parameter, as human behaviour is usually considered as hard to predict and it could yield 
potential security leaks. Therefore, this criterion also contributes to confidentiality and 
integrity. A system level model could be designed to derive specific policies from its 
functionalities, yet it might need human administrators to specify the protocols 
beforehand. A data level model could be designed to process data objects automatically, 
yet it might need a specialist to adjust its parameters. 
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 Completeness – “How complete is the context model regarding the coverage of its representation of 
what is modelled?”: As the progress of modelling is fundamentally speaking a progress to 
selectively represent the physical reality in a systematically formalised way, this criterion 
is set to assess security-oriented context models for their completeness of their coverage of 
the physical reality being modelled, i.e. if there is relevant information failed to be 
contextualised. Therefore, this criterion also contributes to the integrity from the security 
perspective of view. On the system level, if a security-oriented context model extracts its 
global security context from use-cases, those use-cases shall cover all aspects of the 
expected usage of resulting system. On the data level, the completeness of security-
oriented context models could mean that they shall cover all the environmental factors 
that related to the acquisition of data objects to be processed. 
 Complexity and clarity – “How complex is the representation of the context in the context model? 
And how clear is it to the user? ”: Both of them contribute to the usability of the security-
oriented context models. Complexity refers to the amount of context entities and the degree 
of interactions between them, while clarity refers to the ability of the models to represent, 
express and manage the entities and their interactions. From the security point of view, 
these can eventually contribute to non-repudiation. A system level example would be that 
the model shall be able to handle large amount of security policies using clear hierarchy 
and formalism, while on the data level this could mean that the operations which are 
deployed on the data objects shall be well clarified. 
 Trustiness – “How well is the context model designed to meet the security-related requirement 
from the application scenario?”: The overall security performance of security-oriented 
context models is assessed by this criterion, which requires that the models come with 
security-compliant design and operate only with context entities that are trustable, i.e. the 
context entities shall be subject to necessary security requirements in various aspects 
(authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and availability). On the system level, 
this means that some system components must be able to realise the functionality of check 
and enforce corresponding security enhancement measures, e.g. central audit service for 
non-repudiation. On the data level the data processing procedures must be derived with 
security compliance, e.g. meta-data update for authenticity. 
The universality of the above criteria determines that they are applicable for subjective 
assessment of any context model. With these criteria, the next step towards the metrics is the 
development of the evaluation scale. In this section, the following three-level evaluation scale is 
proposed: 
 Sufficiently addressed is assigned, if the context model being evaluated meets all the 
important aspects of the requirement regarding a certain criterion in the evaluation 
metrics; 
 Partially addressed is assigned, if the context model being evaluated meets some aspects of 
the requirement regarding a certain criterion, yet missing at least one important one; 
 Not addressed is assigned, if the context model being evaluated is not able to address any of 
the aspects of the requirement regarding a certain criterion at all. 
To be able to conduct a subjective quality assessment using the metrics, a series of regulations 
are developed to clarify that how the evaluation scale should be utilised, with regard to each criterion 
in specific circumstances. These regulations are described in the Table 21. 
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 Sufficiently addressed Partially addressed Not addressed 
Heterogeneity The context model is 
designed to process a 
diversity of context (e.g. 
data objects with various 
types, appearances, 
forms, formats, etc.), as 
expected in the 
application scenario.  
The context model is 
designed to process 
context with a certain 
level of diversity (e.g. 
certain type of data 
object with various 
formats), yet not 
completely covering the 
expectation of the 
application scenario. 
The context model does 
not consider the need of 
processing the diversity of 
the context from the 
application scenario at all. 
Typically, the model is 
designed to process only 
fixed types of them. 
Relationships The context model is 
designed with effective 
means of expression to 
represent all kinds 
relationships expected to 
appear in the application 
scenario in the context. 
The context model is 
designed with adequate 
means of expression to 
represent parts of the 
relationships expected to 
appear in the application 
scenario in the context. 
The context model is 
lacking of means of 
expression to represent 
the relationships expected 
to appear in the 
application scenario in the 
context. 
Imperfection The context model is 
designed with effective 
mechanisms to handle all 
kinds of flawed context 
information during the 
processing expected to 
appear in the application 
scenario. 
The context model is 
designed with adequate 
mechanisms to handle 
certain kinds of flawed 
context information 
during the processing 
expected to appear in the 
application scenario. 
The context model 
possesses no mechanism 
to handle flawed context 
information during the 
processing expected to 
appear in the application 
scenario at all. 
Reasoning The context model is 
designed with effective 
reasoning 
mechanisms/techniques 
to 
derive/interpret/organise 
all kinds of context 
collected from the 
application scenario, and 
to maintain their 
consistency during the 
processing. 
The context model is 
designed with adequate 
reasoning 
mechanism/technique to 
derive/interpret/organise 
certain, but not all kinds 
of context collected from 
the application scenario, 
and optionally to maintain 
their consistency during 
the process. 
The context model is 
lacking proper means to 
derive/interpret/organise 
context collected from the 
application scenario. 
Provenance The context model is 
designed with effective 
mechanism to preserve 
the provenance 
information of the context 
and reuse it as expected 
The context model is 
designed with limited 
mechanism to preserve 
the provenance 
information of the 
context, yet not 
The context model is 
lacking mechanism to 
preserve the provenance 
information of the context 
or reuse it as expected in 
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in the application 
scenario. 
necessarily support its 
reuse, as expected in the 
application scenario. 
the application scenario. 
Evolvability The context model is 
designed with effective 
adaptability for evolving 
context, within the 
changing range expected 
in the application 
scenario. 
The context model is 
designed with adequate 
adaptability for evolving 
context, yet not 
completely covering the 
changing range expected 
in the application 
scenario. 
The context model 
possesses no adaptability 
for evolving context, 
albeit the expectation of 
the application scenario. 
Automatability The context model is 
designed with proper 
balance between 
automatic processing and 
human intervention as 
expected in the 
application scenario. 
The design of the context 
model considers the 
issue, yet it introduces 
either too much or too 
human intervention, 
comparing to the 
expectation in the 
application scenario.  
The design of the context 
model does not consider 
this issue at all, despite 
that human intervention is 
expected in the 
application scenario. 
Completeness The context model is 
designed to thoroughly 
cover all context 
information on each level 
of granularities from the 
application scenario.  
The context model is 
designed to cover most 
context information on all 
the important levels of 
granularities from the 
application scenario. 
The design of the context 
model fails to 
contextualise important 
information from the 
application scenario. 
Complexity & 
clarity 
The context model is 
designed with effective 
mechanisms to represent 
large amount of context 
information and 
sophisticated 
relationships, while its 
infrastructure is clear and 
understandable enough, 
both as expected in the 
application scenario. 
The context model is 
designed with adequate 
mechanisms to represent 
certain amount of context 
information and 
sophisticated 
relationships, yet its 
infrastructure is not as 
clear as expected in the 
application scenario. 
The context model is 
lacking of mechanism to 
represent large amount of 
context information and 
sophisticated 
relationships, and/or its 
infrastructure is not clear 
at all, according to the 
expectations of the 
application scenario.  
Trustiness The context model is 
designed with 
mechanisms to assure all 
aspects of the security 
requirements from the 
application scenario.  
The context model is 
designed with 
mechanisms to assure 
some of the aspects of 
the security requirements 
from the application 
scenario. 
The context model is 
lacking of mechanisms to 
assure security 
requirements from the 
application scenario. 
Table 21. Regulations on the application of quality evaluation metrics of security-oriented context models 
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As shown in Table 21, although the criteria in the evaluation metrics are not specific regarding 
to the nature of the application scenario, the application of such metrics nevertheless needs to refer to 
its expectations. To demonstrate how to apply the metrics to assess the quality of context models, they 
are further utilised on the two context models described in Chapter 4 and 5. 
Table 22 on page 104 shows the evaluation results for the system level security-oriented 
context model derived in the instantiation in Chapter 4. The context model uses a hierarchical 
structure to process different types of context entities that come on different levels of granularities, 
thus heterogeneity is considered as sufficiently addressed. As the form of security policies is used in the 
hierarchical structure, enabling the convenient expression of relationships between different context 
entities, the criterion regarding relationships is also sufficiently met. Within the scope of the context 
model, there is no strictly enforced formalism for the context entities, therefore the lack of information 
can be tolerated to a certain degree. Additionally, the existence of conflict handling mechanisms is 
able to resolve the conflicts triggered by the potential erroneous information. Therefore, it is also 
considered that imperfection is sufficiently addressed. As the carrier of context information, security 
policies are derived from higher level to lower level. This progress of interpretation of context 
information contributes to the ability of reasoning of the context model. The assurance of provenance is 
realised by the derivation of security policies for certain specialised functions in the context model, e.g. 
“provenance info copy and enrichment” in the ingest functional entity, “provenance info maintenance” 
in the archival storage functional entity, as well as “provenance info update” in the access functional 
entity (see subsection 4.1.1). The sufficient addressing of evolvability is reflected by the ability of the 
context model to handle evolving context entities, and this is the task of the control block of the 
developed security framework (see subsection 4.1.4): when the context changes, new security policies 
will be derived accordingly to replace obsolete ones. Automatability is not within the main focus of the 
context model. Despite the processing of archived data objects is designed to be automatic, human 
agents are still heavily involved in various roles, e.g. administrators, auditors, or content managers. 
Despite the fact that they are needed, there is not further investigation conducted on e.g. the potential 
security risk brought by such involvement. Therefore, this criterion is only partially addressed. As the 
whole context model is developed to cover the raw context in the form of use-cases and possess the 
ability to evolve in case of newly emerged context, it is assumed that the completeness of coverage is 
sufficiently addressed. With the large amount of security policies representing complicated 
relationships both within and in between the functional entities, the complexity of the context model is 
considered as high. However, as the boundaries between different hierarchies and the reasoning for 
the derivation of lower level security policies from higher level ones is well formulated, the clarity of 
the model is also high. Therefore, the criterion of complexity and clarity is sufficiently addressed, 
yielding satisfactory usability. The last criterion trustiness is also sufficiently addressed, as security is 
the most essential focus of the development of the context model in the first place: the security 
requirements in all five aspects are considered at first during the context extraction from the use-cases, 
then in the derivation of security relevant functional entities and their functions, subsequently 
throughout the development of security policies on different levels, and at last the construction of the 
final security framework. 
Criteria  Assessments 
Heterogeneity Sufficiently addressed 
Relationships Sufficiently addressed 
Imperfection Sufficiently addressed 
6 Modelling security with context awareness 
 
 104 
Reasoning Sufficiently addressed 
Provenance Sufficiently addressed 
Evolvability Sufficiently addressed 
Automatability Partially addressed 
Completeness Sufficiently addressed 
Complexity and clarity Sufficiently addressed 
Trustiness Sufficiently addressed 
Table 22. The application of the evaluation metrics on the system-level security-oriented context model for 
digital long-term preservation described in Chapter 4 
Table 23 on page 105 summarises the evaluation results for the data level security-oriented 
context model derived in the instantiation in Chapter 5. The context model is designed to process 
various types of context entities that emerge in different phases in the data processing (see the 
summaries in section 5.4). However, as the processed data object is restricted to certain format (i.e. the 
fingerprint image acquired with CWL sensor), its ability of handling the heterogeneity of the data 
objects is to some degree compromised. Within the scope of the context model, the relationships 
between various context entities are fully analysed and eventually reflected by the developed 
processing procedures (see section 5.1), thus this criterion is sufficiently addressed. The criterion of 
imperfection is partially addressed, as the context model has considered the context that could 
influence the quality of the data object and handled some of these influential factors, yet the 
overlapping behaviour of the processed fingerprint sample still exists as the main cause of separation 
failure. The criterion of reasoning is sufficiently reflected by the progress of context derivation, i.e. 
secondary context from primary context, and processing context from acquisition context, and also by 
how the specific operations are derived from the interpretation of the derived context. Provenance is 
partially addressed by the context model in two aspects: a) It is one of the primary objectives of the 
forensic approach yielded by context model, as the successful separation results are expected to be 
subject to follow-up authentication/identification procedures to confirm/identify the source of the 
fingerprints. b) On a finer level of granularity, each single processing step and its input and output are 
clarified (see Table 14 on page 55) together with the context histories, so the whole separation process 
is deterministic and described with enough details to be reproduced on the same type of data objects. 
However, the current approach saves no copies of them as back-ups and applies no audit trail on the 
processing procedures. The evolvability of the context model is addressed by the self-adjustability it 
contributes to the resulting separation approach, e.g. the self-adjustable parameter setting according to 
the context of input data (see subsection 5.1.2). However, as all the context entities collected and 
analysed is referred to only fingerprint samples acquired by CWL sensor, the approach shows a 
limited evolvability to other data sources. Regarding automatability, the context model is designed for 
an automatic separation approach with an appropriate degree of human intervention from forensic 
specialists (e.g. the assignment of fingerprint masks, adjustment of the parameters, etc.), thus this 
criterion is partially addressed. The completeness of the context model is addressed by the 
contextualisation of both the acquisition and processing environment (see subsection 5.1.1), which is 
considered as sufficient here, as it covers not only the context directly relevant in the discussed 
scenario, but also alternatives in the state of the art. Consisting of four types of context entities with 
various forms of expression, the complexity of the context model is considered as high. However, as the 
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reasoning from one type of context to another is clearly explained and demonstrated, the clarity of the 
model is also considered as high. Therefore, it can be assumed that the context model achieves high 
usability. The trustiness of a forensic approach can be generally assessed regarding to its Daubert 
compliance: comparing to the state-of-the-art approaches, the introduction of context awareness 
makes its contribution to the admissibility of the approach. Regarding the required non-repudiation, the 
context model provides a systematic method to reveal explicitly all the influential factors on the 
processed potential evidence piece from both the acquisition and the follow-up processing, and this at 
the same time assures integrity. However, the investigation regarding the known error rate is still to 
conduct, due to the relatively small sample place. Therefore, the criterion of trustiness is considered as 
partially addressed. 
Criteria  Assessments 
Heterogeneity Partially addressed 
Relationships Sufficiently addressed 
Imperfection Partially addressed 
Reasoning Sufficiently addressed 
Provenance Partially addressed 
Evolvability Partially addressed 
Automatability Partially addressed 
Completeness Sufficiently addressed 
Complexity and clarity Sufficiently addressed 
Trustiness Partially addressed 
Table 23. The application of the evaluation metrics on the data-level security-oriented context model for 
digital dactyloscopy described in Chapter 5 
6.1.2 Evaluation of the model’s performance 
With the evaluation metrics derived and demonstrated in subsection 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, it can be 
established that if a context model should be considered as a “good” one. However, without further 
evaluation which takes into consideration the actual situation of the application scenario, it would be 
preconceived to conclude that the “good” context model would at the same time be a “well-
performing” one. Therefore, it is also necessary to assess the performance of the context model, i.e. 
how well the application of the context model functions in its application scenario, so the achieved 
improvement by introducing the context awareness can be evaluated according to the specific 
requirements of the scenario. Therefore, unlike the evaluation depicted in the last two sections, the one 
discussed here focuses on the outcome of the application of context modelling, i.e. data processing 
system/proceduress, of which the corresponding evaluation methods have been in fact widely 
developed and applied, as summarised in the state of the art (see section 2.4.2 and 2.5.2). Similar 
evaluation has also been conducted on the instantiations derived in previous chapters: in section 4.3, 
the assessment of the performance of the context model for secure long-term preservation is 
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conducted subjectively with regard to a series criteria assembled together working as a checklist, 
whereas in section 5.2 and 5.3 objective and subjective evaluations are respectively performed to 
reveal the performance of the context model for a overlapped latent fingerprint separation approach 
with regard to the error rates in its processing results and it security coverage. As reflected by these 
two cases, the nature of the application scenarios of security-oriented context modelling varies 
dramatically, so the suitable assessing means should also vary accordingly.  
Therefore, instead of presenting universally applicable general metrics (which in this case do 
not exist), this section summarises some basic principles for the development of metrics to evaluate 
the performance of security-oriented context models:  
 The metrics must be scenario-specific, i.e. the metrics need to be derived based on the 
specific requirements from the application scenario of the context model. For example, in 
section 4.3, the selected part of TRAC that used as the evaluation metrics reflects the 
expectations from the scenario of digital long-term preservation. 
 The metrics must be able to reveal the security compliance. Different from the general 
criteria of trustiness derived in section 6.1.1, the scenario-specific metrics should focus on 
if the particular data object is processed to meet its expected security requirement in the 
scenario. For example, section 5.2 conducts an evaluation that assesses the integrity of the 
separation results with regard to its expected quality as potential evidence. 
 The metrics must come with understandable expression, especially for those who do not 
develop them. It is reasonable to assume that in most cases the developer of the evaluation 
metrics is not the one who applies them. Therefore, the metrics need to be presented in a 
way that can be relatively easy to understand and utilise. This ensures not only the 
correctness of the evaluation, but also its reproducibility by third parties if necessary. For 
example, the subjective assessment in section 4.3 employs the metrics consisting of 
evaluation criteria expressed in natural language, which eases the understanding and 
application of the criteria. 
 Besides subjective assessment, the metrics should also consider employing objective 
indicators, if applicable. Objective indicator has its advantage as it shows the benefit of 
introducing context modelling in a more quantifiable way. For example, section 5.2 
applies EER as such indicator to show the improvement brought by context modelling. 
The following table summarises the performance assessments conducted on the two context 
models derived in Chapter 4 and 5 (see section 4.3, 5.2, and 5.3): they are respectively analysed with 
regard to the above four principles, clarifying if and how the principles are addressed. 
Principles 
Assessment on the context model for 
digital long-term preservation 
Assessment on the context model for 
separating overlapped latent fingerprints 
Principle 
addressed 
or not? 
Reasoning 
Principle 
addressed 
or not? 
Reasoning 
Scenario-specific Addressed The applied assessment 
framework represents the 
expectations of the 
application scenario of 
digital long-term archiving. 
Addressed The subjective assessment is based 
on the security rules that describe 
the specific forensic scenario, and 
the objective assessment is based 
on the investigation of error rates, 
which directly reflect the reliability 
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of forensic approaches. 
Security 
compliance 
Addressed The selected and applied 
assessing criteria from the 
assessment framework all 
reflect various security 
aspects. 
Addressed Both subjective and objective 
assessments reflect the 
requirements regarding various 
security aspects from the 
application scenario (e.g. Daubert 
criteria). 
Understandable 
expression 
Addressed The assessing criteria are 
described in natural 
language. 
Addressed The security rules that the 
subjective assessment is based on 
are described in natural language, 
while the methods of applying the 
objective assessment is also 
explicitly described (see subsection 
5.2.1 and 5.2.2) 
Objective 
indicators 
Not 
addressed 
Only subjective assessment 
is applied at this stage. 
Addressed Error rate is used as the objective 
indicator in the assessment. 
Table 24 Summary of the performance assessments of the two context models developed in this dissertation 
regarding the four principles 
To sum up, the development of the scenario-specific evaluation metrics is of little difference 
with those already existing in academia and industry for data processing systems or procedures. 
Nevertheless, the above summarised principles shall be fulfilled, to assess what is brought to the 
scenario by the introduction of the context awareness.  
6.2 A GENERALISED MODELLING METHODOLOGY TOWARDS CONTEXT 
AWARENESS 
Till now, this dissertation has developed a theoretical framework of security-oriented context 
modelling, applied the framework in two selected application scenarios that cover respectively the 
system and data level, and discussed the evaluation of the quality as well as the performance of the 
resulting context models. However, it should be noted that despite that it has already been mentioned 
that context modelling tends to be an iterative rather than one-time process due to the fact that the 
context evolves, this is not specifically addressed by the previous chapters, as they rather focus on 
addressing the context from a relatively static status of a potentially dynamic scenario. In other words, 
the focus has been how one version of a context model should be developed, regarding the current 
status of the context from the application scenario, despite that the model possesses the potential to 
evolve to future versions (here version as part of the descriptive scheme presented in section 3.3). 
Therefore, in this section, a general methodology is further developed for the security-oriented context 
modelling, summarising the previous chapters and emphasising the iterative nature of the modelling 
process. 
Extending the descriptive scheme of security-oriented context model introduced in section 3.3, 
the general methodology is proposed here as Figure 32 on page 108 illustrates. As the figure shows, 
the identifier links the prospective application scenario to the model, the version indicates the status of 
the model in its iteration of modelling process, the two types of evaluation metrics both reflect the 
application scenario in different ways as depicted in last section, and the security-oriented context model 
itself is the output of modelling process either on system or data models. 
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The security-oriented context modelling starts with context collection, where relevant 
information is collected from the application scenario. On the system level, such information 
addresses the question “what are expected for the data processing system to be developed to achieve?” 
As for the data level, it focuses on the question “what are expected to happen on the data during its 
acquisition and processing?” The thorough coverage and correctness of the collected information 
regarding the requirements from the application scenario, especially the security-related ones, is vital 
for the context model to be developed. As the context collected in this step usually contains a large 
amount of information, a follow-up step is context interpretation, which aims to the categorisation and 
formalisation of the context. On the system level, this is achieved by the gradual derivation of security 
policies with various levels of granularities corresponding to their roles in a policy hierarchy, so the 
context entities (including. corresponding system component, human agent, actions, etc.) are clarified 
and formalised, as described in section 4.1. On the data level, this is conducted first in the acquisition 
environment by specifying its impact on the data object (i.e. deriving secondary acquisition context 
from the primary one), and then in the processing environment by analysing the introduced impact in 
this environment, developing mechanisms to address it, and forming specific data processing 
operations (i.e. deriving secondary processing context from the primary one), as described in section 
5.1.  
 
Figure 32. General methodology to introduce context awareness into modelling process 
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Afterwards, the clarified security context can directly leads to model construction and application, 
resulting in context models being applied in the designated application scenario. On the system level, 
the constructed model yields a data processing system that enforces its security rules (see section 4.1 
and 4.2), while on the data level a series of data processing procedures that meet expectations, 
typically described by security rules (see section 5.1). Therefore, the security rules connect the system 
and data levels by serving as different roles: on the system level, it is one of the outcomes of the 
modelling process, while on the data level it contributes to the description of processing environment. 
After a security-oriented context model is constructed, it enters model evaluation, where it needs to be 
assessed in two aspects: its quality needs to be assessed using the universally applicable scenario-
unspecific metrics (see subsections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2), and its performance using scenario-specific metrics 
(subsection 6.1.3), which should be derived based on the context from the application scenario (see 
section 4.3 and 5.3). The result of the assessment is then fed back to the start of the modelling process 
as new context, leading to necessary modification on the context model.  
The iterative nature of the proposed security-oriented context modelling process is clearly 
illustrated in Figure 32 (see the two bold dashed arrows respectively in purple and orange). In case of 
an evolving application scenario, the corresponding security-oriented context modelling consists of 
two iterative processes, instead of being static: First, as the purple dashed arrow shows, when the 
application scenario changes, the evaluation on the context model correspondingly changes 
accordingly, i.e. this can lead to the necessary change of the scenario-specific metrics themselves as 
well as the assessment results from them, and despite that scenario-unspecific metrics stay the same, 
their assessment results can also vary. Second, as the orange one shows, by regularly applying the 
evolving evaluation metrics, the current version of the context model is assessed for its quality and 
performance, and new context is meanwhile generated according to the application scenario, so a new 
version of the context model can therefore be correspondingly developed. Figure 33 further illustrates 
how these two iterative processes interplay over time and space. 
 
Figure 33. The two iterative processes within security-oriented context modelling 
As shown in the figure, the evolvement of the context model progresses simultaneously with 
its evaluation, as the context contributed by the application scenario evolves over time and space. The 
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practice its sophistication should be directly related to how often it is expected to be updated, which 
further depends on the nature of the application scenario. Some application scenario can be relatively 
static, e.g. forensic application scenario, as its security protocols and requirements tend to change only 
over months or even years, during which they remain consistent in large geographical areas (e.g. 
always within the same country). In this case, the resulting context model can also maintain the same 
status for relatively longer period of time, so the form of its version can also be relatively simple. Some 
other application scenario can however be relatively dynamic, e.g. digital long-term archiving, as new 
requirements can emerge over days, if not hours, for e.g. archiving new types of data, including new 
roles of human agents, etc., and they can also be different geographically. In this case, the update of 
the context model can be expected to be quite frequent, and its form of version is expected to be 
sophisticated enough to comprise time and space information. At last, as also shown in the figure, for 
the sake of non-repudiation over time and space, an audit trail also needs to be constructed 
accompanying the evolvement of the context model and its evaluation, so the specific changes made 
during both processes can be documented and revisited if needed. 
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7 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, ONGOING AND FUTURE WORK 
In this chapter, section 7.1 summarises the whole dissertation and give conclusions, section 7.2 
suggests several research paths towards the future work. 
7.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Motivated by the demand for the solution to the security compromise caused by applying modelling 
with little context awareness, this dissertation aims at closing the identified research gaps in the 
current study of context modelling: the state-of-the-art theories are scattered in their foci thus hard to 
compare or reproduce, the applications are limited in certain scenarios, and there is little focus on 
security. It proposes a theoretical framework of security-oriented context modelling with a series of 
formalised concepts, applies the framework on both system and data levels in the selected application 
scenarios of digital long-term preservation and digital dactyloscopy, regulates the evaluation of both 
quality and performance of security-oriented context models, and eventually induces a general 
methodology which describes the security-oriented context modelling process and identifies its nature 
of being iterative. 
Regarding the research challenges raised at the beginning of this dissertation in section 1.1, 
this dissertation addresses them in the following ways: 
1) “How to collect and organise useful information that constitutes security related context?” The 
nature of the application scenario of the resulting model decides what and how 
information from the scenario should be handled in contribution to the context, following 
the proposed conception of security-oriented context modelling. In case of a system level 
scenario where a data processing system is expected, context information describes the 
security-related expectations for the system (e.g. in the form of use-cases), which need to 
be formalised and interpreted to reveal system infrastructure and functionalities. In case 
of a data level scenario where a series of data processing procedures is expected, context 
information describe the influential factors on the data objects from both the acquisition 
and processing environments, and needs to be interpreted to derive a series of 
corresponding processing steps to meet the security expectations.  
2) “What is the general context modelling methodology that can be used to address various security 
issues in sophisticated data processing systems?” On both system and data levels, the security-
oriented context modelling process consists of steps including context identification and 
collection, context interpretation, model construction and application, and model 
evaluation. More importantly, such modelling process is designed to be iterative, 
addressing the evolving security context from the changing application scenario, which 
further results in an evolving evaluation progress. 
3) “How to evaluate the context models, especially from the security point of view?” The context 
models should be evaluated with regard to their qualities and performances using 
different metrics. As for the quality, subjective assessment should be conducted using the 
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presented scenario-unspecific criteria, while for the performance scenario-specific metrics 
should be designed for subjective and/or objective assessments. 
Therefore, summarising the contributions that this dissertation has made, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
1) Context modelling is able to serve as an effective solution for the security assurance in 
various application scenarios. A sound theory has been formed in this dissertation. It 
conforms with the state-of-the-art theories on context modelling, yet for the first time it 
takes security requirements into systematic consideration and gives formalised 
descriptions of all concepts related to security context, providing clear guidance and 
regulation for its application. Furthermore, the correctness and applicability have been 
established by the two instantiations in two different application scenarios, where context 
models are developed, yielding a security framework for long-term archiving system and 
a separation approach of overlapped latent fingerprints for forensic dactyloscopy, both 
have gained improvement regarding their security assurance, in contrast to their state-of-
the-art achievements. 
2) The competence of a context model should be estimated by assessing it using both 
scenario-unspecific and scenario-specific evaluation metrics. As mentioned previously, 
the competence of a context model is reflected by its quality, i.e. how well its design is 
able to address the scenario-unspecific criteria, and its performance, i.e. how well the data 
processing system/procedures that it yields perform regarding the expectations from the 
application scenario. 
3) A generalised modelling process can be followed for the introduction of context 
awareness. As a first answer to the general problem identified at the beginning of this 
dissertation, the presented generalised modelling methodology summaries the modelling 
steps, which can be further specified according to the nature of the application scenario.  
4) In practice, the security-oriented context modelling is an iterative process. With 
evolving application scenarios, the security-oriented context modelling is an iterative 
process, as not only the context model evolves with the changing context from the 
application scenario, it evaluation also evolves correspondingly.  
5) The proposed security framework poses a potential solution for its application scenario 
of digital long-term archiving. Comparing to stat-of-the-art achievements which lack 
effective solution for security issues, it provides a prototype based on which a secure 
digital long-term archive can be constructed, to handle large amounts of data with more 
reasonable storage solution, effectively manage and utilise large number of security 
policies for security requirements, and possess proper mechanism to derive and process 
evolving context. Therefore, it can be used to avoid similar incidents like NASA’s “digital 
dark age” from happening, and also to serve as the foundation of a digital evidence 
archive, which would have solved the problems that DEA had to face (see Chapter 1). 
6) The proposed overlapped latent fingerprint separation approach achieves 
improvements in various aspects regarding its application scenario of digital 
dactyloscopy. It takes into consideration the security requirements from the forensic 
scenario by introducing context awareness into the entire progress of its development. 
The reported error rate shows an obvious improvement on the high-resolution samples 
acquired by CWL sensor, and its applicability is also further extended to the 
conventionally acquired samples. 
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7.2 FUTURE WORK 
There is only so much that can be addressed in one dissertation. Therefore, this section discusses the 
future work that should be considered conducting. 
Regarding the modelling theory introducing context-awareness for security as well as its 
application in general, the following aspects can be explored in the future: 
 In the current modelling theory, the security context is expressed to a large extend by 
using natural language, which has its advantage regarding the understandability of the 
resulting model. However, it can at the same time cause complications, if the model is 
expected to employ automatic mechanism to process the context. Therefore, it is necessary 
to explore a further formalised expression for the security context, to ease such burden. 
This could be essential in case of large amount of context. 
 The applicability of the presented modelling theory can be further justified. In this 
dissertation, the system and data level modelling is conducted respectively in two 
different application scenarios, mainly due to the time limit of the SHAMAN project that 
restrains the modelling work from proceeding further into the data level. Therefore, it is 
necessary to seek for the opportunity to apply the presented modelling theory on both 
system and data levels in one application scenario, resulting in a complete data processing 
system with implementations of its functionalities with data procedures. As a matter of 
fact, such work has already been planned and is currently undergoing within the scope of 
research project DigiDak+1, where a forensic processing infrastructure is planned to be 
developed to manage and realise the de-personalisation of the biometric data being 
processed, so the confidentiality/privacy of such data can be further enhanced in a general 
forensic scenario. 
For the extension of the security framework derived in this dissertation for digital long-term 
archiving, the future work can be explored in the following aspects: 
 The current security framework focuses on the contextualisation in the archiving module, 
thus it ensures the security requirements only when the digital data is being archived. 
However, no security assurance has been integrated into the progress before it enters or 
after it leaves the archive. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out the contextualisation to 
introduce further security assurance to the complete information lifecycle as described by 
the ILM. 
 As mentioned earlier, the contextualisation described in this dissertation covers only the 
system level, so the resulting secure framework still needs to be further implemented on 
the data level. Therefore, the next step of work should be the derivation of a processing 
environment described by the security rules for each single functional entity, and apply 
data level context modelling to develop specific processing procedures of the IPs. 
 The developed security framework poses a solution for digital evidence archiving. 
Therefore, in the future it is also necessary to verify the use cases used in the development 
with regard to corresponding legal regulations and protocols. As such regulations and 
protocols tend to evolve over time, new context should be introduced into the modelling 
process, resulting updates to the security framework. 
                                                        
1 Funded in part by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Science (BMBF) through the research program 
under the contract no. FKZ: 13N10816. 
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As for the improvement of the developed separation approach of overlapped latent 
fingerprint, the following directions should be considered for the planning of future work: 
 As a further pursuit regarding the integrity of the potential evidence, the local reliability 
of the separation results should be investigated. As the separation is conducted in a block-
wise way, the reliability of the separation result in each of the blocks should be estimated 
(e.g. based on the compatibility probability value computed in the relaxation labelling 
step) and visualised, so the forensic expert can use such estimation as a reference to decide 
which part of the separated fingerprint, if not all of it, can be considered as reliable 
enough to contribute to the evidence chain. 
 As a forensic approach needs to eventually be subject to the testing with corresponding 
standards, e.g. Daubert criteria, future work should also be planned for the separation 
approach regarding its Daubert compliance. To approach to a more statistically significant 
error rate, the objective assessment needs be extended. The test set should be expanded 
with larger number of latent fingerprint samples, and the diversity of the involved 
substrate types should also be increased. Alternative fingerprint matching software (e.g. 
VeriFinger 6.2 SDK mentioned in the state of the art) can also be considered, for the sake 
of better comparability of the testing results with those reported in the state-of-the-art 
literature. Furthermore, the current objective evaluation is established in conformity with 
the forensic scenario, i.e. it establishes the reliability of the separation results only based 
on the examination of the minutiae points (which is referred to as the second level of 
detail of fingerprint features), similar to what forensic experts do. However, in addition to 
such method, it is also necessary to assess the integrity of the separation results with 
regard to the first level of detail of fingerprint features, i.e. investigate on the global flow 
of resulting friction ridges. This could be done subjectively, by involving trained eyes, 
and/or using objective indicator that is automatically computed. 
 The subjective assessment presented in this dissertation is conducted by the author from 
the point of view of the developer of the approach. However, as already mentioned earlier, 
such assessment makes better sense if conduced in a form of joint work of both the 
developer and the prospective user of the approach. Therefore, there is this gap to be 
closed in the future work: the approach needs to be presented in an understandable way, 
not only for the academia (e.g. as presented using series of formulas in [QSZ+2014]), but 
also for the forensic experts. As such the approach can be assessed more thoroughly, 
regarding the needs in the field of the forensic investigation, and ultimately be utilised 
there. 
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APPENDIX A 
This appendix comprises all the security-related use-cases provided by SHAMAN project partners, 
and these use-cases contribute to the global context for the modelling. 
Use Case No. Use Case Description Roles Objects Rights 
UC-DOF1-510b Registration of the Content 
Requester 
Access System certification list read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-620b Adhering access rights to digital 
objects 
Access System archived object 
and its metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-
630b/UC-DOF3-
531b 
Performing the search and 
returning corresponding digital 
objects 
Access System archived object read 
UC-DOF1-
630c/UC-DOF1-
640/UC-DOF1-
670b/UC-DOF1-
680b/UC-DOF3-
560b 
Providing access to digital 
objects 
Access System archived object read 
UC-DOF1-631b Performing the search and 
returning corresponding 
metadata entries 
Access System metadata of 
archived object, 
search index 
read 
UC-DOF1-632b Performing the full-text search 
and returning corresponding 
digital objects 
Access System archived object, 
search index 
read 
UC-DOF3-530b Execution of query and 
displaying the metadata 
Access System metadata of 
archived object 
read 
UC-DOF3-561b Dissemination of the source 
code 
Access System archived object read 
UC-DOF3-562b Dissemination of the publication Access System archived object read 
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UC-DOF3-563b Dissemination of the set of raw 
data 
Access System non-archived 
object 
read 
UC-DOF3-564b Dissemination of the data 
product 
Access System archived object read 
UC-DOF3-565b Execution of query and 
dissemination of the resulting 
data product 
Access System archived object read 
UC-DOF3-566b Computation of the data 
product out of the raw data and 
dissemination afterwards 
Access System non-archived 
object 
read 
UC-DOF3-567b Dissemination of the digital 
object in selected representation 
Access System archived object read 
UC-DOF3-570b Performing automatic format 
migration 
Access System archived object 
and its metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-340b Manual error resolving Administrator non-archived 
object and its 
metadata 
read 
UC-DOF1-410 System administration Administrator archived objects 
and its metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-441b Dealing with the objects failed in 
the consistency check 
Administrator archived object read 
UC-DOF1-460 Execution of preservation 
measure 
Administrator archived objects 
and its metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF3-310 Prepare data for ingestion Administrator archived object 
and its metadata 
read 
UC-DOF3-330 Correction of errors during 
ingesting 
Administrator archived object 
and its metadata 
read 
UC-DOF3-410 Move data between storage 
levels 
Administrator archived objects 
and its metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF3-420 Refreshment of media Administrator archived object 
and its metadata 
read 
UC-DOF3-440 Recovery of the data after Administrator archived object read 
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disaster and its metadata 
UC-DOF3-450b Identification of digital objects 
stored in an obsolete format 
Administrator metadata of 
archived object 
read 
UC-DOF3-470b Implementation of updating 
usage rights and dissemination 
restrictions 
Administrator certification list read, 
write 
UC-DOF3-580 Registration of the user Administrator certification list read, 
write 
UC-DOF3-540 Move selected data to fast 
access location 
Administrator archived object 
and its metadata 
read 
UC-DOF3-590 Audit the archive Auditor audit-trail read 
UCE2 Verification of the archival 
system, the archived objects and 
their metadata 
Auditor archived objects 
and its metadata 
read 
UC-DOF1-320 Import of the data into the 
system and indexing 
Collection 
Manager 
non-archived 
object and its 
metadata/index 
read/ 
write 
UC-DOF1-322 Separation of digital objects 
from delivery carrier media 
Collection 
Manager 
non-archived 
object 
read 
UC-DOF1-323 Creation of a catalogue entry 
from a new object 
Collection 
Manager 
catalogue create 
UC-DOF1-330 Generation and consignment of 
SIPs to the long-term archival 
system 
Collection 
Manager 
non-archived 
object and its 
metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-340a Monitoring the import and 
ingest process 
Collection 
Manager 
non-archived 
objects and its 
metadata 
read 
UC-DOF1-440 Collection management Collection 
Manager 
archived objects 
and its metadata 
read, 
write, 
delete 
UC-DOF1-441a Consistency check to avoid 
corruption of the objects 
Collection 
Manager 
archived object 
and its metadata 
read 
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UC-DOF1-442 Deleting objects from the long-
term archive 
Collection 
Manager 
archived object 
and its metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-443 Changing objects using update 
instead of replacement 
Collection 
Manager 
archived object 
and its metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-470 Import and export of metadata Collection 
Manager 
metadata of 
archived object 
read 
UC-DOF1-620a Access rights management Collection 
Manager 
certification list read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-680a Access to long-term archive to 
retrieve digital objects and 
metadata 
Collection 
Manager 
archived object 
and its metadata 
read 
UC-DOF3-460 Update metadata Collection 
Manager 
metadata of 
archived object 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF3-571b Performing manual format 
migration 
Collection 
Manager 
archived object 
and its metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-310 Delivery of new material for 
collection 
Content 
Provider 
non-archived 
object and its 
metadata 
read 
UC-DOF1-311 Grant of usage rights for 
individual digital objects 
Content 
Provider 
certification list write 
UC-DOF1-312 Assignment of the object as a 
subsequent version of a previous 
one 
Content 
Provider 
metadata of non-
archived object 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-641a Providing access to a digital 
object 
Content 
Provider 
certification list create 
UC-DOF1-650 Collection sharing Content 
Provider 
certification list write 
UC-DOF1-660 Access to own original data Content 
Provider 
non-archived 
object and its 
metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-670a Access to changed version of 
own data 
Content 
Provider 
archived object 
and its metadata 
read, 
write 
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UC-DOF3-130a Providing necessary information Content 
Provider 
non-archived 
object and its 
metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF3-320a Ingestion of data and metadata 
into the archive 
Content 
Provider 
non-archived 
object and its 
metadata 
read 
UC-DOF3-470a Requesting to update rights and 
dissemination restrictions 
Content 
Provider 
system metadata read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-510a Providing registration 
information  
Content 
Requester 
certification list write 
UC-DOF1-
630a/UC-DOF3-
531a 
Formulating a query to start a 
search for digital objects 
Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF1-631a Formulating a query to start a 
search for metadata catalogue 
Content 
Requester 
catalogue read 
UC-DOF1-632a Formulating a query to start a 
full-text search 
Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF1-641b Access to digital object from 
content provider 
Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF1-642 Access to an alternative 
representation of a selected 
digital object 
Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF3-510 Access to metadata of the digital 
objects 
Content 
Requester 
metadata of 
archived object 
read 
UC-DOF3-520 Browse the metadata catalogue Content 
Requester 
catalogue read 
UC-DOF3-530a Query for metadata Content 
Requester 
metadata of 
archived object 
read 
UC-DOF3-550 Access to metadata via OAI-
PMH for harvesting system 
Content 
Requester 
metadata of 
archived object 
read 
UC-DOF3-560a Selection of a specific digital 
object 
Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
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UC-DOF3-561a Selection of a specific source 
code 
Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF3-562a Selection of a specific 
publication 
Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF3-563a Selection of a set of raw data Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF3-564a Selection of a specific data 
product 
Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF3-565a Query for data Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF3-566a Selection of a data product Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF3-567a Selection of a digital object and 
an alternative representation 
Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF3-
570a/UC-DOF3-
571a 
Selection of a digital object and 
its representation 
Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
WP1-TDUC012 Viewing data in obsolete formats Content 
Requester 
archived object read 
UC-DOF1-
211b/UC-DOF3-
210b 
Registration of the content 
provider 
Import System certification list read, 
write 
UC-DOF1-315 Harvesting of publications Import System non-archived 
object and its 
metadata 
read, 
write 
UC-DOF3-320b Verification of the ingestion and 
Backup 
Import System archived objects 
and its metadata 
read 
WP1-TDUC002 Indexing of ingested data Index System archived object 
and its 
metadata/index 
read/ 
write 
WP1-TDUC003 Re-index Data Index System archived object 
and its 
read/ 
write 
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metadata/index 
UC-DOF3-450a Identification of an obsolete 
format 
Preservation 
Manager 
metadata of 
archived object 
read 
UC-DOF1-450 Preservation planning for objects 
whose file formats are in danger 
of technical obsolescence 
Preservation 
Manager 
archived objects 
and its metadata 
read 
UC-DOF3-461 Addition of erratum Preservation 
Manager 
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APPENDIX B 
This appendix enumerates the audit and certification criteria from TRAC (Trustworthy Repositories 
Audit & Certification: Criteria and Checklist) [TRAC2007]. 
A Organisational infrastructure 
A1 Governance & organizational viability 
A1.1 Repository has a mission statement that reflects a commitment to the long-term retention of, 
management of, and access to digital information. 
A1.2 Repository has an appropriate, formal succession plan, contingency plans, and/or escrow 
arrangements in place in case the repository ceases to operate or the governing or funding 
institution substantially changes its scope. 
A2 Organizational structure & staffing 
A2.1 Repository has identified and established the duties that it needs to perform and has appointed 
staff with adequate skills and experience to fulfil these duties. 
A2.2 Repository has the appropriate number of staff to support all functions and services. 
A2.3 Repository has an active professional development program in place that provides staff with skills 
and expertise development opportunities. 
A3 Procedural accountability & policy framework 
A3.1 Repository has defined its designated community(ies) and associated knowledge base(s) and has 
publicly accessible definitions and policies in place to dictate how its preservation service 
requirements will be met. 
A3.2 Repository has procedures and policies in place, and mechanisms for their review, update, and 
development as the repository grows and as technology and community practice evolve. 
A3.3 Repository maintains written policies that specify the nature of any legal permissions required to 
preserve digital content over time, and repository can demonstrate that these permissions have 
been acquired when needed. 
A3.4 Repository is committed to formal, periodic review and assessment to ensure responsiveness to 
technological developments and evolving requirements. 
A3.5 Repository has policies and procedures to ensure that feedback from producers and users is 
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sought and addressed over time. 
A3.6 Repository has a documented history of the changes to its operations, procedures, software, and 
hardware that, where appropriate, is linked to relevant preservation strategies and describes 
potential effects on preserving digital content. 
A3.7 Repository commits to transparency and accountability in all actions supporting the operation 
and management of the repository, especially those that affect the preservation of digital content 
over time. 
A3.8 Repository commits to defining, collecting, tracking, and providing, on demand, its information 
integrity measurements. 
A3.9 Repository commits to a regular schedule of self-assessment and certification and, if certified, 
commits to notifying certifying bodies of operational changes that will change or nullify its 
certification status. 
A4 Financial sustainability 
A4.1 Repository has short- and long-term business planning processes in place to sustain the 
repository over time. 
A4.2 Repository has in place processes to review and adjust business plans at least annually. 
A4.3 Repository’s financial practices and procedures are transparent, compliant with relevant 
accounting standards and practices, and audited by third parties in accordance with territorial 
legal requirements. 
A4.4 Repository has ongoing commitment to analyse and report on risk, benefit, investment, and 
expenditure (including assets, licenses, and liabilities). 
A4.5 Repository commits to monitoring for and bridging gaps in funding. 
A5 Contracts, licenses, & liabilities 
A5.1 If repository manages, preserves, and/or provides access to digital materials on behalf of another 
organization, it has and maintains appropriate contracts or deposit agreements. 
A5.2 Repository contracts or deposit agreements must specify and transfer all necessary preservation 
rights, and those rights transferred must be documented. 
A5.3 Repository has specified all appropriate aspects of acquisition, maintenance, access, and 
withdrawal in written agreements with depositors and other relevant parties. 
A5.4 Repository tracks and manages intellectual property rights and restrictions on use of repository 
content as required by deposit agreement, contract, or license. 
A5.5 If repository ingests digital content with unclear ownership/rights, policies are in place to address 
liability and challenges to those rights. 
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B Digital Object Management 
B1 Ingest: acquisition of content 
B1.1 Repository identifies properties it will preserve for digital objects. 
B1.2 Repository clearly specifies the information that needs to be associated with digital material at the 
time of its deposit (i.e., SIP). 
B1.3 Repository has mechanisms to authenticate the source of all materials. 
B1.4 Repository’s ingest process verifies each submitted object (i.e., SIP) for completeness and 
correctness as specified in B1.2. 
B1.5 Repository obtains sufficient physical control over the digital objects to preserve them. 
B1.6 Repository provides producer/depositor with appropriate responses at predefined points during 
the ingest processes. 
B1.7 Repository can demonstrate when preservation responsibility is formally accepted for the 
contents of the submitted data objects (i.e., SIPs). 
B1.8 Repository has contemporaneous records of actions and administration processes that are 
relevant to preservation (Ingest: content acquisition). 
B2 Ingest: creation of the archivable package 
B2.1 Repository has an identifiable, written definition for each AIP or class of information preserved by 
the repository. 
B2.2 Repository has a definition of each AIP (or class) that is adequate to fit long-term preservation 
needs. 
B2.3 Repository has a description of how AIPs are constructed from SIPs. 
B2.4 Repository can demonstrate that all submitted objects (i.e., SIPs) are either accepted as whole or 
part of an eventual archival object (i.e., AIP), or otherwise disposed of in a recorded fashion. 
B2.5 Repository has and uses a naming convention that generates visible, persistent, unique identifiers 
for all archived objects (i.e., AIPs). 
B2.6 If unique identifiers are associated with SIPs before ingest, the repository preserves the identifiers 
in a way that maintains a persistent association with the resultant archived object (e.g., AIP). 
B2.7 Repository demonstrates that it has access to necessary tools and resources to establish 
authoritative semantic or technical context of the digital objects it contains (i.e., access to 
appropriate international Representation Information and format registries). 
B2.8 Repository records/registers Representation Information (including formats) ingested. 
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B2.9 Repository acquires preservation metadata (i.e., PDI) for its associated Content Information. 
B2.10 Repository has a documented process for testing understandability of the information content 
and bringing the information content up to the agreed level of understandability. 
B2.11 Repository verifies each AIP for completeness and correctness at the point it is generated. 
B2.12 Repository provides an independent mechanism for audit of the integrity of the repository 
collection/content. 
B2.13 Repository has contemporaneous records of actions and administration processes that are 
relevant to preservation (AIP creation). 
B3 Preservation planning 
B3.1 Repository has documented preservation strategies. 
B3.2 Repository has mechanisms in place for monitoring and notification when Representation 
Information (including formats) approaches obsolescence or is no longer viable. 
B3.3 Repository has mechanisms to change its preservation plans as a result of its monitoring activities. 
B3.4 Repository can provide evidence of the effectiveness of its preservation planning. 
B4 Archival storage & preservation/maintenance of AIPs 
B4.1 Repository employs documented preservation strategies. 
B4.2 Repository implements/responds to strategies for archival object (i.e., AIP) storage and migration. 
B4.3 Repository preserves the Content Information of archival objects (i.e., AIPs). 
B4.4 Repository actively monitors integrity of archival objects (i.e., AIPs). 
B4.5 Repository has contemporaneous records of actions and administration processes that are 
relevant to preservation (Archival Storage). 
B5 Information management 
B5.1 Repository articulates minimum metadata requirements to enable the designated community(ies) 
to discover and identify material of interest. 
B5.2 Repository captures or creates minimum descriptive metadata and ensures that it is associated 
with the archived object (i.e., AIP). 
B5.3 Repository can demonstrate that referential integrity is created between all archived objects (i.e., 
AIPs) and associated descriptive information. 
B5.4 Repository can demonstrate that referential integrity is maintained between all archived objects 
(i.e., AIPs) and associated descriptive information. 
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B6 Access management 
B6.1 Repository documents and communicates to its designated community(ies) what access and 
delivery options are available. 
B6.2 Repository has implemented a policy for recording all access actions (includes requests, orders 
etc.) that meet the requirements of the repository and information producers/depositors. 
B6.3 Repository ensures that agreements applicable to access conditions are adhered to. 
B6.4 Repository has documented and implemented access policies (authorization rules, authentication 
requirements) consistent with deposit agreements for stored objects. 
B6.5 Repository access management system fully implements access policy. 
B6.6 Repository logs all access management failures, and staff review inappropriate “access denial” 
incidents. 
B6.7 Repository can demonstrate that the process that generates the requested digital object(s) (i.e., 
DIP) is completed in relation to the request. 
B6.8 Repository can demonstrate that the process that generates the requested digital object(s) (i.e., 
DIP) is correct in relation to the request. 
B6.9 Repository demonstrates that all access requests result in a response of acceptance or rejection. 
B6.10 Repository enables the dissemination of authentic copies of the original or objects traceable to 
originals. 
C Technologies, Technical Infrastructure, & Security 
C1 System infrastructure 
C1.1 Repository functions on well-supported operating systems and other core infrastructural software. 
C1.2 Repository ensures that it has adequate hardware and software support for backup functionality 
sufficient for the repository’s services and for the data held, e.g., metadata associated with access 
controls, repository main content. 
C1.3 Repository manages the number and location of copies of all digital objects. 
C1.4 Repository has mechanisms in place to ensure any/multiple copies of digital objects are 
synchronized. 
C1.5 Repository has effective mechanisms to detect bit corruption or loss. 
C1.6 Repository reports to its administration all incidents of data corruption or loss, and steps taken to 
repair/replace corrupt or lost data. 
C1.7 Repository has defined processes for storage media and/or hardware change (e.g., refreshing, 
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migration). 
C1.8 Repository has a documented change management process that identifies changes to critical 
processes that potentially affect the repository’s ability to comply with its mandatory 
responsibilities. 
C1.9 Repository has a process for testing the effect of critical changes to the system. 
C1.10 Repository has a process to react to the availability of new software security updates based on a 
risk-benefit assessment. 
C2 Appropriate technologies 
C2.1 Repository has hardware technologies appropriate to the services it provides to its designated 
community(ies) and has procedures in place to receive and monitor notifications, and evaluate 
when hardware technology changes are needed. 
C2.2 Repository has software technologies appropriate to the services it provides to its designated 
community(ies) and has procedures in place to receive and monitor notifications, and evaluate 
when software technology changes are needed. 
C3 Security 
C3.1 Repository maintains a systematic analysis of such factors as data, systems, personnel, physical 
plant, and security needs. 
C3.2 Repository has implemented controls to adequately address each of the defined security needs. 
C3.3 Repository staff have delineated roles, responsibilities, and authorizations related to implementing 
changes within the system. 
C3.4 Repository has suitable written disaster preparedness and recovery plan(s), including at least one 
off-site backup of all preserved information together with an off-site copy of the recovery plan(s). 
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